Carol Anilowski Cain
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Carol Anilowski Cain has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Antonio J. Macias
Baylor University
3 shared publicationsJuan Manuel Sanchez
University of Texas at San Antonio
3 shared publications- Kalin S. Kolev
City University of New York - Stan Ross Department of Accountancy
2 shared publications Douglas J. Skinner
The University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
1 shared publicationGary Fleischman
Texas Tech University
1 shared publicationMei Feng
University of Pittsburgh - Katz Graduate School of Business
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (5) , 2099-2119
Detecting Opportunistic Special Items
The frequency of special items has increased dramatically over time, offering a convenient conduit for the inappropriate classification of past, present, and future recurring expenses as nonrecurring. Identifying this misclassification is especially important in light of the pervasive use of non–generally accepted accounting principles earnings in recent periods because special items offer camouflage for excluded recurring expenses. Building on prior research, we propose a method for identifying the predicted level of special items, attributing any excess to opportunism, and demonstrate the importance of this partitioning for financial-statement users. In particular, we provide evidence that the opportunistic portion of special items is associated with lower future earnings, cash flows, and returns. We conclude that this portion of special items is more likely to contain opportunistically misclassified recurring expenses that should have been recognized as such in prior, current, or future periods. Thus, we provide a meaningful partition of special items that should be useful to investors, analysts, creditors, auditors, and regulators because each of these parties must assess the implications of special items. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (5) , 2099-2119
Detecting Opportunistic Special Items
The frequency of special items has increased dramatically over time, offering a convenient conduit for the inappropriate classification of past, present, and future recurring expenses as nonrecurring. Identifying this misclassification is especially important in light of the pervasive use of non–generally accepted accounting principles earnings in recent periods because special items offer camouflage for excluded recurring expenses. Building on prior research, we propose a method for identifying the predicted level of special items, attributing any excess to opportunism, and demonstrate the importance of this partitioning for financial-statement users. In particular, we provide evidence that the opportunistic portion of special items is associated with lower future earnings, cash flows, and returns. We conclude that this portion of special items is more likely to contain opportunistically misclassified recurring expenses that should have been recognized as such in prior, current, or future periods. Thus, we provide a meaningful partition of special items that should be useful to investors, analysts, creditors, auditors, and regulators because each of these parties must assess the implications of special items. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Do Targets Benefit From Auctions? The Role of Private Information
We examine the impact of ethical and acquisition dynamics related to whether the target initiates the sale of the firm on the method-of-sale decision (auctions vs. one-on-one negotiations), and on shareholder wealth creation. While we find a strong positive relationship between proxies of adverse selection risk and the likelihood of target initiation, robustness tests suggest target initiation itself is a unique indicator of information asymmetry in an acquisition environment. We also find that most target initiated transactions follow an auction as the method of sale. Regarding shareholder wealth, we find that the wealth accrued to both bidders and targets increases in auctions, especially in non-target initiated acquisitions. This benefit, however, disappears when the target initiates the acquisition, arguably due to higher unethical adverse selection risk concerns, which is consistent with Akerlof’s (1970) theory of the market for lemons. When adverse selection risk is lower, both the bidder’s and target’s combined gains from acquisitions are higher. The findings have noteworthy implications for managing the target’s ethical reputation.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDo Targets Benefit From Auctions? The Role of Private Information
We examine the impact of ethical and acquisition dynamics related to whether the target initiates the sale of the firm on the method-of-sale decision (auctions vs. one-on-one negotiations), and on shareholder wealth creation. While we find a strong positive relationship between proxies of adverse selection risk and the likelihood of target initiation, robustness tests suggest target initiation itself is a unique indicator of information asymmetry in an acquisition environment. We also find that most target initiated transactions follow an auction as the method of sale. Regarding shareholder wealth, we find that the wealth accrued to both bidders and targets increases in auctions, especially in non-target initiated acquisitions. This benefit, however, disappears when the target initiates the acquisition, arguably due to higher unethical adverse selection risk concerns, which is consistent with Akerlof’s (1970) theory of the market for lemons. When adverse selection risk is lower, both the bidder’s and target’s combined gains from acquisitions are higher. The findings have noteworthy implications for managing the target’s ethical reputation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Comprehensive Analysis of the Use of Special Items to Manage Earnings
The frequency of special items has increased dramatically over time, offering a convenient conduit for the inappropriate classification of past, present, and future recurring expenses as non-recurring. Identifying this misclassification is especially important in light of the pervasive use of non-GAAP earnings in recent periods, as special items offer camouflage for excluded recurring expenses. Building on prior research, we propose a method for identifying the predicted level of special items, attributing any excess to opportunism, and demonstrate the importance of this partitioning for financial statement users. In particular, we provide evidence that the opportunistic portion of special items is associated with lower future earnings, cash flows, and returns. We conclude that this portion of special items is more likely to contain opportunistically misclassified recurring expenses that should have been recognized as such in prior, current, or future periods. Thus, we provide a meaningful partition of special items that should be useful to investors, analysts, creditors, auditors, and regulators, as each of these parties must assess the implications of special items.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Comprehensive Analysis of the Use of Special Items to Manage Earnings
The frequency of special items has increased dramatically over time, offering a convenient conduit for the inappropriate classification of past, present, and future recurring expenses as non-recurring. Identifying this misclassification is especially important in light of the pervasive use of non-GAAP earnings in recent periods, as special items offer camouflage for excluded recurring expenses. Building on prior research, we propose a method for identifying the predicted level of special items, attributing any excess to opportunism, and demonstrate the importance of this partitioning for financial statement users. In particular, we provide evidence that the opportunistic portion of special items is associated with lower future earnings, cash flows, and returns. We conclude that this portion of special items is more likely to contain opportunistically misclassified recurring expenses that should have been recognized as such in prior, current, or future periods. Thus, we provide a meaningful partition of special items that should be useful to investors, analysts, creditors, auditors, and regulators, as each of these parties must assess the implications of special items.
- Open Access
- 20 January 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Can Targets Benefit from Negotiations? Evidence from Auctions and Negotiations
Prior theory generally suggests target shareholders benefit more from auctions due to increased bidder competition. Recent evidence, however, finds no difference in target shareholders’ wealth effects whether the company is auctioned to multiple bidders or sold in a single bidder negotiation. Controlling for the self-selection bias stemming from management’s private information inherent in this decision, we find auctions are associated with higher target cumulative abnormal returns and offer premiums. Focusing on the impact of various proxies of adverse selection risk and the uncertainty of future cash flows on the sale, we find that targets with more aggressive (or opaque) financial reporting are more likely to auction the firm and this strategy proves beneficial only when the uncertainty of future cash flows is high. When financial reporting is more transparent or the uncertainty of future cash flows is low, targets benefit more from single bidder negotiations.
- 20 January 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCan Targets Benefit from Negotiations? Evidence from Auctions and Negotiations
Prior theory generally suggests target shareholders benefit more from auctions due to increased bidder competition. Recent evidence, however, finds no difference in target shareholders’ wealth effects whether the company is auctioned to multiple bidders or sold in a single bidder negotiation. Controlling for the self-selection bias stemming from management’s private information inherent in this decision, we find auctions are associated with higher target cumulative abnormal returns and offer premiums. Focusing on the impact of various proxies of adverse selection risk and the uncertainty of future cash flows on the sale, we find that targets with more aggressive (or opaque) financial reporting are more likely to auction the firm and this strategy proves beneficial only when the uncertainty of future cash flows is high. When financial reporting is more transparent or the uncertainty of future cash flows is low, targets benefit more from single bidder negotiations.
- Open Access
- 18 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Can Targets Benefit from Negotiations? Evidence from Auctions and Negotiations
Prior theory generally suggests target shareholders benefit more from auctions due to increased bidder competition. Recent evidence, however, finds no difference in target shareholders’ wealth effects whether the company is auctioned to multiple bidders or sold in a single bidder negotiation. Controlling for the self-selection bias stemming from management’s private information inherent in this decision, we find auctions are associated with higher target cumulative abnormal returns and offer premiums. Focusing on the impact of various proxies of adverse selection risk and the uncertainty of future cash flows on the sale, we find that targets with more aggressive (or opaque) financial reporting are more likely to auction the firm and this strategy proves beneficial only when the uncertainty of future cash flows is high. When financial reporting is more transparent or the uncertainty of future cash flows is low, targets benefit more from single bidder negotiations.
- 18 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCan Targets Benefit from Negotiations? Evidence from Auctions and Negotiations
Prior theory generally suggests target shareholders benefit more from auctions due to increased bidder competition. Recent evidence, however, finds no difference in target shareholders’ wealth effects whether the company is auctioned to multiple bidders or sold in a single bidder negotiation. Controlling for the self-selection bias stemming from management’s private information inherent in this decision, we find auctions are associated with higher target cumulative abnormal returns and offer premiums. Focusing on the impact of various proxies of adverse selection risk and the uncertainty of future cash flows on the sale, we find that targets with more aggressive (or opaque) financial reporting are more likely to auction the firm and this strategy proves beneficial only when the uncertainty of future cash flows is high. When financial reporting is more transparent or the uncertainty of future cash flows is low, targets benefit more from single bidder negotiations.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2006
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Earnings Guidance Affect Market Returns? The Nature and Information Content of Aggregate Earnings Guidance
We investigate whether earnings guidance affects aggregate stock returns through its effects on expectations about overall earnings performance and/or aggregate expected returns. We find that aggregate guidance, especially relative levels of quarterly downward guidance, is associated with analyst- and time-series-based measures of aggregate earnings news. We find more modest evidence that guidance, again, largely downward guidance, is associated with market returns - market returns appear to respond to guidance toward the end of each calendar quarter, when most earnings preannouncements are released, and there is some evidence that firm-level guidance affects market returns in short windows around its release.
- 1 May 2006
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Earnings Guidance Affect Market Returns? The Nature and Information Content of Aggregate Earnings Guidance
We investigate whether earnings guidance affects aggregate stock returns through its effects on expectations about overall earnings performance and/or aggregate expected returns. We find that aggregate guidance, especially relative levels of quarterly downward guidance, is associated with analyst- and time-series-based measures of aggregate earnings news. We find more modest evidence that guidance, again, largely downward guidance, is associated with market returns - market returns appear to respond to guidance toward the end of each calendar quarter, when most earnings preannouncements are released, and there is some evidence that firm-level guidance affects market returns in short windows around its release.