RERana Elnaggar

Rana Elnaggar

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Rana Elnaggar has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Securing SoCs With FPGAs Against Rowhammer Attacks

    by Rana Elnaggar, Siyuan Chen, Peilin Song, Krishnendu Chakrabarty

    Heterogeneous SoCs integrate FPGAs and microprocessor cores on the same fabric to accelerate applications, such as cryptography and deep learning. Since FPGAs share resources with the microprocessor cores, they can launch noncacheable synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) transactions through direct FPGA-to-microprocessor SDRAM interface. Therefore, if the FPGA 3rd party IPs (3PIPs) are malicious, they can launch rowhammer attacks on the SDRAM. Today’s countermeasures based on performance counters cannot detect these attacks because memory transactions from FPGAs do not pass through the cache. In addition, today’s countermeasures that count the frequency of activation of memory rows cannot identify the intellectual property (IP) that launches the attack from the FPGA. We present a security solution that monitors the SDRAM transactions from IPs on the FPGA to each bank of the microprocessor SDRAM through the FPGA-to-microprocessor SDRAM interface. The proposed monitor is implemented on the FPGA fabric. It can detect attempts to launch a rowhammer attack before it causes bit flips in the SDRAM. It utilizes 6.3% of the adaptive logic modules (ALMs) available in an Intel Cyclone V FPGA, when multiple IPs are monitored.


  • Accurate and Robust Malware Detection: Running XGBoost on Runtime Data From Performance Counters

    by Rana Elnaggar, Lorenzo Servadei, Shubham Mathur, Robert Wille, Wolfgang Ecker, Krishnendu Chakrabarty

    Malware applications are one of the major threats that computing systems face today. While security researchers develop new defense mechanisms to detect malware, attackers continue to release new malware families that evade detection. New defense mechanisms must therefore be developed to effectively counter malware. Hardware performance counters (HPCs) have been recently proposed as a means to detect malware. However, recent work has also shown that malware detection is not effective when performance counters are sampled in realistic scenarios. We show how proper data preprocessing and the use of the XGBoost classifier can be used to improve the performance of malware detection using HPCs by at least 15%. We also show that the proposed method can detect malware early (shortly after its launch) by classifying HPC datastreams at short time intervals. In addition, we propose a multitemporal classification model that ensures the early detection of a high percentage of malware while maintaining overall low false positive rates. Finally, we show that through robust training, the XGBoost classifier shows up to 50x less vulnerability to adversarial attacks that are intended to undermine its malware detection performance.


  • Runtime Malware Detection Using Embedded Trace Buffers

    by Rana Elnaggar, Kanad Basu, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Ramesh Karri

    Anti-virus software (AVS) tools are used to detect malware in a system. However, AVS are vulnerable to attacks. A malicious entity can exploit these vulnerabilities to subvert the AVS. Recently, hardware components such as hardware performance counters have been used for malware detection. In this article, we propose preempts malware by examining embedded processor traces (PREEMPT), a zero overhead, high-accuracy, low-latency technique to detect malware by repurposing embedded trace buffer (ETB), a debug hardware component available in most modern processors. The ETB is used for postsilicon validation and debug and allows us to control and monitor the internal activities of a chip, beyond what is provided by the input/output pins. PREEMPT combines these hardware-level observations with machine learning-based classifiers to preempt malware before it causes damage. The benefits of reusing ETB for malware detection include the increased robustness against attacks and no performance penalties. PREEMPT can detect malware on an OpenSPARC T1 core running Linux operating system with a F1-score of 96.6%.


  • Toward Hardware-Based IP Vulnerability Detection and Post-Deployment Patching in Systems-on-Chip

    by Benjamin Tan, Rana Elnaggar, Jason M. Fung, Ramesh Karri, Krishnendu Chakrabarty

    System integrators create heterogeneous systems-on-chip (SoCs) by integrating numerous third-party intellectual property blocks (3PIPs) to achieve application-specific design goals. With increasing intellectual property (IP) complexity, 3PIPs can suffer from hardware bugs or they can inadvertently introduce other software-exploitable security threats to the SoC. To ensure the ongoing survivability of new SoCs, we need infrastructure for patching newly discovered IP issues after an SoC has been deployed. To address the increasing risks from 3PIPs, we explore the feasibility and limitations of implementing monitoring and mitigation capabilities in hardware. Our proposed monitoring and mitigation patch (MoP) blocks provide a defensive foundation against critical IP-centric issues, focusing on situations where a system integrator only has interface-level visibility of 3PIP designs. The MoPs are distributed throughout the SoC to monitor and mitigate issues directly in hardware and transparently for potentially compromised software-the MoPs are resilient against run-time compromised software and firmware. We ensure that these monitors are reconfigurable after deployment by implementing them using embedded-FPGAs or as a reprogrammable, fixed-design module. We perform a case study of numerous IP-types and model a selection of security-relevant issues and bugs in the IPs, exploring the relative complexity and potential resource overhead. Our study shows the utility of our proposed approach, with MoP blocks requiring less than ~1.5% of the adaptive logic modules (ALMs) in a Cyclone V FPGA for interface monitoring and issue mitigation per IP.


  • Security Against Data-Sniffing and Alteration Attacks in IJTAG

    by Rana Elnaggar, Ramesh Karri, Krishnendu Chakrabarty

    The IEEE Std. 1687 (IJTAG) facilitates access to on-chip instruments in complex system-on-chip designs. However, a major security vulnerability in IJTAG has yet to be addressed. IJTAG supports the integration of tapped and wrapped instruments at the IP provider with hidden test-data registers (TDRs). The instruments with hidden TDRs can alter and steal the data that is shifted through them. These attacks are called “data-alteration” and “data-sniffing” attacks, respectively. We propose the addition of shadow test-data registers and information-flow tracking logic to protect the shifted in test data from illegitimate alteration and leakage by malicious third-party IPs. We present two security architectures for IJTAG. The first architecture secures the IJTAG against data alteration and incurs no timing overhead. However, it does not secure IJTAG against data-sniffing attacks. The second architecture is an upgrade to the first architecture where we re-purpose the use of the shadow test-data registers and information-tracking logic to secure the IJTAG against both data-alteration and data-sniffing attacks. However, it incurs timing overhead. We present security proofs, simulation results, and the overheads associated with these countermeasures for various benchmarks. We also discuss the trade-offs in security and overhead between the two proposed architectures.


  • Hardware Trojan Detection Using Changepoint-Based Anomaly Detection Techniques

    by Rana Elnaggar, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Mehdi B. Tahoori

    There has been a growing trend in recent years to outsource various aspects of the semiconductor design and manufacturing flow to different parties spread across the globe. Such outsourcing increases the risk of adversaries adding malicious logic, referred to as hardware Trojans, to the original design. The increased complexity of modern microprocessors increases the difficulty in detecting hardware Trojans at early stages of design and manufacturing. Therefore, there is a need for run-time detection techniques to capture Trojans that escape detection at these stages. In this paper, we introduce a machine learning-based run-time hardware Trojan detection method for microprocessor cores. This approach uses changepoint-based anomaly detection algorithm to detect the activation of Trojans that introduce abnormal patterns in the data streams obtained from performance counters. It does not modify the original microprocessor design to integrate on-chip monitoring sensors. We evaluate our method by detecting the activation of Trojans that cause denial-of-service, the degradation of system performance, and change in functionality of a microprocessor core. Results obtained using the OpenSPARC T1 core and an field-programmable gate array (FPGA) prototyping framework show that the Trojan activation is detected with a true positive rate of above 99% and a false positive rate of 0% for most of the implemented Trojans.