Andrii M. Kuchuk

У статті досліджено правовладдя як метапринцип конституційного порядку та визначено його загально-правову природу й межі конституційної інтерпретації. Актуальність теми зумовлена відсутністю цілісної концептуалізації верховенства права, яка б узгоджувала його нормативно-ціннісний, структурний і функціональний виміри, що ускладнює забезпечення внутрішньої узгодженості правової системи та формування сталої судової практики. Обґрунтовано, що правовладдя не зводиться до сукупності окремих елементів (юридична визначеність, заборона свавілля, доступ до правосуддя), а має характер метапринципу і виступає нормативною підставою легітимності самої конституційної системи. Визначено три виміри правовладдя: онтологічний – як умову існування права в його нормативній якості; структурний – як критерій узгодженості та ієрархічної впорядкованості норм; інтерпретаційний – як методологічну основу тлумачення та застосування національного права. Відзначено, що правовладдя виконує подвійну функцію: обмежувальну, встановлюючи межі дискреції органів публічної влади, та конститутивну, визначаючи параметри легітимності правового регулювання. Доведено, що правовладдя функціонує як метавторинна норма, яка дозволяє розмежувати формальну і субстантивну конституційність та виявити межі допустимого конституційного розвитку. Воно одночасно легітимує активну роль конституційної юрисдикції та окреслює межі інтерпретації, запобігаючи довільному судовому нормотворенню. Акцентовано, що співвідношення правовладдя та народного суверенітету не є конфліктним за своєю природою. Конституційна демократія передбачає, що воля більшості реалізується в межах і через право, а тому не може бути джерелом свавілля. Правовладдя не заперечує демократію, а визначає її умови можливості: воно гарантує, що демократичне самоврядування відбувається в нормативних межах, які забезпечують повагу до людських прав та недоторканність основ конституційного ладу. Зроблено висновок, що правовладдя є структуроутворювальним ядром конституційного порядку, яке забезпечує його внутрішню цілісність, ціннісну спрямованість і стійкість в умовах суспільних трансформацій.

The article examines the transformation of legal activity in the context of the digitalization of social relations. Attention is paid to the change in the interpretative paradigm of the modern lawyer, caused by the transition from the dominance of hermeneutics of legal text to the urgency to interpret algorithms as technically mediated carriers of normativity. The influence of algorithmic systems and digital platforms on the processes of law enforcement, public administration, and the realization of rights is considered, and the role of algorithms in the formation of new de facto regulatory effects is outlined. It is argued that algorithms in contemporary social and legal practices perform the function of “normativity operators,” mediating access to public services, determining the priority of administrative procedures, and influencing the trajectories of procedural rights. The example of judicial practice shows that legally significant consequences for individuals may arise from the functioning of digital systems in the absence of a formalized individual administrative act, which raises the issue of algorithm transparency and the effectiveness of legal control. The risks of human rights violations due to the opacity of algorithmic decisions, possible discriminatory effects, and the delegation of authority to digital systems without proper accountability procedures are highlighted. The necessity of developing interpretative approaches focused on the analysis of algorithmic logic, data sources, and value assumptions embedded in digital systems, is justified. The interpretation of algorithms is a required element in ensuring the principles of the rule of law, legal certainty, proportionality, and non-discrimination. It is concluded that the legal activity transformation in the digital era is a change in the interpretative paradigm, which requires a rethinking of the professional competencies of lawyers, the development of interdisciplinary methodological tools, and the formation of new standards of legal argumentation. The implementation of these tasks is a prerequisite for preserving the value and normative dimension of law in the context of the growing algorithmization of public administration and law enforcement.

The article examines restitution as a form of restoring justice in transitional justice in a philosophical and legal dimension. It emphasizes that transitional justice is formed in a situation of a fundamental break between the normatively declared legal order and the actual practice of mass human rights violations, as a result of which law loses its usual stability and acquires a reflexive character. In this context, restitution is seen not as a universal or unconditionally effective mechanism for restoring justice, but as a problematic tool for legal “correction of the past.” It is argued that the classical understanding of restitution as a return to the state that existed before the violation is limited in situations of mass and systematic human rights violations, a significant part of which are irreversible. It is shown that under such conditions, restitution can take on the characteristics of a normative fiction if it is absolutized and separated from other components of transitional justice. Critical philosophical and legal approaches, according to which restitution can create the illusion of restoring justice and replace the moral responsibility of the state with formal legal gestures, are analyzed. At the same time, it has been proven that the awareness of the fundamental impossibility of full restitution does not negate its significance but, on the contrary, reveals its normative and symbolic potential. Restitution is justified as a form of legal recognition of injustice caused, aimed at establishing the limits of what is permissible for public authorities and restoring trust in the rule of law. It has been determined that, in the philosophical and legal dimension, restitution appears as a space of tension between the possible and the impossible, between the normative requirement of justice and the limitations of law in overcoming the consequences of radical evil. It has been concluded that, in the context of transitional justice in Ukraine, restitution should be considered as a fundamentally limited but normatively necessary element of the multidimensional architecture of restoring justice, which is implemented in conjunction with other legal and extra-legal means aimed at recognizing responsibility, preserving public memory, and forming institutional guarantees against the recurrence of mass human rights violations.

The article deals with the phenomenon of constitutional democracy under extraordinary conditions. It is substantiated that a state of emergency is not a legal vacuum, but a form of testing the viability of the constitutional order. It is found that modern constitutionalism, unlike the Schmittian understanding of “exceptionalism”, does not recognize the state going beyond the boundaries of the constitution even in crisis situations, instead proposing the concept of constitutional adaptability. The approach, formed in the papers of B. Ackermann, S. Holmes, and J. Rawls, is based on the principle of continuity of constitutionality, which assumes the preservation of the validity of the rule of law fundamental principles regardless of external or internal threats. It is noted that the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the constitutional courts of European states affirm the approach according to which even during a crisis, the essence of rights cannot be denied, and their restrictions can only be temporary and proportionate. Particular attention is paid to the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which forms a position on the continuity of the constitutional order in wartime and the subordination of any extraordinary measures to the principles of the rule of law and human dignity. It is emphasized that the priority of the individual over the general, inherent in Western legal culture, determines the humanistic orientation of the theory of human rights, embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. In this context, extraordinariness is considered not as a space for arbitrariness, but as a special regime for the implementation of constitutional values. It is shown that the doctrine of necessity can act as an instrument for preserving the constitutional order only under the condition of control by the judiciary, compliance with the criteria of proportionality, legitimacy and temporality. It is concluded that constitutional democracy under extraordinary conditions is a self-correcting system capable of preserving its own normative nature in conditions of threat. Its strength lies in the fact that even in a state of restriction of rights and concentration of power it does not lose its fundamental content - the subordination of state power to the constitution and the priority of human dignity as the highest value.

The article explores the issue of the correlation between justice and algorithmic automation of justice. The question of the nature of justice gains new dimensions in the context of the artificial intelligence use in judicial proceedings. Classical concepts of justice are compared with the capabilities of algorithms, which, despite their apparent impartiality, reflect the biases of their creators and training data. Special attention is paid to procedural justice and the problem of “fair procedure” requiring combining the result with the proper decision-making process. It is emphasized that algorithmic systems function in the paradigm of inductive generalization, which contradicts the principles of legal certainty and standards of proof. The hermeneutic tradition demonstrates the inability of algorithms to adequately take into account the context and value aspects. The paper also analyzes the concept of value pluralism of Isaiah Berlin, which indicates the impossibility of reducing moral values to mathematical criteria, which threatens reductionism in justice. The issue of the “accountability gap” is considered, since algorithmic systems are deprived of freedom and moral responsibility that are necessary conditions for the legitimacy of a judicial decision. Epistemological challenges are particularly emphasized, namely the opacity of algorithms contradicts the requirements of the validity and comprehensibility of judicial decisions. Attention is paid to the temporal aspect of justice, since algorithms trained on historical data risk reproducing outdated prejudices. Based on philosophical and legal analysis, the principle of algorithmic justice subsidiarity is substantiated: automation is possible in the field of procedural, analytical and standardized decisions, but is unacceptable for issues of guilt, punishment or complex value dilemmas. The principles of the ethical architecture of algorithmic justice are proposed, in particular moral agency, hermeneutic transparency, value completeness and temporal justice. It is concluded that the automation of justice can only act as an auxiliary tool, while the ultimate responsibility for the legal decision should belong to the human judge.