LSLaura Smalarz

Laura Smalarz

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Laura Smalarz has a total of 661 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Correction: Rath et al. (2025). Does the Forensic Filler-Control Method Reduce Examiner Overconfidence? An Experimental Investigation Using Mock Fingerprint Examiners. Behavioral Sciences, 15(9), 1191

    by Hannah J. Rath, Bethany Rocha, Andrew M. Smith, Laura Smalarz

    In the original publication (Rath et al

  • Open Access

    Investigating the replicability of the social and behavioural sciences

    by Andrew Harold Tyner, Anna Lou Abatayo, Macie Daley, Samuel Field, Nicholas William Fox, Noah Haber, Krystal Hahn, Melissa Kline Struhl, Brinna Mawhinney, Olivia Miske, et al.

    We attempted replications of 274 claims of positive results from 164 quantitative papers published from 2009 to 2018 in 54 journals in the social and behavioral sciences. Replications were high-powered on average to detect the original effect size (Median = 99.6%), used original materials when relevant and available, and were peer-reviewed in advance through a standardized internal protocol. Replications showed statistically significant results in the original pattern for 151 of 274 claims (55.1% [95% CI 49.2 - 60.9%]) and for 80.8 of 164 papers (49.3% [95% CI 43.8 - 54.7%]) weighed for replicating multiple claims per paper. We observed modest variation in replication rates across disciplines (42.5% to 63.1%) though some estimates had high uncertainty. For claims with Pearson’s r effect sizes, the median was 0.25 [95% CI 0.21 - 0.27] for original studies and 0.10 [95% CI 0.09 - 0.13] for replication studies, a 82.4% [95% CI 67.8 - 88.2%] reduction in shared variance. Thirteen methods for evaluating replication success provided estimates ranging from 28.6% to 74.8% (median = 49.3%). Some decline in effect size and significance is expected based on power to detect original effects and regression to the mean due to replicating only positive results. The conditions that promote or inhibit replicability are worthy of additional investigation.

  • Open Access

    Does the Forensic Filler-Control Method Reduce Examiner Overconfidence? An Experimental Investigation Using Mock Fingerprint Examiners

    by Hannah J. Rath, Bethany Rocha, Andrew M. Smith, Laura Smalarz

    Examiner overconfidence is a persistent challenge in the field of forensic science, where testimony overstating the validity of forensic techniques has contributed to numerous wrongful convictions. Scholars have proposed a new method for reducing examiner overconfidence (i.e., subjective confidence that exceeds objective accuracy): the forensic filler-control method. The forensic filler-control method, which includes known non-matching “filler” samples alongside the suspect’s sample, is theorized to reduce examiner overconfidence through the provision of immediate error feedback to examiners following match judgments on fillers. We conducted two experiments that failed to yield support for this claim. Among both an undergraduate student sample (Experiment 1) and a forensic science student sample (Experiment 2), the filler-control method was associated with worse calibration (C) and greater overconfidence (O/U) in affirmative match judgments than the standard method. Moreover, the filler-control method produced less accurate non-match judgments, undermining the exonerating value of forensic analysis (i.e., NPV). However, the filler-control method’s ability to draw false positive matches away from innocent-suspect samples and onto fillers produced more reliable incriminating evidence (i.e., PPV) compared to the standard procedure. Our findings suggest that neither the standard procedure nor the filler-control procedure offers a uniformly superior method of conducting forensic analysis. We suggest alternative procedures for enhancing both the inculpatory and exculpatory value of forensic analysis.


  • Open Access

    Mechanisms of Self-Regulatory Decline in Accusatorial Interrogations

    by Amber Heemskerk, Laura Smalarz, Stephanie Madon, Max Guyll, Yueran Yang

    Confessions carry substantial weight in criminal investigations, yet little is known about the psychological mechanisms underlying suspects’ confession decisions. This research tested the hypothesis that situational pressures inherent to accusatorial interrogations deplete suspects’ self-regulatory resources, impairing their ability to make rational, self-protective decisions. We examined three potential mechanisms of self-regulatory depletion in accusatorial interrogations: (1) decision-making pressure, (2) fatigue, and (3) depleted self-regulatory reserves. Participants were interviewed about minor (Experiment 1; N = 154) or serious (Experiment 2; N = 486) prior criminal and unethical behaviors under conditions that manipulated whether they experienced both decision-making pressure and fatigue, fatigue alone, or neither. We operationalized decision-making pressure through a response-contingent consequence structure and fatigue through extended questioning. We measured self-regulatory capacity by assessing time spent on an unsolvable anagram task after the interview. Experiment 2 also manipulated whether participants’ pre-interview self-regulatory reserves were depleted by having some complete the unsolvable anagram task before, as opposed to after, the interview. The results suggested a role of decision-making pressure—alone and in combination with fatigue—in producing self-regulatory depletion but provided no evidence for the effect of experimentally depleted self-regulatory reserves. These findings offer empirical support for theories linking interrogation pressures to self-regulatory decline.


  • The Miranda penalty: Inferring guilt from suspects’ silence.

    by Megan L. Lawrence, Emma R. Saiter, Rose E. Eerdmans, Laura Smalarz

    Despite the risks inherent to custodial police interrogation, criminal suspects may waive their Miranda rights and submit to police questioning in fear that exercising their rights or remaining silent will make them appear guilty. We tested whether such a Miranda penalty exists. We predicted that people would perceive suspects who invoke their Miranda rights or sit in silence during an interrogation as more likely to be guilty than those who waive their Miranda rights. In two experiments, undergraduate psychology students (Experiment 1; N = 256) and students enrolled in law-enforcement-related degree programs (Experiment 2; N = 119) were instructed to play the role of a police officer investigating a series of crimes in which the suspect invoked his Miranda rights, sat in silence, or spoke to police. Participants evaluated each suspect along various characteristics (e.g., honest, suspicious), assessed his likely guilt, and reported how many hours they would allocate to investigating the suspect versus other potential suspects. Suspects who invoked their right to silence or remained silent, compared with those who waived their rights and spoke to police, were perceived more negatively and judged as guiltier. Participants also allocated more hours toward investigating such suspects. The protective power of Miranda is eroded by the tendency for people to infer guilt from a suspect's decision to invoke Miranda or remain silent during police interrogation. This Miranda penalty violates suspects' legal protection from being penalized for exercising their constitutional rights against self-incrimination and may bias the investigation and prosecution of criminal suspects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).


  • Open Access

    Large-scale cross-societal examination of real- and minimal-group biases

    by Xin Yang, Jonathan Friedemann Schulz, Kathleen Schmidt, Adam R Kenny, Gerit Pfuhl, Biljana Gjoneska, Ilker Dalgar, Savannah C Lewis, Anna Exner, Erin Michelle Buchanan, et al.

    Biases in favor of culturally prevalent social ingroups are ubiquitous, but random assignment to arbitrary experimentally created social groups is also sufficient to create ingroup biases (i.e., the minimal group effect; MGE). The extent to which ingroup bias arises from specific social contexts versus more general psychological tendencies remains unclear. This registered report focuses on three questions. First, how culturally prevalent is the MGE? Second, how do critical cultural and individual factors moderate its strength? Third, does the MGE meaningfully relate to culturally salient real-world ingroup biases? We compare the MGE to bias in favor of a family member (first cousin) and a national ingroup member. We propose to recruit a sample of > 200 participants in each of > 50 nations to examine these questions and advance our understanding of the psychological foundations and cultural prevalence of ingroup bias.

  • Open Access

    Cross-Examination Fails to Safeguard Against Feedback Effects on Eyewitness Testimony

    by Taylor Lebensfeld, Laura Smalarz

    The legal system relies heavily on eyewitness evidence to identify and prosecute criminal perpetrators, but wrongful convictions resulting from eyewitness misidentification have led many to conclude that eyewitness memory is unreliable. Advances in eyewitness identification research have produced a more nuanced understanding of eyewitness reliability, however. Whereas pristinely collected eyewitness identification evidence provides diagnostic information about a suspect’s guilt or innocence, numerous contaminants of eyewitness memory can undermine the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence. One such contaminant is confirming post-identification feedback—feedback given to or inferred by an eyewitness that communicates that their identification decision was correct. Confirming feedback is inevitable in real cases involving eyewitness identification and compromises the diagnostic value of eyewitness memory to such an extent that it undermines evaluators’ abilities to differentiate between accurate and mistaken eyewitnesses (Smalarz & Wells, 2014). The current research tested whether cross-examination, a fundamental legal safeguard for preventing wrongful conviction based on eyewitness misidentification, can help remedy the contaminating effects of feedback on eyewitness testimony. Evaluators (N = 128) viewed direct examination testimony or direct- and cross-examination testimony of accurate and mistaken eyewitnesses, some of whom had received confirming feedback following their identification. Although the majority of eyewitnesses admitted during cross-examination that some or all of their recollections may have been influenced by the feedback, viewing the cross-examination did not improve evaluators’ abilities to differentiate between accurate and mistaken eyewitness testimony. Cross-examination appears to be an insufficient safeguard for preventing wrongful convictions based on contaminated eyewitness evidence.