GMGaëlle Marinthe

Gaëlle Marinthe

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Gaëlle Marinthe has a total of 47 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Navigating social change and social harmony: Testing SIMCA in Gen Z collective action in Madagascar and its role in reconciliation processes

    by Gaëlle Marinthe, Yvana Hassim Rajabali

    The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) effectively predicts collective action and social change, but has been less examined in emerging movements and non‐WEIRD contexts. This research had two aims: to test SIMCA during the Gen Z mobilization in Madagascar, a largely online movement that culminated in the overthrow of the government in October 2025; and to examine how SIMCA variables relate to post‐action activism and reconciliation. Study 1 ( N = 959), conducted during the governmental transition, tested SIMCA—including national identification, Gen Z identification, perceived injustice, collective efficacy, and morality—on online collective action support, intention, and participation. Study 2 ( N = 258), conducted post‐transition, examined associations with activism intention, reconciliation, and forgiveness. Gen Z identification and morality were consistently associated with collective action and activism intention, whereas perceived injustice was primarily linked to ongoing collective action. Collective efficacy showed mixed associations. In contrast, national identification emerged as a key factor of post‐action forgiveness. These findings suggest that SIMCA variables are involved not only in social change but also in post‐action social harmony. They highlight the distinct roles of politicized and non‐politicized identities, underscoring the importance of conceptualizing collective action as a temporally and contextually embedded process.

  • Approche psycho-sociale des dégradations de symboles nationaux : conséquences sur les relations intergroupes, implication de l’identification et des patriotismes

    by GaëlLe Marinthe

    Cette thèse étudie l’impact des dégradations de symboles nationaux sur les relations intergroupes et les dimensions psycho-sociales (identification et patriotismes) pouvant le moduler. Les symboles permettent de maintenir une identité sociale satisfaisante en renforçant la cohésion, la distinctivité et l’identité culturelle du groupe. En se fondant sur la théorie de l’identité sociale, nous avons postulé que les atteintes aux symboles nationaux, même commises par un membre de l’endogroupe, pourraient constituer une menace et ainsi augmenter un biais pro-endogroupe diffus. Ces conséquences pourraient être modérées par l’identification au groupe et par un mode d’attachement rigide à la nation, i.e., le patriotisme aveugle. Ces questions ont été traitées à travers quatre chapitres expérimentaux. Les trois premiers examinent les implications des dégradations de symboles nationaux et de l’identification sur les attitudes intergroupes. Dans l’ensemble, l’identification n’explique pas l’émergence de biais pro-endogroupe. En revanche, le contexte est déterminant. Une dégradation du symbole national effectuée par un membre de l’endogroupe dans un contexte intergroupe (compétition sportive) ou intragroupe implique des stratégies de défense respectivement intergroupe (hausse du biais pro-endogroupe) et intragroupe (hausse de l’identification). Dans le quatrième chapitre, le patriotisme aveugle modère les conséquences d’une dégradation de symbole national endogroupe en contexte intragroupe. Les personnes les plus patriotes aveugles ressentent plus de menace, provoquant une augmentation diffuse du biais pro-endogroupe. Les apports, limites et perspectives de ces travaux sont discutés.

  • Open Access

    Collective Action hinders the increase in post-election trust among election losers: Longitudinal evidence from the 2024 UK election

    by Gaëlle Marinthe, Fanny Lalot, Alice Kasper, Efisio Manunta, Genavee Brown

    Political trust is a key component of civic investment in democratic societies. However, the reasons for its fluctuations within the democratic process remain insufficiently understood. This study investigated longitudinal associations between electoral outcome, political collective action, and political trust. We hypothesized that collective action would moderate the impact of election results, such that trust would increase among engaged individuals whose preferred party won, but decrease among those whose preferred party lost. Using longitudinal data collected before and after the 2024 UK General Election (N = 543), we found a general increase in political trust following the election. This increase was weaker, although still significant, among participants who supported losing parties. Furthermore, we observed an interaction between collective action and local electoral outcome: Political trust increased for all participants except those who had greatly invested in collective action and whose local candidate had not been elected as Member of Parliament. These findings confirm that electoral processes foster political trust, but also suggest that unsuccessful collective action may hinder the typical increase in political trust following an election. They highlight the importance of both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political engagement in shaping trust, with implications for understanding how democratic participation can strengthen—or undermine—support for the political system.


  • Social judgement of defensive and secure social identities among advantaged and disadvantaged groups

    by Gaëlle Marinthe, Peggy Chekroun, Vincent Dru, Mélanie Kader-Issack, Clément Vallée, Patrick Mollaret

    This research integrates social judgement and social identity theories to examine evaluations of defensive (narcissistic) and secure social identity (vs. lack of identification) expressed by targets with varying group statuses (advantaged vs. disadvantaged). Across three studies (total N = 2,915), we manipulated target group status and forms of identity. In socioeconomic groups (Study 1), an advantaged target with a defensive identity was deemed assertive, while a disadvantaged counterpart was perceived as moral. Unexpectedly, in ethnocultural groups (Studies 2–3), the disadvantaged target expressing a defensive identity was judged equally or more assertive than the advantaged target. Notably, defensive identity from a disadvantaged target consistently garnered higher moral judgement than from an advantaged target. These results highlight that defensive identity can receive positive evaluations and confer elevated status. Nonetheless, we observed differential evaluation strategies depending on intergroup settings, suggesting system justification in socioeconomic groups versus ingroup favouritism in U.S. ethnic groups.


  • Collective action among the extremes? Relations between political ideology, political extremism, emotions, and collective action

    by Gaëlle Marinthe, Alice Kasper, Romain Veillé, Fanny Lalot

    Past research has highlighted the central role of ideology and political values in collective action. This research aims to determine whether, in addition to political ideology , political extremism can promote collective action. Arguing that political extremism may promote political activism per se, independently of its ideological content, we hypothesized an asymmetric U‐shaped relationship between political ideology and collective action, with emotions (anger, fear, and hope) acting as mediators. We conducted two studies in the context of two real‐world social movements in France. Study 1 ( N = 1386) examined collective action against COVID‐19 restrictions, a movement that defended typical right‐wing values. Study 2 ( N = 418) examined collective action against pension reform, a movement that defended values typical of the left. In both studies, we found that the congruent political ideology (right‐wing in Study 1 and left‐wing in Study 2) and political extremism were both associated with greater intentions (Studies 1 and 2) and greater participation (Study 2) in collective action. Anger partially mediated the relationship between political extremism and collective action in both studies. Overall, our results call for considering political extremism in addition to the left/right dimension of political ideology in order to better understand engagement in collective action.


  • Yes, we can (but for different reasons): Collective narcissism is linked to different values but similar pro‐ingroup collective action tendencies among disadvantaged and advantaged ethnic groups

    by Gaëlle Marinthe, Aleksandra Cislak, Samantha Stronge, Mikey Biddlestone, Flavio Azevedo, Alice Kasper, Chris G. Sibley, Aleksandra Cichocka

    Collective narcissism, a belief that one's group is exceptional and entitled to special treatment but underappreciated by others, is related to important social and political outcomes but has been predominantly studied in advantaged groups. The present research compares the motivational correlates (through values) of collective narcissism in ethnic groups of different status (advantaged and disadvantaged) and explores its associations with attitudes towards, and intention to engage in collective action. Three studies examined these processes in different national and intergroup contexts (total N = 16,275). Overall, ethnic collective narcissism was linked to self‐protective values (power, and less consistently, conservation) in advantaged groups but to universalism in disadvantaged groups. Moreover, in both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, ethnic collective narcissism was related to more positive attitudes towards, and intentions of pro‐ingroup actions but not to attitudes towards (other) disadvantaged groups (i.e., intergroup solidarity). These studies suggest that collective narcissism may be associated with different motivations, yet linked to similar intergroup attitudes among advantaged and disadvantaged groups.


  • Open Access

    Predicting vaccination hesitancy: The role of basic needs satisfaction and institutional trust

    by Gaëlle Marinthe, Genavee Brown, Mioara Cristea, Maja Kutlaca


  • Open Access

    We’re All the Same: Collective Narcissists’ Cross-National Support for Putin and Russian Military Attacks

    by Genavee Brown, Gaëlle Marinthe

    National narcissism is associated with support for nationalist and anti-democratic leaders and decisions in one’s own country. We hypothesize that it might also relate to more favorable judgments of outgroup nationalist leaders and actions, even if the latter may pose a threat to the ingroup. Using the context of the Russian attack on Ukraine, we hypothesize that people with a higher level of national narcissism would be more supportive of Russian attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian people. This may be due to a higher perception of belief similarity to Putin and Russians. We also considered the moderating role of the explicit target of the attack (Ukraine vs. ingroup). We tested our hypotheses in two studies (Study 1: N = 339 French; Study 2: N = 400 Americans). In both studies, national narcissism was related to a judgment of the attack (on Ukraine or the ingroup) as less immoral and to a better opinion of Putin. These effects were mediated by perceived belief similarity. In both studies however, these less negative judgments of the attack and of Putin did not extend to Russian people. Our results highlight that national narcissists are inclined to support a nationalist outgroup leader and their violent actions, although these may ultimately harm the ingroup.


  • Open Access

    When Less Is More: Defensive National Identity Predicts Sacrifice of Ingroup Profit to Maximize the Difference Between Groups

    by Bjarki Gronfeldt, Aleksandra Cislak, Gaëlle Marinthe, Aleksandra Cichocka

    We propose that defensive forms of identity (i.e., nationalism and national narcissism) can harm the nation through a tendency to maximize the difference between own and other groups in resource allocation. We test this hypothesis by adopting a classic social psychological paradigm, the Tajfel’s matrices, to real-life scenarios designed in the COVID-19 context. We captured maximizing the difference as a preference for one’s nation being allocated more medical resources relative to other countries, but at the expense of absolute ingroup profit. In Studies 1 and 2, defensiveness in national identity predicted this counterproductive strategy that ultimately benefits neither ingroup nor outgroup. In experimental Study 3, inducing ingroup disadvantage led to a greater tendency to maximize the difference. The results provide evidence that defensive national identity might be liked to support for policies that offer a positive intergroup comparison, but simultaneously harm one’s own ingroup.


  • Open Access

    We’re all the Same: Collective Narcissists’s Cross-National Support for Putin and Russian Military Attacks

    by Genavee Brown, Gaëlle Marinthe

    National narcissism is associated with support for nationalist and anti-democratic leaders and decisions in one's own country. We hypothesize that it might also relate to more favorable judgments of outgroup nationalism leaders and actions, even if the latter may pose a threat to the ingroup. Using the context of the Russian attack on Ukraine, we hypothesize that people with a higher level of national narcissism would be more supportive of Russian attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian people. This may be due to a higher perception of belief similarity to Putin and Russians. We also considered the moderating role of the explicit target of the attack (Ukraine vs. ingroup). We tested our hypotheses in two studies (Study 1: N = 339 French; Study 2: N = 400 Americans). In both studies, national narcissism was related to a judgment of the attack (on Ukraine or the ingroup) as less immoral and, in France, to a better opinion of Putin. These effects were mediated by perceived belief similarity. In both studies however, these less negative judgment of the attack and of Putin did not extend to Russians people. Our results highlight that national narcissists are inclined to support a nationalist outgroup leader and his violent actions, although these may ultimately harm the ingroup.