Zhenghong Qiu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Zhenghong Qiu has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jianhui Huang
Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
2 shared publications - Jianhui Huang
Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
1 shared publication - Shujun Wang
School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan, China
1 shared publication - Tinghan Xie
Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, PR China
1 shared publication - Xinwei Feng
Zhongtai Securities Institute for Financial Studies, Shandong University, Jinan, China
1 shared publication - Zhen Wu
School of Mathematics, State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Shandong University, Jinan, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 69 (5) , 3325-3332
A Unified Relation Analysis of Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Game, Team, and Control
This article revisits well-studied dynamic decisions in weakly coupled large-population (LP) systems. Specifically, three types of LP decision problems: mean-field game (MG), mean-field team (MT), and mean-field-type control (MC), are completely analyzed in a general stochastic linear-quadratic setting with controlled-diffusion in state dynamics and indefinite weight in cost functional. More importantly, interrelations among MG, MT, and MC are systematically discussed; some relevant and interesting findings are reported that may be applied to a structural analysis of general LP decisions.
- 11 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 69 (5) , 3325-3332
A Unified Relation Analysis of Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Game, Team, and Control
This article revisits well-studied dynamic decisions in weakly coupled large-population (LP) systems. Specifically, three types of LP decision problems: mean-field game (MG), mean-field team (MT), and mean-field-type control (MC), are completely analyzed in a general stochastic linear-quadratic setting with controlled-diffusion in state dynamics and indefinite weight in cost functional. More importantly, interrelations among MG, MT, and MC are systematically discussed; some relevant and interesting findings are reported that may be applied to a structural analysis of general LP decisions.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-34
Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian mean-field controls of social optima
This paper investigates a class of unified stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optima problems involving a large number of weakly-coupled interactive agents under a generalized setting. For each individual agent, the control and state process enters both diffusion and drift terms in its linear dynamics, and the control weight might be indefinite in cost functional. This setup is innovative and has great theoretical and realistic significance as its applications in mathematical finance (e.g., portfolio selection in mean-variation model). Using some fully-coupled variational analysis under the person-by-person optimality principle, and the mean-field approximation method, the decentralized social control is derived by a class of new type consistency condition (CC) system for typical representative agent. Such CC system is some mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation (MF-FBSDE) combined with embedding representation. The well-posedness of such forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system is carefully examined. The related social asymptotic optimality is related to the convergence of the average of a series of weakly-coupled backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). They are verified through some Lyapunov equations.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-34
Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian mean-field controls of social optima
This paper investigates a class of unified stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optima problems involving a large number of weakly-coupled interactive agents under a generalized setting. For each individual agent, the control and state process enters both diffusion and drift terms in its linear dynamics, and the control weight might be indefinite in cost functional. This setup is innovative and has great theoretical and realistic significance as its applications in mathematical finance (e.g., portfolio selection in mean-variation model). Using some fully-coupled variational analysis under the person-by-person optimality principle, and the mean-field approximation method, the decentralized social control is derived by a class of new type consistency condition (CC) system for typical representative agent. Such CC system is some mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation (MF-FBSDE) combined with embedding representation. The well-posedness of such forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system is carefully examined. The related social asymptotic optimality is related to the convergence of the average of a series of weakly-coupled backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). They are verified through some Lyapunov equations.
- 28 December 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 67 (12) , 6858-6865
Mixed Social Optima and Nash Equilibrium in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Mean-Field System
This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in the context of a large-scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of weakly-coupled minor agents. All minor agents are cooperative to minimize the social cost as the sum of their individual costs, whereas such social cost is conflictive to that of the major agent. Thus, the major agent and all minor agents are further competitive to reach some nonzero-sum Nash equilibrium. Applying the mean-field approximations and person-by-person optimality, we obtain auxiliary control problems for the major agent and minor agents, respectively. The decentralized social strategy is derived by a class of new consistency condition (CC) system, which consists of mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The well-posedness of CC system is obtained by the discounting method. The related asymptotic social optimality for minor agents and Nash equilibrium for major-minor agents are also verified.
- 28 December 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 67 (12) , 6858-6865
Mixed Social Optima and Nash Equilibrium in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Mean-Field System
This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in the context of a large-scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of weakly-coupled minor agents. All minor agents are cooperative to minimize the social cost as the sum of their individual costs, whereas such social cost is conflictive to that of the major agent. Thus, the major agent and all minor agents are further competitive to reach some nonzero-sum Nash equilibrium. Applying the mean-field approximations and person-by-person optimality, we obtain auxiliary control problems for the major agent and minor agents, respectively. The decentralized social strategy is derived by a class of new consistency condition (CC) system, which consists of mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The well-posedness of CC system is obtained by the discounting method. The related asymptotic social optimality for minor agents and Nash equilibrium for major-minor agents are also verified.