Matthew Philip Makofske
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Matthew Philip Makofske has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carl Kitchens
Florida State University & National Bureau of Economic Research , USA
1 shared publication - Le Wang
Department of Ag and Applied Economics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 26 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 85 (3) , 821-864
“Crime” on the Field
Does a greater police presence cause crime rates to decrease? To answer this question, we circumvent common simultaneity and reverse causality issues by exploiting an experiment from college football. In 2013, the Big XII added an eighth referee to conference games only. Unique features of this experiment allow us to identify the causal effects of increased “police force” (officiating crew) size on observed “crime” (penalty) rates, and to distinguish between alternative mechanisms behind those effects. Overall, we find that the increased police presence causes an increase in the observed crime rate. This increase is largest in teams' first treated games, suggesting a substantial detection effect. However, the penalty rate decreases sharply in teams' second treated games, suggesting a large general deterrent effect. Under mild assumptions, results suggest that the general deterrent effect is partly due to players learning to avoid detection, but that the learning process involves errors over time.
- 26 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 85 (3) , 821-864
“Crime” on the Field
Does a greater police presence cause crime rates to decrease? To answer this question, we circumvent common simultaneity and reverse causality issues by exploiting an experiment from college football. In 2013, the Big XII added an eighth referee to conference games only. Unique features of this experiment allow us to identify the causal effects of increased “police force” (officiating crew) size on observed “crime” (penalty) rates, and to distinguish between alternative mechanisms behind those effects. Overall, we find that the increased police presence causes an increase in the observed crime rate. This increase is largest in teams' first treated games, suggesting a substantial detection effect. However, the penalty rate decreases sharply in teams' second treated games, suggesting a large general deterrent effect. Under mild assumptions, results suggest that the general deterrent effect is partly due to players learning to avoid detection, but that the learning process involves errors over time.
- 7 November 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 50 (22) , 2415-2430
Are you hiring Johnny Football or Johnny Doe? Uncertain labour quality and the measurement of monopsony in college football
I assess monopsony in the college football labour market as it relates to both typical and elite performers, while also accounting for the uncertain performance quality of prospective players who are in this labour market. Existing studies suggest that the marginal revenue product (MRP) of elite collegiate players later drafted into the National Football League (NFL), significantly exceeds their compensation. These comparisons overstate monopsony rents because schools don’t know ex ante which prospects will become these elite performers. Using financial data spanning 2004–2011 from 114 major schools, I estimate the MRP of players sorted into three ex post quality tiers, and find that while eventual NFL draftees generate revenue that significantly exceeds their compensation, a majority of scholarship players do not. Then, using Rivals.com talent ratings of 6,604 prospective players recruited from 2002–2008, I estimate the probability that prospects will reach each ex post quality tier given their ex ante ratings. MRP estimates are adjusted by these conditional probability estimates to reflect the expected MRP of prospects, which allows more appropriate assessment of monopsony rents. I find that schools possess substantially less monopsony power than unadjusted MRP estimates suggest.
- 7 November 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 50 (22) , 2415-2430
Are you hiring Johnny Football or Johnny Doe? Uncertain labour quality and the measurement of monopsony in college football
I assess monopsony in the college football labour market as it relates to both typical and elite performers, while also accounting for the uncertain performance quality of prospective players who are in this labour market. Existing studies suggest that the marginal revenue product (MRP) of elite collegiate players later drafted into the National Football League (NFL), significantly exceeds their compensation. These comparisons overstate monopsony rents because schools don’t know ex ante which prospects will become these elite performers. Using financial data spanning 2004–2011 from 114 major schools, I estimate the MRP of players sorted into three ex post quality tiers, and find that while eventual NFL draftees generate revenue that significantly exceeds their compensation, a majority of scholarship players do not. Then, using Rivals.com talent ratings of 6,604 prospective players recruited from 2002–2008, I estimate the probability that prospects will reach each ex post quality tier given their ex ante ratings. MRP estimates are adjusted by these conditional probability estimates to reflect the expected MRP of prospects, which allows more appropriate assessment of monopsony rents. I find that schools possess substantially less monopsony power than unadjusted MRP estimates suggest.