Eduard Alonso-Paulí
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Eduard Alonso-Paulí has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Francisco Javier André
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
1 shared publication - Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz
Department of Economics, Public University of Navarre, Pamplona/Iruña, Spain
1 shared publication - Lara Ezquerra
Department of Business Economics, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Palma, Spain
1 shared publication Lluís Bru
Department of Business Economics Universitat de les Illes Balears Palma Spain
1 shared publication- Pau Balart
Department of Business Economics, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Palma, Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (18)
Using pledges to improve the effectiveness of environmental information campaigns: The case of biowaste recycling
Through a field study (N = 1,519) that uses a technology to record real-time data on waste sorting, we find that offering the opportunity to sign a pledge increases the effectiveness of an environmental campaign. With a timespan of over four years, the pledge increased waste sorting participation by 4.55 to 5.10 percentage points (SD = 0.1997). The effect is greater immediately after the campaign (around 9 to 10 pp during the first 15 wk), but it remains sizable and statistically significant 150 to 210 wk after signing (3.11 to 4.45 pp).
- 2 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (18)
Open AccessUsing pledges to improve the effectiveness of environmental information campaigns: The case of biowaste recycling
Through a field study (N = 1,519) that uses a technology to record real-time data on waste sorting, we find that offering the opportunity to sign a pledge increases the effectiveness of an environmental campaign. With a timespan of over four years, the pledge increased waste sorting participation by 4.55 to 5.10 percentage points (SD = 0.1997). The effect is greater immediately after the campaign (around 9 to 10 pp during the first 15 wk), but it remains sizable and statistically significant 150 to 210 wk after signing (3.11 to 4.45 pp).
- 2 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad
- Vol. 52 (1) , 1-31
The adoption of a code of corporate governance: incentive implications
By means of an agency model, we show whether and when firms are interested in adopting a Code of Corporate Governance. The Code allows the shareholder to reduce the manager’s discretion, but it makes the manager less efficient due to the over-emphasis on monitoring. Our results suggest that if a voluntary Code is available, not all firms will be interested in it. In firms that do adopt it, the Code is not always used to reach more efficient outcomes. We show under which conditions the introduction of the code attenuates the underinvestment problem caused by the agency relationship. Finally, we analyse some features that a regulator protecting shareholder’s wealth should consider. Our findings suggest that heterogeneity in Codes may be partially explained by differences in the distribution of firms or by different abilities of the regulator.
- 2 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad
- Vol. 52 (1) , 1-31
The adoption of a code of corporate governance: incentive implications
By means of an agency model, we show whether and when firms are interested in adopting a Code of Corporate Governance. The Code allows the shareholder to reduce the manager’s discretion, but it makes the manager less efficient due to the over-emphasis on monitoring. Our results suggest that if a voluntary Code is available, not all firms will be interested in it. In firms that do adopt it, the Code is not always used to reach more efficient outcomes. We show under which conditions the introduction of the code attenuates the underinvestment problem caused by the agency relationship. Finally, we analyse some features that a regulator protecting shareholder’s wealth should consider. Our findings suggest that heterogeneity in Codes may be partially explained by differences in the distribution of firms or by different abilities of the regulator.
- Open Access
- 5 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 43 (3) , 813-828
Incentives versus monitoring within the firm: Understanding Codes of Corporate Governance
The paper analyzes the interaction between two different internal mechanisms of the firm: a performance‐based scheme and a monitoring device. We show that it is always optimal to use both instruments if available; the two instruments are complementary instruments. We also find that ownership structure becomes relevant in determining the optimal contract. Using these findings, we study the incentives to adopt a Code of Corporate Governance. The Code can be understood as an exogenous monitoring technology. We find that some firms may optimally choose not to adopt the Code because they are providing better incentives. Others may adopt it but not always use it to reach more efficient outcomes.
- 5 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 43 (3) , 813-828
Open AccessIncentives versus monitoring within the firm: Understanding Codes of Corporate Governance
The paper analyzes the interaction between two different internal mechanisms of the firm: a performance‐based scheme and a monitoring device. We show that it is always optimal to use both instruments if available; the two instruments are complementary instruments. We also find that ownership structure becomes relevant in determining the optimal contract. Using these findings, we study the incentives to adopt a Code of Corporate Governance. The Code can be understood as an exogenous monitoring technology. We find that some firms may optimally choose not to adopt the Code because they are providing better incentives. Others may adopt it but not always use it to reach more efficient outcomes.
- 14 February 2020
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 41 (6) , 902-910
A note on the impact of the internal organization on the accuracy of the information transmitted within the firm
- 14 February 2020
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 41 (6) , 902-910
A note on the impact of the internal organization on the accuracy of the information transmitted within the firm
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
- Vol. 32 (1) , 2231-2251
Contracting with a quiet-life manager
The aim of this paper is to analyse how employees may affect firm’s corporate governance. We analyse shareholder–manager relationship through a principal-agent framework. The manager is the agent in charge of taking decisions for firm’s success. Yet, when deciding, the manager takes into account employees’ preferences, i.e., the manager wants to enjoy a ‘quiet life’. We build a theoretical (mathematical) model based on principal-agent models in which the manager (the agent) interacts with the shareholder (principal) but it is influenced by employee’s decisions. Our results highlight that having a quiet-life manager is not necessarily linked to a destruction of value, as suggested in recent research. It might even recover part of the efficient decisions (at a cost borne by the shareholder). This research links the management of human resources with corporate governance enlarging the concept of corporate governance itself. It may help to differentiate better situations where labour is highly protected from those that are not as protected, which in turn has implications on the level of manager’s discretion.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
- Vol. 32 (1) , 2231-2251
Open AccessContracting with a quiet-life manager
The aim of this paper is to analyse how employees may affect firm’s corporate governance. We analyse shareholder–manager relationship through a principal-agent framework. The manager is the agent in charge of taking decisions for firm’s success. Yet, when deciding, the manager takes into account employees’ preferences, i.e., the manager wants to enjoy a ‘quiet life’. We build a theoretical (mathematical) model based on principal-agent models in which the manager (the agent) interacts with the shareholder (principal) but it is influenced by employee’s decisions. Our results highlight that having a quiet-life manager is not necessarily linked to a destruction of value, as suggested in recent research. It might even recover part of the efficient decisions (at a cost borne by the shareholder). This research links the management of human resources with corporate governance enlarging the concept of corporate governance itself. It may help to differentiate better situations where labour is highly protected from those that are not as protected, which in turn has implications on the level of manager’s discretion.
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Resource and Energy Economics
- Vol. 40, 85-106
Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Resource and Energy Economics
- Vol. 40, 85-106
Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool