Polly Mitchell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Polly Mitchell has a total of 62 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alan Cribb
Centre for Public Policy Research King's College London United Kingdom
6 shared publications- Vikki Ann Entwistle
University of Aberdeen
6 shared publications - Alan Cribb
King’s College London
4 shared publications - Albert Weale
University College London
4 shared publications Vikki Entwistle
Health Services Research Unit and Department of Philosophy University of Aberdeen United Kingdom
4 shared publicationsCatherine Max
Catherine Max Consulting, London, UK
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 19 (2) , 153-173
We need to talk about values: a proposed framework for the articulation of normative reasoning in health technology assessment
It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper – developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting – seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 19 (2) , 153-173
Open AccessWe need to talk about values: a proposed framework for the articulation of normative reasoning in health technology assessment
It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper – developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting – seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.
- Open Access
- 27 July 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Health Services Research & Policy
- Vol. 29 (1) , 42-50
Tackling disrespect in health care: The relevance of socio-relational equality
Disrespect in health care often persists despite firm commitments to respectful service provision. This conceptual paper highlights how the ways in which respect and disrespect are characterised can have practical implications for how well disrespect can be tackled. We stress the need to focus explicitly on disrespect (not only respect) and propose that disrespect can usefully be understood as a failure to relate to people as equals. This characterisation is consonant with some accounts of respect but sometimes obscured by a focus on respecting people’s autonomy and dignity. Emphasising equality is consistent with connections patients draw between being (dis)respected and (in)equality. It readily accommodates microaggressions as forms of disrespect, helping to understand how and why experiences of disrespect may be unintentional and to explain why even small instances of disrespect are wrong. Our view of disrespect with an emphasis on equality strengthens the demand that health systems take disrespect seriously as a problem of social injustice and tackle it at institutional, not just individual levels. It suggests several strategies for practical action. Emphasising relational equality is not an easy or short-term fix for disrespect, but it signals a direction of travel towards an important improvement ambition.
- 27 July 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Health Services Research & Policy
- Vol. 29 (1) , 42-50
Open AccessTackling disrespect in health care: The relevance of socio-relational equality
Disrespect in health care often persists despite firm commitments to respectful service provision. This conceptual paper highlights how the ways in which respect and disrespect are characterised can have practical implications for how well disrespect can be tackled. We stress the need to focus explicitly on disrespect (not only respect) and propose that disrespect can usefully be understood as a failure to relate to people as equals. This characterisation is consonant with some accounts of respect but sometimes obscured by a focus on respecting people’s autonomy and dignity. Emphasising equality is consistent with connections patients draw between being (dis)respected and (in)equality. It readily accommodates microaggressions as forms of disrespect, helping to understand how and why experiences of disrespect may be unintentional and to explain why even small instances of disrespect are wrong. Our view of disrespect with an emphasis on equality strengthens the demand that health systems take disrespect seriously as a problem of social injustice and tackle it at institutional, not just individual levels. It suggests several strategies for practical action. Emphasising relational equality is not an easy or short-term fix for disrespect, but it signals a direction of travel towards an important improvement ambition.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2023
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 54 (4) , 523-538
Truth and consequences
In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth‐seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.
- 3 July 2023
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 54 (4) , 523-538
Open AccessTruth and consequences
In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth‐seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.
- Open Access
- 3 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Future Healthcare Journal
- Vol. 10 (1) , 82-84
A wide vocabulary for person-centred care
Many different words and phrases are used to describe healthcare that treats patients as people. Do terms such as ‘person centred’, ‘patient centred’, ‘people centred’ and ‘personalised’ mean broadly the same thing or do they refer to distinct concepts? Should we prefer one over the others? In this essay, we set out the value and limitations of some of the different terms used to describe what we broadly refer to as ‘person-centred care’. We offer a critical conceptual analysis of the most commonly used words and phrases in this domain, exploring how they differ from, and relate to, one another. We argue that there is value in retaining a wide vocabulary: the distinctive emphasis and connotations of different terms allow us to communicate about this multifaceted area of research and practice with nuance and context sensitivity.
- 3 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Future Healthcare Journal
- Vol. 10 (1) , 82-84
Open AccessA wide vocabulary for person-centred care
Many different words and phrases are used to describe healthcare that treats patients as people. Do terms such as ‘person centred’, ‘patient centred’, ‘people centred’ and ‘personalised’ mean broadly the same thing or do they refer to distinct concepts? Should we prefer one over the others? In this essay, we set out the value and limitations of some of the different terms used to describe what we broadly refer to as ‘person-centred care’. We offer a critical conceptual analysis of the most commonly used words and phrases in this domain, exploring how they differ from, and relate to, one another. We argue that there is value in retaining a wide vocabulary: the distinctive emphasis and connotations of different terms allow us to communicate about this multifaceted area of research and practice with nuance and context sensitivity.
- Open Access
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Research Policy and Systems
- Vol. 21 (1) , 1-19
An ethical analysis of policy dialogues
Background: A policy dialogue is a tool which promotes evidence-informed policy-making. It involves deliberation about a high-priority issue, informed by a synthesis of the best-available evidence, where potential policy interventions are discussed by stakeholders. We offer an ethical analysis of policy dialogues – an argument about how policy dialogues ought to be conceived and executed – to guide those organizing and participating in policy dialogues. Our analysis focuses on the deliberative dialogues themselves, rather than ethical issues in the broader policy context within which they are situated. Methods: We conduct a philosophical conceptual analysis of policy dialogues, informed by a formal and an interpretative literature review. Results: We identify the objectives of policy dialogues, and consider the procedural and substantive values that should govern them. As knowledge translation tools, the chief objective of policy dialogues is to ensure that prospective evidence-informed health policies are appropriate for and likely to support evidence-informed decision-making in a particular context. We identify five core characteristics which serve this objective: policy dialogues are (i) focused on a high-priority issue, (ii) evidence-informed, (iii) deliberative, (iv) participatory and (v) action-oriented. In contrast to dominant ethical frameworks for policy-making, we argue that transparency and accountability are not central procedural values for policy dialogues, as they are liable to inhibit the open deliberation that is necessary for successful policy dialogues. Instead, policy dialogues are legitimate insofar as they pursue the objectives and embody the core characteristics identified above. Finally, we argue that good policy dialogues need to actively consider a range of substantive values other than health benefit and equity. Conclusions: Policy dialogues should recognize the limits of effectiveness as a guiding value for policy-making, and operate with an expansive conception of successful outcomes. We offer a set of questions to support those organizing and participating in policy dialogues.
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Research Policy and Systems
- Vol. 21 (1) , 1-19
Open AccessAn ethical analysis of policy dialogues
Background: A policy dialogue is a tool which promotes evidence-informed policy-making. It involves deliberation about a high-priority issue, informed by a synthesis of the best-available evidence, where potential policy interventions are discussed by stakeholders. We offer an ethical analysis of policy dialogues – an argument about how policy dialogues ought to be conceived and executed – to guide those organizing and participating in policy dialogues. Our analysis focuses on the deliberative dialogues themselves, rather than ethical issues in the broader policy context within which they are situated. Methods: We conduct a philosophical conceptual analysis of policy dialogues, informed by a formal and an interpretative literature review. Results: We identify the objectives of policy dialogues, and consider the procedural and substantive values that should govern them. As knowledge translation tools, the chief objective of policy dialogues is to ensure that prospective evidence-informed health policies are appropriate for and likely to support evidence-informed decision-making in a particular context. We identify five core characteristics which serve this objective: policy dialogues are (i) focused on a high-priority issue, (ii) evidence-informed, (iii) deliberative, (iv) participatory and (v) action-oriented. In contrast to dominant ethical frameworks for policy-making, we argue that transparency and accountability are not central procedural values for policy dialogues, as they are liable to inhibit the open deliberation that is necessary for successful policy dialogues. Instead, policy dialogues are legitimate insofar as they pursue the objectives and embody the core characteristics identified above. Finally, we argue that good policy dialogues need to actively consider a range of substantive values other than health benefit and equity. Conclusions: Policy dialogues should recognize the limits of effectiveness as a guiding value for policy-making, and operate with an expansive conception of successful outcomes. We offer a set of questions to support those organizing and participating in policy dialogues.
- Open Access
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 48 (1) , 33-49
Patient Safety and the Question of Dignitary Harms
Patient safety is a central aspect of healthcare quality, focusing on preventable, iatrogenic harm. Harm, in this context, is typically assumed to mean physical injury to patients, often caused by technical error. However, some contributions to the patient safety literature have argued that disrespectful behavior towards patients can cause harm, even when it does not lead to physical injury. This paper investigates the nature of such dignitary harms and explores whether they should be included within the scope of patient safety as a field of practice. We argue that dignitary harms in health care are—at least sometimes—preventable, iatrogenic harms. While we caution against including dignitary harms within the scope of patient safety just because they are relevantly similar to other iatrogenic harms, we suggest that thinking about dignitary harms can help to elucidate the value of patient safety, and to illuminate the evolving relationship between safety and quality.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 48 (1) , 33-49
Open AccessPatient Safety and the Question of Dignitary Harms
Patient safety is a central aspect of healthcare quality, focusing on preventable, iatrogenic harm. Harm, in this context, is typically assumed to mean physical injury to patients, often caused by technical error. However, some contributions to the patient safety literature have argued that disrespectful behavior towards patients can cause harm, even when it does not lead to physical injury. This paper investigates the nature of such dignitary harms and explores whether they should be included within the scope of patient safety as a field of practice. We argue that dignitary harms in health care are—at least sometimes—preventable, iatrogenic harms. While we caution against including dignitary harms within the scope of patient safety just because they are relevantly similar to other iatrogenic harms, we suggest that thinking about dignitary harms can help to elucidate the value of patient safety, and to illuminate the evolving relationship between safety and quality.
- Open Access
- 5 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Patient Education and Counseling
- Vol. 105 (12) , 3422-3428
Unifying and universalizing Personalised Care? An analysis of a national curriculum with implications for policy and education relating to person-centred care
- 5 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Patient Education and Counseling
- Vol. 105 (12) , 3422-3428
Open AccessUnifying and universalizing Personalised Care? An analysis of a national curriculum with implications for policy and education relating to person-centred care
- Open Access
- 16 June 2022
- Published by F1000 Research Ltd in Wellcome Open Research
- Vol. 7, 170
Vagueness and variety in person-centred care
Person-centred care is a cornerstone of contemporary health policy, research and practice. However, many researchers and practitioners worry that it lacks a ‘clear definition and method of measurement,’ and that this creates problems for the implementation of person-centred care and limits understanding of its benefits. In this paper we urge caution about this concern and resist calls for a clear, settled definition and measurement approach. We develop a philosophical and conceptual analysis which is grounded in the body of literature concerning the theory and practice of person-centred care. We consider a range of influential definitional frameworks of person-centred care, highlighting their differences and showing that they do not correspond to a clearly circumscribed and consistent underlying concept. We argue that a degree of indeterminacy and vagueness should not be seen as a problem with the concept of person-centred care; these are features of a rich and contested concept which exists prior to and outside of practical and technical operational definitions and applications. We defend the value of operating with multiple accounts of person-centred care, arguing that what counts as being person-centred can vary across different care contexts, in relation to different patient groups, and as a reflection of different, defensible ethical perspectives. Although the idea of a single, agreed definition is attractive and may seem to be a practical or even necessary step towards meaningful and coordinated action, we argue that this is only the case in a qualified sense. Comprehensive attempts to narrow down the concept in this way should be resisted, as they risk undermining what it is that makes person-centredness a valuable concept in healthcare.
- 16 June 2022
- Published by F1000 Research Ltd in Wellcome Open Research
- Vol. 7, 170
Open AccessVagueness and variety in person-centred care
Person-centred care is a cornerstone of contemporary health policy, research and practice. However, many researchers and practitioners worry that it lacks a ‘clear definition and method of measurement,’ and that this creates problems for the implementation of person-centred care and limits understanding of its benefits. In this paper we urge caution about this concern and resist calls for a clear, settled definition and measurement approach. We develop a philosophical and conceptual analysis which is grounded in the body of literature concerning the theory and practice of person-centred care. We consider a range of influential definitional frameworks of person-centred care, highlighting their differences and showing that they do not correspond to a clearly circumscribed and consistent underlying concept. We argue that a degree of indeterminacy and vagueness should not be seen as a problem with the concept of person-centred care; these are features of a rich and contested concept which exists prior to and outside of practical and technical operational definitions and applications. We defend the value of operating with multiple accounts of person-centred care, arguing that what counts as being person-centred can vary across different care contexts, in relation to different patient groups, and as a reflection of different, defensible ethical perspectives. Although the idea of a single, agreed definition is attractive and may seem to be a practical or even necessary step towards meaningful and coordinated action, we argue that this is only the case in a qualified sense. Comprehensive attempts to narrow down the concept in this way should be resisted, as they risk undermining what it is that makes person-centredness a valuable concept in healthcare.
- Open Access
- 13 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Medical Ethics
- Vol. 22 (1) , 1-13
Pushing poverty off limits: quality improvement and the architecture of healthcare values
Background: Poverty and social deprivation have adverse effects on health outcomes and place a significant burden on healthcare systems. There are some actions that can be taken to tackle them from within healthcare institutions, but clinicians who seek to make frontline services more responsive to the social determinants of health and the social context of people’s lives can face a range of ethical challenges. We summarise and consider a case in which clinicians introduced a poverty screening initiative (PSI) into paediatric practice using the discourse and methodology of healthcare quality improvement (QI). Discussion: Whilst suggesting that interventions like the PSI are a potentially valuable extension of clinical roles, which take advantage of the unique affordances of clinical settings, we argue that there is a tendency for such settings to continuously reproduce a narrower set of norms. We illustrate how the framing of an initiative as QI can help legitimate and secure funding for practical efforts to help address social ends from within clinical service, but also how it can constrain and disguise the value of this work. A combination of methodological emphases within QI and managerialism within healthcare institutions leads to the prioritisation, often implicitly, of a limited set of aims and governing values for healthcare. This can act as an obstacle to a genuine broadening of the clinical agenda, reinforcing norms of clinical practice that effectively push poverty ‘off limits.’ We set out the ethical dilemmas facing clinicians who seek to navigate this landscape in order to address poverty and the social determinants of health. Conclusions: We suggest that reclaiming QI as a more deliberative tool that is sensitive to these ethical dilemmas can enable managers, clinicians and patients to pursue health-related values and ends, broadly conceived, as part of an expansive range of social and personal goods.
- 13 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Medical Ethics
- Vol. 22 (1) , 1-13
Open AccessPushing poverty off limits: quality improvement and the architecture of healthcare values
Background: Poverty and social deprivation have adverse effects on health outcomes and place a significant burden on healthcare systems. There are some actions that can be taken to tackle them from within healthcare institutions, but clinicians who seek to make frontline services more responsive to the social determinants of health and the social context of people’s lives can face a range of ethical challenges. We summarise and consider a case in which clinicians introduced a poverty screening initiative (PSI) into paediatric practice using the discourse and methodology of healthcare quality improvement (QI). Discussion: Whilst suggesting that interventions like the PSI are a potentially valuable extension of clinical roles, which take advantage of the unique affordances of clinical settings, we argue that there is a tendency for such settings to continuously reproduce a narrower set of norms. We illustrate how the framing of an initiative as QI can help legitimate and secure funding for practical efforts to help address social ends from within clinical service, but also how it can constrain and disguise the value of this work. A combination of methodological emphases within QI and managerialism within healthcare institutions leads to the prioritisation, often implicitly, of a limited set of aims and governing values for healthcare. This can act as an obstacle to a genuine broadening of the clinical agenda, reinforcing norms of clinical practice that effectively push poverty ‘off limits.’ We set out the ethical dilemmas facing clinicians who seek to navigate this landscape in order to address poverty and the social determinants of health. Conclusions: We suggest that reclaiming QI as a more deliberative tool that is sensitive to these ethical dilemmas can enable managers, clinicians and patients to pursue health-related values and ends, broadly conceived, as part of an expansive range of social and personal goods.
- Open Access
- 20 December 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 29 (1) , 39-58
Made to Measure: The Ethics of Routine Measurement for Healthcare Improvement
This paper analyses the ethics of routine measurement for healthcare improvement. Routine measurement is an increasingly central part of healthcare system design and is taken to be necessary for successful healthcare improvement efforts. It is widely recognised that the effectiveness of routine measurement in bringing about improvement is limited—it often produces only modest effects or fails to generate anticipated improvements at all. We seek to show that these concerns do not exhaust the ethics of routine measurement. Even if routine measurement does lead to healthcare improvements, it has associated ethical costs which are not necessarily justified by its benefits. We argue that the practice of routine measurement changes the function of the healthcare system, resulting in an unintended and ethically significant transformation of the sector. It is difficult to determine whether such changes are justified or offset by the benefits of routine measurement because there may be no shared understanding of what is ‘good’ in healthcare by which to compare the benefits of routine measurement with the goods that are precluded by it. We counsel that the practice of routine measurement should proceed with caution and should be recognised to be an ethically significant choice, rather than an inevitability.
- 20 December 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 29 (1) , 39-58
Open AccessMade to Measure: The Ethics of Routine Measurement for Healthcare Improvement
This paper analyses the ethics of routine measurement for healthcare improvement. Routine measurement is an increasingly central part of healthcare system design and is taken to be necessary for successful healthcare improvement efforts. It is widely recognised that the effectiveness of routine measurement in bringing about improvement is limited—it often produces only modest effects or fails to generate anticipated improvements at all. We seek to show that these concerns do not exhaust the ethics of routine measurement. Even if routine measurement does lead to healthcare improvements, it has associated ethical costs which are not necessarily justified by its benefits. We argue that the practice of routine measurement changes the function of the healthcare system, resulting in an unintended and ethically significant transformation of the sector. It is difficult to determine whether such changes are justified or offset by the benefits of routine measurement because there may be no shared understanding of what is ‘good’ in healthcare by which to compare the benefits of routine measurement with the goods that are precluded by it. We counsel that the practice of routine measurement should proceed with caution and should be recognised to be an ethically significant choice, rather than an inevitability.