Li-An Zhou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Li-An Zhou has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xi Weng
Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
3 shared publications Chao Chen
School of Management Fudan University Shanghai 200433 China
1 shared publication- Chong Liu
Peking University
1 shared publication - Ginger Zhe Jin
Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; and National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
1 shared publication - Guangyu Cao
Peking University - School of Economics
1 shared publication - Hongbin Cai
Guanghua School of Management and IEPR, Peking University;
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 December 2025
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Research in Government and Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 76-93
Regional Competition and Political-Economic Interactions, Chinese Style
Regional competition surrounding economic development has been a critical element with distinctive Chinese characteristics during the reform and opening-up process over the past four decades. Based on a review and synthesis of existing literature, this paper first examines the historical evolution, key features, and institutional causes of regional competition in China, pointing out that promotion competition among local officials and market competition among local enterprises are the main driving forces. Subsequently, the paper explores significant impacts of regional competition on the political-economic interaction process with Chinese characteristics, focusing on three unique effects: first, it has shaped local governments that integrate three key roles of public service providers, competitive players, and market-participants; second, it has created a trinity government-market relationship involving the central government, local governments, and the market, rather than a traditional dichotomy between government and market; third, it has facilitated the formation of regional growth alliances and a government-business cooperative relationship based on the nexus between political achievements and economic performance.
- 15 December 2025
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Research in Government and Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 76-93
Open AccessRegional Competition and Political-Economic Interactions, Chinese Style
Regional competition surrounding economic development has been a critical element with distinctive Chinese characteristics during the reform and opening-up process over the past four decades. Based on a review and synthesis of existing literature, this paper first examines the historical evolution, key features, and institutional causes of regional competition in China, pointing out that promotion competition among local officials and market competition among local enterprises are the main driving forces. Subsequently, the paper explores significant impacts of regional competition on the political-economic interaction process with Chinese characteristics, focusing on three unique effects: first, it has shaped local governments that integrate three key roles of public service providers, competitive players, and market-participants; second, it has created a trinity government-market relationship involving the central government, local governments, and the market, rather than a traditional dichotomy between government and market; third, it has facilitated the formation of regional growth alliances and a government-business cooperative relationship based on the nexus between political achievements and economic performance.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in China Journal of Economic
- Vol. 11 (1) , 233-271
The 156 Projects and Regional Industrial Clustering of China—Evidence from Production Networks
We study the production-linkage effects of the 156 projects on regional industrial clustering at the beginning of the People’s Republic of China(PRC). We use panel data from 1949 to 1975 to empirically analyze the impact of the 156 projects on local firms’ entries in the industrial production networks. The data are drawn from firm-level industrial surveys and prefecture-level information on industrial and social development. We find that the prefectures with the 156 projects have more firm entries than other prefectures. Industry-level analysis shows that the effects of the 156 projects on firm entries are larger for industries closer to the 156 projects in the production network. In addition, the effects in the network based on output linkages are larger than those in the network based on input linkages. These industry-level effects are concentrated in the period when the construction of the 156 projects was completed. We also show that the 156 projects have significant long-term effects on local production networks after 1978. To address the potential endogeneity issue in the empirical analysis, we exploit national defense considerations related to the 156 projects to conduct instrumental variable analysis and find robust results. We also identify some projects that moved from planned to actual sites because of the national defense considerations. Then we compare the production-network effects between the actual and planned locations and find those effects are concentrated in the actual locations. Our analysis shows that the 156 projects significantly improve regional industrial clustering and offers crucial empirical evidence for the establishment and development of the industrial system of the PRC.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in China Journal of Economic
- Vol. 11 (1) , 233-271
Open AccessThe 156 Projects and Regional Industrial Clustering of China—Evidence from Production Networks
We study the production-linkage effects of the 156 projects on regional industrial clustering at the beginning of the People’s Republic of China(PRC). We use panel data from 1949 to 1975 to empirically analyze the impact of the 156 projects on local firms’ entries in the industrial production networks. The data are drawn from firm-level industrial surveys and prefecture-level information on industrial and social development. We find that the prefectures with the 156 projects have more firm entries than other prefectures. Industry-level analysis shows that the effects of the 156 projects on firm entries are larger for industries closer to the 156 projects in the production network. In addition, the effects in the network based on output linkages are larger than those in the network based on input linkages. These industry-level effects are concentrated in the period when the construction of the 156 projects was completed. We also show that the 156 projects have significant long-term effects on local production networks after 1978. To address the potential endogeneity issue in the empirical analysis, we exploit national defense considerations related to the 156 projects to conduct instrumental variable analysis and find robust results. We also identify some projects that moved from planned to actual sites because of the national defense considerations. Then we compare the production-network effects between the actual and planned locations and find those effects are concentrated in the actual locations. Our analysis shows that the 156 projects significantly improve regional industrial clustering and offers crucial empirical evidence for the establishment and development of the industrial system of the PRC.
- 24 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-39
Evaluating the effects of a massive rural school expansion in pre-reform China
- 24 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-39
Evaluating the effects of a massive rural school expansion in pre-reform China
- 6 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 82 (3) , 625-661
The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902–1911
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam removed. Using anti-elite protests as a proxy for the deterioration of local governance, we find that prefectures with a higher POUM experienced more incidents of anti-elite protests after the abolition.
- 6 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 82 (3) , 625-661
The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902–1911
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam removed. Using anti-elite protests as a proxy for the deterioration of local governance, we find that prefectures with a higher POUM experienced more incidents of anti-elite protests after the abolition.
- 5 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (4) , 778-814
Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing
Using staggered entry of two dockless bike‐sharing firms, we study whether the entrant expands or steals the market from the incumbent in 59 cities. Compared with 23 cities without entry, the entry helps the incumbent to serve more trips, make more bike investment, achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization, and form a wider and more dispersed network. The market‐expanding effect on new users dominates a significant market‐stealing effect on old users. These findings, plus a theory that highlights consumer search and network effects, suggest that a market with positive network effects and multihoming users is not necessarily winner‐takes‐all.
- 5 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (4) , 778-814
Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing
Using staggered entry of two dockless bike‐sharing firms, we study whether the entrant expands or steals the market from the incumbent in 59 cities. Compared with 23 cities without entry, the entry helps the incumbent to serve more trips, make more bike investment, achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization, and form a wider and more dispersed network. The market‐expanding effect on new users dominates a significant market‐stealing effect on old users. These findings, plus a theory that highlights consumer search and network effects, suggest that a market with positive network effects and multihoming users is not necessarily winner‐takes‐all.
- Top Cited Papers
- 20 May 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 129 (623) , 2888-2915
Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China
Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.
- 20 May 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 129 (623) , 2888-2915
Top Cited PapersTarget Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China
Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.
- 28 January 2016
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 39-47
Executive Compensation and Legal Investor Protection: Evidence from China's Listed Firms
- 28 January 2016
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 39-47
Executive Compensation and Legal Investor Protection: Evidence from China's Listed Firms
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Chinese Journal of Sociology
- Vol. 2 (1) , 34-74
The administrative subcontract: Significance, relevance and implications for intergovernmental relations in China
This article attempts to demonstrate the significance, relevance and implications of the ‘administrative subcontract’ as an analytical framework for understanding China’s intergovernmental relations, bureaucratic incentives and administrative governance. As an ideal type, the term ‘administrative subcontract’ refers to a subcontracting relationship inside the government system, representing a hybrid governance structure between bureaucracy in the Weberian sense and a ‘pure’ subcontract which occurs among independent entities having no hierarchical relationships. An administrative subcontract exhibits a coherent and consistent set of characteristics along the dimensions of authority relations, economic incentives and internal control. It is argued that these three dimensions are complementary and mutually supportive, and tend to move together if the system encounters systemic shocks. This new framework helps with identifying the key and durable features of China’s intergovernmental relations and administrative governance. The notion of the administrative subcontract enables many puzzling observations and patterns regarding the workings of China’s government system to be reinterpreted and some important and as yet long understudied issues brought to our attention. The theory of the administrative subcontract is combined with that of ‘political tournaments’ to extend the analysis of China’s political incentives and governance. With regard to vertical subcontracting and horizontal (political) competition inside the government system, an attempt is made to explain the strength and weakness of China’s state capacity in various areas of public service.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Chinese Journal of Sociology
- Vol. 2 (1) , 34-74
Open AccessThe administrative subcontract: Significance, relevance and implications for intergovernmental relations in China
This article attempts to demonstrate the significance, relevance and implications of the ‘administrative subcontract’ as an analytical framework for understanding China’s intergovernmental relations, bureaucratic incentives and administrative governance. As an ideal type, the term ‘administrative subcontract’ refers to a subcontracting relationship inside the government system, representing a hybrid governance structure between bureaucracy in the Weberian sense and a ‘pure’ subcontract which occurs among independent entities having no hierarchical relationships. An administrative subcontract exhibits a coherent and consistent set of characteristics along the dimensions of authority relations, economic incentives and internal control. It is argued that these three dimensions are complementary and mutually supportive, and tend to move together if the system encounters systemic shocks. This new framework helps with identifying the key and durable features of China’s intergovernmental relations and administrative governance. The notion of the administrative subcontract enables many puzzling observations and patterns regarding the workings of China’s government system to be reinterpreted and some important and as yet long understudied issues brought to our attention. The theory of the administrative subcontract is combined with that of ‘political tournaments’ to extend the analysis of China’s political incentives and governance. With regard to vertical subcontracting and horizontal (political) competition inside the government system, an attempt is made to explain the strength and weakness of China’s state capacity in various areas of public service.
- 20 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 15 (3) , 569-585
Intra‐industry Knowledge Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in Research and Development: Evidence from China's “Silicon Valley”
This study examines a specific channel of technology diffusion from multinational enterprises to domestic firms in less developed regions: research and development (R&D) activities of multinational enterprises in the host country. Using firm‐level panel data from a Chinese science park, known as China's “Silicon Valley,” we find that the R&D stock of foreign‐owned firms has a positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry, while the capital stock of foreign firms has no such effect. These results suggest that foreign firms' knowledge spills over within industries through their R&D activities, but not through their production activities. In addition, we find no evidence of spillovers from domestic firms or firms from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, suggesting that the size of knowledge spillovers is larger when the technology gap between source and recipient firms is larger.
- 20 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 15 (3) , 569-585
Intra‐industry Knowledge Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in Research and Development: Evidence from China's “Silicon Valley”
This study examines a specific channel of technology diffusion from multinational enterprises to domestic firms in less developed regions: research and development (R&D) activities of multinational enterprises in the host country. Using firm‐level panel data from a Chinese science park, known as China's “Silicon Valley,” we find that the R&D stock of foreign‐owned firms has a positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry, while the capital stock of foreign firms has no such effect. These results suggest that foreign firms' knowledge spills over within industries through their R&D activities, but not through their production activities. In addition, we find no evidence of spillovers from domestic firms or firms from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, suggesting that the size of knowledge spillovers is larger when the technology gap between source and recipient firms is larger.
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (1) , 156-189
INCENTIVES, EQUALITY AND CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN THE CHINESE BANKING INDUSTRY*
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (1) , 156-189
INCENTIVES, EQUALITY AND CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN THE CHINESE BANKING INDUSTRY*