Xi Weng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Xi Weng has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Li-An Zhou
Guanghua School of Management,CHINA. Peking University, 100871,CHINA
3 shared publications - Ju Hu
Peking Univ, China Ctr Econ Res, Natl Sch Dev, Beijing, Peoples R China
2 shared publications - Chong Liu
Peking University
1 shared publication - Dusit Niyato
Nanyang technological university, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication - Ginger Zhe Jin
Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; and National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
1 shared publication - Guangyu Cao
Peking University - School of Economics
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 169
The technological origins of the decline in labor market dynamism
- 10 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 169
Open AccessThe technological origins of the decline in labor market dynamism
- 3 September 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Communications Magazine
- Vol. 62 (9) , 106-112
Meta-Backscatter: A New ISAC Paradigm for Battery-Free Internet of Things
The meta-material sensor has been regarded as a next-generation sensing technology for the battery-free Internet of Things (IoT) due to its battery-free characteristic and improved sensing performance. The meta-material sensors function as backscatter tags that change their reflection coefficients with the conditions of sensing targets, such as temperature and gas concentration, allowing transceivers to perform sensing by analyzing the reflected signals from the sensors. Simultaneously, the sensors also function as environmental scatterers, creating additional signal paths to enhance communication performance. Therefore, the meta-material sensor potentially provides a new paradigm of integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) for the battery-free IoT system. In this article, we first propose a meta-backscatter system that utilizes meta-material sensors to achieve diverse sensing functionalities and improved communication performance. We begin with the introduction of the meta-material sensor and further elaborate on the meta-backscatter system. Subsequently, we present optimization strategies for meta-material sensors, transmitters, and receivers to strike a balance between sensing and communication. Furthermore, this article provides a case study of the system and examines the feasibility and trade-off through the simulation results. Finally, potential extensions of the system and their related research challenges are addressed.
- 3 September 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Communications Magazine
- Vol. 62 (9) , 106-112
Meta-Backscatter: A New ISAC Paradigm for Battery-Free Internet of Things
The meta-material sensor has been regarded as a next-generation sensing technology for the battery-free Internet of Things (IoT) due to its battery-free characteristic and improved sensing performance. The meta-material sensors function as backscatter tags that change their reflection coefficients with the conditions of sensing targets, such as temperature and gas concentration, allowing transceivers to perform sensing by analyzing the reflected signals from the sensors. Simultaneously, the sensors also function as environmental scatterers, creating additional signal paths to enhance communication performance. Therefore, the meta-material sensor potentially provides a new paradigm of integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) for the battery-free IoT system. In this article, we first propose a meta-backscatter system that utilizes meta-material sensors to achieve diverse sensing functionalities and improved communication performance. We begin with the introduction of the meta-material sensor and further elaborate on the meta-backscatter system. Subsequently, we present optimization strategies for meta-material sensors, transmitters, and receivers to strike a balance between sensing and communication. Furthermore, this article provides a case study of the system and examines the feasibility and trade-off through the simulation results. Finally, potential extensions of the system and their related research challenges are addressed.
- 30 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 208
Optimal contingent delegation
- 30 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 208
Optimal contingent delegation
- 6 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 82 (3) , 625-661
The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902–1911
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam removed. Using anti-elite protests as a proxy for the deterioration of local governance, we find that prefectures with a higher POUM experienced more incidents of anti-elite protests after the abolition.
- 6 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 82 (3) , 625-661
The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902–1911
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam removed. Using anti-elite protests as a proxy for the deterioration of local governance, we find that prefectures with a higher POUM experienced more incidents of anti-elite protests after the abolition.
- 5 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (4) , 778-814
Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing
Using staggered entry of two dockless bike‐sharing firms, we study whether the entrant expands or steals the market from the incumbent in 59 cities. Compared with 23 cities without entry, the entry helps the incumbent to serve more trips, make more bike investment, achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization, and form a wider and more dispersed network. The market‐expanding effect on new users dominates a significant market‐stealing effect on old users. These findings, plus a theory that highlights consumer search and network effects, suggest that a market with positive network effects and multihoming users is not necessarily winner‐takes‐all.
- 5 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (4) , 778-814
Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing
Using staggered entry of two dockless bike‐sharing firms, we study whether the entrant expands or steals the market from the incumbent in 59 cities. Compared with 23 cities without entry, the entry helps the incumbent to serve more trips, make more bike investment, achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization, and form a wider and more dispersed network. The market‐expanding effect on new users dominates a significant market‐stealing effect on old users. These findings, plus a theory that highlights consumer search and network effects, suggest that a market with positive network effects and multihoming users is not necessarily winner‐takes‐all.
- 8 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 72 (3) , 909-953
Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- 8 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 72 (3) , 909-953
Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- 16 April 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Intelligent Systems
- Vol. 35 (4) , 58-69
A Sustainable Incentive Scheme for Federated Learning
In Federated Learning (FL), a federation distributedly trains a collective machine learning model by leveraging privacy preserving technologies. However, FL participants need to incur some cost for contributing to the FL models. The training and commercialization of the models will take time. Thus, there will be delays before the federation could pay back the participants. This temporary mismatch between contributions and rewards has not been accounted for by existing payoff-sharing schemes. To address this limitation, we propose the Federated Learning Incentivizer (FLI). It dynamically divides a given budget in a context-aware manner among data owners in a federation by jointly maximizing the collective utility while minimizing the inequality among the data owners, in terms of the payoff received and the waiting time for receiving payoffs. Comparisons with five state-of-the-art payoff-sharing schemes show that FLI attracts high quality data owners and achieves the highest expected revenue for a federation.
- 16 April 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Intelligent Systems
- Vol. 35 (4) , 58-69
A Sustainable Incentive Scheme for Federated Learning
In Federated Learning (FL), a federation distributedly trains a collective machine learning model by leveraging privacy preserving technologies. However, FL participants need to incur some cost for contributing to the FL models. The training and commercialization of the models will take time. Thus, there will be delays before the federation could pay back the participants. This temporary mismatch between contributions and rewards has not been accounted for by existing payoff-sharing schemes. To address this limitation, we propose the Federated Learning Incentivizer (FLI). It dynamically divides a given budget in a context-aware manner among data owners in a federation by jointly maximizing the collective utility while minimizing the inequality among the data owners, in terms of the payoff received and the waiting time for receiving payoffs. Comparisons with five state-of-the-art payoff-sharing schemes show that FLI attracts high quality data owners and achieves the highest expected revenue for a federation.
- Top Cited Papers
- 20 May 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 129 (623) , 2888-2915
Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China
Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.
- 20 May 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 129 (623) , 2888-2915
Top Cited PapersTarget Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China
Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 10 (4) , 94-130
A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency
We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In addition, organizations with a certain degree of incongruity perform better in the long run than either harmonious or very divided organizations.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 10 (4) , 94-130
A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency
We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In addition, organizations with a certain degree of incongruity perform better in the long run than either harmonious or very divided organizations.
- 18 April 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 742-771
Managerial turnover and entrenchment
We consider a two‐period model in which the success of the firm depends on the effort of a first‐period manager (the incumbent) as well as the effort and ability of a second‐period manager. At the end of the first period, the board receives a noisy signal of the incumbent manager's ability and decides whether to retain or replace the incumbent manager. We show that severance pay can be utilized in the optimal contract to provide a credible commitment to a lenient second‐period equilibrium replacement policy, mitigating the first‐period moral hazard problem. Unlike existing models that aim to rationalize managerial entrenchment, we identify conditions on the information structure under which both entrenchment and anti‐entrenchment emerge in the optimal contract. Specifically, our model predicts that it is optimal for the board to design a contract to induce entrenchment (respectively, anti‐entrenchment) if the signal regarding the incumbent manager's ability becomes sufficiently uninformative (respectively, informative).
- 18 April 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 742-771
Managerial turnover and entrenchment
We consider a two‐period model in which the success of the firm depends on the effort of a first‐period manager (the incumbent) as well as the effort and ability of a second‐period manager. At the end of the first period, the board receives a noisy signal of the incumbent manager's ability and decides whether to retain or replace the incumbent manager. We show that severance pay can be utilized in the optimal contract to provide a credible commitment to a lenient second‐period equilibrium replacement policy, mitigating the first‐period moral hazard problem. Unlike existing models that aim to rationalize managerial entrenchment, we identify conditions on the information structure under which both entrenchment and anti‐entrenchment emerge in the optimal contract. Specifically, our model predicts that it is optimal for the board to design a contract to induce entrenchment (respectively, anti‐entrenchment) if the signal regarding the incumbent manager's ability becomes sufficiently uninformative (respectively, informative).