CKCarl Kitchens

Carl Kitchens

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Carl Kitchens has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Impact of the WWI Agricultural Boom and Bust on Female Opportunity Cost and Fertility

    by Carl T Kitchens, Luke P Rodgers

    Using variation in crop prices induced by large swings in demand surrounding World War I, we examine the fertility response to crop revenue increases from 1910 to 1930. Our estimates indicate that agricultural price increases reduced fertility, explaining about 9% of the overall decline in fertility over the period. The effect persists years after the collapse of the war boom. Importantly, we show that fertility declines were concentrated in farm women and fertility declined along intensive and extensive margins. Combined, the pattern of estimates is consistent with agricultural women experiencing an increase in the opportunity cost of their time.


  • CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE, CRIME, AND POLICE INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984

    by Shawn Kantor, Carl T. Kitchens, Steven Pawlowski

    The 1984 federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA) included a provision that permitted local law enforcement agencies to acquire up to 80% of the proceeds derived from civil asset forfeitures obtained in joint operations with federal authorities. We investigate how this rule governing forfeited assets influenced crime and police incentives by taking advantage of pre‐existing differences in state‐level civil asset forfeiture law and the timing of the CCCA. We find that after the CCCA was enacted crime fell about 17% in places where the federal law allowed police to retain more of their seized assets than state law previously allowed. (JEL K42, K15, H76)


  • Open Access

    Do Tournaments With Superstars Encourage or Discourage Competition?

    by Michael Babington, Sebastian J. Goerg, Carl Kitchens

    To test and replicate the superstar effect reported by Brown, we empirically study contests where a single entrant has an exogenously higher probability of winning. Unlike the previous literature, we test for the presence of the superstar effect in several new contexts. Ultimately, we collect and explore data from four sources: men’s and women’s professional golf, and men’s and women’s professional alpine skiing. Empirically, we find little robust evidence of the superstar effect in any of our data sets. In our replication exercise, we approximate the findings of Brown; however, we cannot reject the null that the presence of a superstar has no impact on high ranked competitors. In our new settings, we cannot reject the null that superstars have no influence on the performances of highly ranked competitors.


  • “Crime” on the Field

    by Carl Kitchens, Matthew Philip Makofske, Le Wang

    Does a greater police presence cause crime rates to decrease? To answer this question, we circumvent common simultaneity and reverse causality issues by exploiting an experiment from college football. In 2013, the Big XII added an eighth referee to conference games only. Unique features of this experiment allow us to identify the causal effects of increased “police force” (officiating crew) size on observed “crime” (penalty) rates, and to distinguish between alternative mechanisms behind those effects. Overall, we find that the increased police presence causes an increase in the observed crime rate. This increase is largest in teams' first treated games, suggesting a substantial detection effect. However, the penalty rate decreases sharply in teams' second treated games, suggesting a large general deterrent effect. Under mild assumptions, results suggest that the general deterrent effect is partly due to players learning to avoid detection, but that the learning process involves errors over time.


  • The impact of award uncertainty on settlement negotiations

    by Eric Cardella, Carl Kitchens

    Legal disputes are often negotiated under the backdrop of an adjudicated award. While settlements are common, they are not universal. In this paper, we empirically explore how uncertainty in adjudicated awards impacts settlement negotiations. To do so, we develop an experimental design to test how increases in variance and positive skewness of the award distribution impact negotiations and settlement rates. We find increases in variance decrease settlement rates, while increases in skewness generally increases settlement rates. We also gather individual measures of risk aversion and prudence, and incorporate these measures into the analysis to test for heterogeneous treatment effects. Overall, our results suggest that highly variable adjudicated awards can contribute to the excess use of inefficient litigation, while more positively skewed awards can reduce the use of inefficient litigation.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Flip the Switch: The Impact of the Rural Electrification Administration 1935–1940

    by Carl Kitchens, Price Fishback

    To isolate the impact of access to electricity on local economies, we examine the impact of the Rural Electrification Administration low-interest loans in the 1930s. The REA provided loans to cooperatives to lay distribution lines to farms and aid in wiring homes. Consequently, the number of rural farm homes electrified doubled in the United States within five years. We develop a panel data set for the 1930s and use changes within counties over time to identify the effect of the REA loans on a wide range of socio-economic measures. The REA loans contributed significantly to increases in crop output and crop productivity and helped stave off declines in overall farm output, productivity, and land values, but they had much smaller effects on nonagricultural parts of the economy. The ex-ante subsidy from the low-interest loans was large, but after the program was completed, nearly all of the loans were fully repaid, and the ultimate cost to the taxpayer was relatively low.


  • ARE WINNERS PROMOTED TOO OFTEN? EVIDENCE FROM THE NFL DRAFT 1999–2012

    by Carl T. Kitchens

    Firms engaging in hiring face recruitment costs. To reduce these costs, firms concentrate their efforts in locations that are perceived as talent rich or have produced successful employees in the past. Such recruitment mechanisms may lead to statistical discrimination if they reduce uncertainty for a subset of candidates or if firms relate current employee attributes with the institution. In this article, I test for statistical discrimination associated with an individual's institutional affiliation that results from targeted hiring practices by using a unique individual‐level data set of National Football League (NFL) draft prospects. I find that conditional on individual ability, individuals from highly ranked college teams are drafted earlier than individuals from lower ranked institutions. Over the length of a player's professional career, a player's college institution has no effect on career success, indicating that certain players are damaged by this recruitment mechanism. Even though players can suffer substantial financial damages as a result of being drafted later in the draft, NFL team performance is not sufficiently affected for teams to exploit this bias. (JEL J71, J31)