Pier Giuseppe Sessa
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Pier Giuseppe Sessa has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Maryam Kamgarpour
Department of Electrical Engineering, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Alessandro Zanardi
Institute for Dynamic Systems and Control, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Andrea Censi
Institute for Dynamic Systems and Control, ETH Zrich, Zrich, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Damian Frick
Automatic Control Laboratory ETH Zurich Switzerland
1 shared publication Emilio Frazzoli
1 shared publicationMaryam Kamgarpour
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
How Bad is Selfish Driving? Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Urban Driving Games
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most efficient equilibrium (in term of social cost) is often impractical from a computational standpoint, in this work we study the (in)efficiency of any equilibrium players might agree to play. More specifically, we bound the equilibrium inefficiency by modeling driving games as particular type of congestion games over spatio-temporal resources. We obtain novel guarantees that refine existing bounds on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) as a function of problem-dependent game parameters. For instance, the relative trade-off between proximity costs and personal objectives such as comfort and progress. Although the obtained guarantees concern open-loop trajectories, we observe efficient equilibria even when agents employ closed-loop policies trained via decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Open AccessHow Bad is Selfish Driving? Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Urban Driving Games
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most efficient equilibrium (in term of social cost) is often impractical from a computational standpoint, in this work we study the (in)efficiency of any equilibrium players might agree to play. More specifically, we bound the equilibrium inefficiency by modeling driving games as particular type of congestion games over spatio-temporal resources. We obtain novel guarantees that refine existing bounds on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) as a function of problem-dependent game parameters. For instance, the relative trade-off between proximity costs and personal objectives such as comfort and progress. Although the obtained guarantees concern open-loop trajectories, we observe efficient equilibria even when agents employ closed-loop policies trained via decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning.
- 2 April 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 64 (11) , 4803-4810
Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.
- 2 April 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 64 (11) , 4803-4810
Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.
- Open Access
Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.
Open AccessDesigning Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.
- Open Access
From Uncertainty Data to Robust Policies for Temporal Logic Planning
We consider the problem of synthesizing robust disturbance feedback policies for systems performing complex tasks. We formulate the tasks as linear temporal logic specifications and encode them into an optimization framework via mixed-integer constraints. Both the system dynamics and the specifications are known but affected by uncertainty. The distribution of the uncertainty is unknown, however realizations can be obtained. We introduce a data-driven approach where the constraints are fulfilled for a set of realizations and provide probabilistic generalization guarantees as a function of the number of considered realizations. We use separate chance constraints for the satisfaction of the specification and operational constraints. This allows us to quantify their violation probabilities independently. We compute disturbance feedback policies as solutions of mixed-integer linear or quadratic optimization problems. By using feedback we can exploit information of past realizations and provide feasibility for a wider range of situations compared to static input sequences. We demonstrate the proposed method on two robust motion-planning case studies for autonomous driving.
Open AccessFrom Uncertainty Data to Robust Policies for Temporal Logic Planning
We consider the problem of synthesizing robust disturbance feedback policies for systems performing complex tasks. We formulate the tasks as linear temporal logic specifications and encode them into an optimization framework via mixed-integer constraints. Both the system dynamics and the specifications are known but affected by uncertainty. The distribution of the uncertainty is unknown, however realizations can be obtained. We introduce a data-driven approach where the constraints are fulfilled for a set of realizations and provide probabilistic generalization guarantees as a function of the number of considered realizations. We use separate chance constraints for the satisfaction of the specification and operational constraints. This allows us to quantify their violation probabilities independently. We compute disturbance feedback policies as solutions of mixed-integer linear or quadratic optimization problems. By using feedback we can exploit information of past realizations and provide feasibility for a wider range of situations compared to static input sequences. We demonstrate the proposed method on two robust motion-planning case studies for autonomous driving.