Huseyin Yildirim
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Huseyin Yildirim has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alvaro J. Name Correa
Univ Carlos III, Dept Econ, Calle Madrid 126, Getafe 28903, Spain
1 shared publication - Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn
UCLA ( )
1 shared publication - Onur Kesten
Carnegie Mellon University
1 shared publication - Silvana Krasteva
Texas A&M Univ, Dept Econ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 127, 1-27
Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 127, 1-27
Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
- 24 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 23 (1-2) , 1-2
Letter from the editors
- 24 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 23 (1-2) , 1-2
Letter from the editors
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 43 (3) , 514-536
Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations
This article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. The possibility of inefficient trade may generate strict sequencing preference. The buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers and with the stronger one if both sellers are strong bargainers. This sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus. Moreover, the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own acquisition cost by committing to a minimum purchase price or outsourcing. The first‐ and second‐mover advantages for the sellers are also identified.
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 43 (3) , 514-536
Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations
This article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. The possibility of inefficient trade may generate strict sequencing preference. The buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers and with the stronger one if both sellers are strong bargainers. This sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus. Moreover, the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own acquisition cost by committing to a minimum purchase price or outsourcing. The first‐ and second‐mover advantages for the sellers are also identified.
- 23 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 142 (1-2) , 41-57
Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition
- 23 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 142 (1-2) , 41-57
Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition
- 29 September 2006
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 8 (4) , 503-528
Getting the Ball Rolling: Voluntary Contributions to a Large‐Scale Public Project
This paper examines dynamic voluntary contributions to a large‐scale project. In equilibrium, contributions are influenced by the interplay of two opposing incentives. While agents prefer to free ride on others for contributions, they also prefer to encourage others to contribute by increasing their own. Main findings of the paper are that (1) agents increase their contributions as the project moves forward; (2) as additional agents join the group, existing agents increase their contributions in the initial stages of the project while reducing them in the stages close to completion; (3) groups that are formed by more patient agents and that undertake larger projects tend to be larger; and (4) groups that rely on voluntary contributions tend to be too small compared to the social optimum. The empirical evidence on contributions to open‐source software projects provides partial support for these findings.
- 29 September 2006
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 8 (4) , 503-528
Getting the Ball Rolling: Voluntary Contributions to a Large‐Scale Public Project
This paper examines dynamic voluntary contributions to a large‐scale project. In equilibrium, contributions are influenced by the interplay of two opposing incentives. While agents prefer to free ride on others for contributions, they also prefer to encourage others to contribute by increasing their own. Main findings of the paper are that (1) agents increase their contributions as the project moves forward; (2) as additional agents join the group, existing agents increase their contributions in the initial stages of the project while reducing them in the stages close to completion; (3) groups that are formed by more patient agents and that undertake larger projects tend to be larger; and (4) groups that rely on voluntary contributions tend to be too small compared to the social optimum. The empirical evidence on contributions to open‐source software projects provides partial support for these findings.
- 30 November 2004
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 22 (8-9) , 1349-1375
Piecewise procurement of a large-scale project
- 30 November 2004
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 22 (8-9) , 1349-1375
Piecewise procurement of a large-scale project