Georgi Gardiner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Georgi Gardiner has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brian Zaharatos
University of Colorado, Boulder, USA
1 shared publication - Jacob Smith
University of Virginia
1 shared publication Lewis Ross
1 shared publicationLisa Bastian
1 shared publicationMiguel Egler
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- p. 1-11
In Defence of Ritual Erotics without Consent: Pagan Sex Ethics and the Costs of Knowing What is Coming
The “affirmative consent model” for sexual acts requires that participants give explicit, unambiguous, informed, and enthusiastic consent. This model is a valuable harm reduction practice but, as a pre-requisite for erotic action, it is sometimes over-applied. As a result, people can feel unduly constrained and forgo valuable activities. I introduce a case study, the Pagan fertility festival of Beltane, which customarily includes a representation of sexual congress, such as dancing, gyrating, or thrusting. I argue that to permissibly perform these erotic ritual acts, the protagonists—in this case, the May Queen and Oak King—do not need explicit affirmative consent from everyone gathered in the magic circle or temple. Indeed employing the widespread operative model of affirmative consent can be disadvantageous because it would require participants to know the ritual’s details beforehand. In making this case, I highlight the costs of predictability, choreography, and prior communication in erotic rituals. And I argue that, owing to distinctive features of community-orientated and religious erotics, theorists shouldn’t simply extend interpersonal sexual ethics to explain these contexts. Instead, to countenance Paganism as an important social form, theorists must look to the ethics of institutions. Like churches and educational establishments, erotic ritual is social infrastructure.
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- p. 1-11
Open AccessIn Defence of Ritual Erotics without Consent: Pagan Sex Ethics and the Costs of Knowing What is Coming
The “affirmative consent model” for sexual acts requires that participants give explicit, unambiguous, informed, and enthusiastic consent. This model is a valuable harm reduction practice but, as a pre-requisite for erotic action, it is sometimes over-applied. As a result, people can feel unduly constrained and forgo valuable activities. I introduce a case study, the Pagan fertility festival of Beltane, which customarily includes a representation of sexual congress, such as dancing, gyrating, or thrusting. I argue that to permissibly perform these erotic ritual acts, the protagonists—in this case, the May Queen and Oak King—do not need explicit affirmative consent from everyone gathered in the magic circle or temple. Indeed employing the widespread operative model of affirmative consent can be disadvantageous because it would require participants to know the ritual’s details beforehand. In making this case, I highlight the costs of predictability, choreography, and prior communication in erotic rituals. And I argue that, owing to distinctive features of community-orientated and religious erotics, theorists shouldn’t simply extend interpersonal sexual ethics to explain these contexts. Instead, to countenance Paganism as an important social form, theorists must look to the ethics of institutions. Like churches and educational establishments, erotic ritual is social infrastructure.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by University of Illinois Press in American Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 60 (2) , 131-148
Corroboration
Corroborating evidence supports a proposition that is already supported by other initial evidence. It bolsters or confirms the original body of evidence. Corroboration has striking psychological and epistemic force: It potently affects how people do and should assess the target proposition. This essay investigates the distinctive powers of corroborating evidence. Corroboration does not simply increase the quantifiable probability of the adjudicated claim. Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework, I argue that corroboration winnows remaining uneliminated error possibilities. This illuminates the independence, weight, and non-fungibility of corroborating evidence. I compare corroborating evidence to prudential safeguards, like fire doors, that forfend against non-epistemic harms. I thereby sketch a general, non-quantificational model of risk management. Finally, I turn to legal corroboration requirements and the epistemic significance of corroboration for legal proof.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by University of Illinois Press in American Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 60 (2) , 131-148
Corroboration
Corroborating evidence supports a proposition that is already supported by other initial evidence. It bolsters or confirms the original body of evidence. Corroboration has striking psychological and epistemic force: It potently affects how people do and should assess the target proposition. This essay investigates the distinctive powers of corroborating evidence. Corroboration does not simply increase the quantifiable probability of the adjudicated claim. Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework, I argue that corroboration winnows remaining uneliminated error possibilities. This illuminates the independence, weight, and non-fungibility of corroborating evidence. I compare corroborating evidence to prudential safeguards, like fire doors, that forfend against non-epistemic harms. I thereby sketch a general, non-quantificational model of risk management. Finally, I turn to legal corroboration requirements and the epistemic significance of corroboration for legal proof.
- 15 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (2) , 688-703
Pragmatism, skepticism, and over-compatibilism: on Michael Hannon’s What’s the Point of Knowledge ?
Function-first approaches illuminate phenomena by investigating their functional roles. I first describe virtues of this approach. By foregrounding normal instances of knowledge, for example, function-first theorising offers a much-needed corrective to epistemology's counterexample-driven momentum towards increasingly byzantine, marginal cases. And epistemic practices are shaped by human limitations, needs, vices, and power relations. These non-ideal, naturalistic forces of embodied sociality form the roots of function-first theorising, which creates a fecund foundation for social epistemology. Secondly, I consider an objection to function-first theorising. The objection holds that function-first approaches lack adjudicatory power. That is, function-first proposals are overly compatible with diverse claims about knowledge, which encourages “just so” speculation. In response to this concern, I advocate methodological pluralism in epistemological theorising. All methods have limitations; researchers must be mindful of those limits and fruitfully combine multiple methods. I illustrate with Hannon's function-first based arguments for “epistemic pragmatism”, which denies that the meaning of “knows” is determined by truth conditions. Finally, I argue that function-first theorising motivates staunch anti-skepticism about knowledge. Practical forces cannot chisel a sharp threshold for how much evidence is required for knowledge. But thinking this supports radical skepticism about knowledge conflates fuzzy thresholds and high ones.
- 15 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (2) , 688-703
Pragmatism, skepticism, and over-compatibilism: on Michael Hannon’s What’s the Point of Knowledge ?
Function-first approaches illuminate phenomena by investigating their functional roles. I first describe virtues of this approach. By foregrounding normal instances of knowledge, for example, function-first theorising offers a much-needed corrective to epistemology's counterexample-driven momentum towards increasingly byzantine, marginal cases. And epistemic practices are shaped by human limitations, needs, vices, and power relations. These non-ideal, naturalistic forces of embodied sociality form the roots of function-first theorising, which creates a fecund foundation for social epistemology. Secondly, I consider an objection to function-first theorising. The objection holds that function-first approaches lack adjudicatory power. That is, function-first proposals are overly compatible with diverse claims about knowledge, which encourages “just so” speculation. In response to this concern, I advocate methodological pluralism in epistemological theorising. All methods have limitations; researchers must be mindful of those limits and fruitfully combine multiple methods. I illustrate with Hannon's function-first based arguments for “epistemic pragmatism”, which denies that the meaning of “knows” is determined by truth conditions. Finally, I argue that function-first theorising motivates staunch anti-skepticism about knowledge. Practical forces cannot chisel a sharp threshold for how much evidence is required for knowledge. But thinking this supports radical skepticism about knowledge conflates fuzzy thresholds and high ones.
- 30 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (5) , 1-33
The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account
- 30 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (5) , 1-33
The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophical Issues
- Vol. 31 (1) , 334-354
Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophical Issues
- Vol. 31 (1) , 334-354
Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 674-678
What's the point of knowledge?: A function‐first epistemology. MichaelHannon. Oxford University Press, 2019, ix+275 pp., ISBN: 9780190914721. $78.00
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 674-678
What's the point of knowledge?: A function‐first epistemology. MichaelHannon. Oxford University Press, 2019, ix+275 pp., ISBN: 9780190914721. $78.00
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (1-2) , 481-511
Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (1-2) , 481-511
Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk
- Open Access
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 95 (2) , 161-183
Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?
Many theorists hold that outright verdicts based on bare statistical evidence are unwarranted. Bare statistical evidence may support high credence, on these views, but does not support outright belief or legal verdicts of culpability. The vignettes that constitute the lottery paradox and the proof paradox are marshalled to support this claim. Some theorists argue, furthermore, that examples of profiling also indicate that bare statistical evidence is insufficient for warranting outright verdicts. I examine Pritchard's and Buchak's treatments of these three kinds of case. Pritchard argues that his safety condition explains the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts in each of the three cases, while Buchak argues that her treatment of the distinction between credence and belief explains this. In these discussions the three kinds of cases - lottery, proof paradox, and profiling - are treated alike. The cases are taken to exhibit the same epistemic features. I identity significant overlooked epistemic differences amongst these three cases; these differences cast doubt on Pritchard's explanation of the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts. Finally, I raise the question of whether we should aim for a unified explanation of the three paradoxes.
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 95 (2) , 161-183
Open AccessProfiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?
Many theorists hold that outright verdicts based on bare statistical evidence are unwarranted. Bare statistical evidence may support high credence, on these views, but does not support outright belief or legal verdicts of culpability. The vignettes that constitute the lottery paradox and the proof paradox are marshalled to support this claim. Some theorists argue, furthermore, that examples of profiling also indicate that bare statistical evidence is insufficient for warranting outright verdicts. I examine Pritchard's and Buchak's treatments of these three kinds of case. Pritchard argues that his safety condition explains the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts in each of the three cases, while Buchak argues that her treatment of the distinction between credence and belief explains this. In these discussions the three kinds of cases - lottery, proof paradox, and profiling - are treated alike. The cases are taken to exhibit the same epistemic features. I identity significant overlooked epistemic differences amongst these three cases; these differences cast doubt on Pritchard's explanation of the insufficiency of bare statistical evidence for outright verdicts. Finally, I raise the question of whether we should aim for a unified explanation of the three paradoxes.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy & Public Affairs
- Vol. 47 (3) , 288-318
The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy & Public Affairs
- Vol. 47 (3) , 288-318
Top Cited PapersThe Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof