Subir. K. Chakrabarti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Subir. K. Chakrabarti has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexander Shapoval
University of Lodz
1 shared publication - B. Kitchens
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
1 shared publication - Iryna Topolyan
Department of Economics, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, USA
1 shared publication - Jaesoo Kim
Department of Economics, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA
1 shared publication - Michał Misiurewicz
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, 402 N. Blackford Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA
1 shared publication Qin Hu
Department of Computer Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Economics
- Vol. 67 (5) , 3877-3907
Stationary Markov Equilibrium Strategies in Stochastic Games: Existence and Computation
We show here that a stationary Markov equilibrium can be computed for an n -person stochastic game by using an iterative procedure often used in machine learning when the state space is finite and the action sets of the players are finite. The iterative procedure involves computing the equilibrium of the constituent game (possibly mixed) after each iteration. The constituent game in each iteration is the game in which the payoff of a player consists of two terms. One is the payoff of the player from the underlying single-period game and the second is the discounted equilibrium payoff of the player from the constituent game of the previous iteration. We show that the equilibrium payoffs of the constituent games converge, and lead to a constituent game in the limit, whose equilibrium payoffs are the same as those from the previous iteration. The equilibrium payoffs from the iterative procedure thus converge to stationary equilibrium payoffs. These equilibrium payoffs are then the payoffs of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon stochastic game. We provide an algorithm based on this result to compute the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon stochastic game. To evaluate our proposed algorithm, we conduct several experiments to derive their stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, including a version of the cybersecurity game analyzed in Lye and Wing and a version of the price-setting dynamic game of market competition analyzed in Besanko, Daralzeski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite.
- 29 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Economics
- Vol. 67 (5) , 3877-3907
Open AccessStationary Markov Equilibrium Strategies in Stochastic Games: Existence and Computation
We show here that a stationary Markov equilibrium can be computed for an n -person stochastic game by using an iterative procedure often used in machine learning when the state space is finite and the action sets of the players are finite. The iterative procedure involves computing the equilibrium of the constituent game (possibly mixed) after each iteration. The constituent game in each iteration is the game in which the payoff of a player consists of two terms. One is the payoff of the player from the underlying single-period game and the second is the discounted equilibrium payoff of the player from the constituent game of the previous iteration. We show that the equilibrium payoffs of the constituent games converge, and lead to a constituent game in the limit, whose equilibrium payoffs are the same as those from the previous iteration. The equilibrium payoffs from the iterative procedure thus converge to stationary equilibrium payoffs. These equilibrium payoffs are then the payoffs of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon stochastic game. We provide an algorithm based on this result to compute the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon stochastic game. To evaluate our proposed algorithm, we conduct several experiments to derive their stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, including a version of the cybersecurity game analyzed in Lye and Wing and a version of the price-setting dynamic game of market competition analyzed in Besanko, Daralzeski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite.
- 28 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (2)
Games of Social Interactions With Externalities
This paper studies a class of games in which players' payoffs explicitly depend on their intrinsic preferences over the set of available alternatives, level of social interaction and the global influence of the aggregate societal choices. Using the potential functions approach, we examine the conditions under which the games admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with a special emphasis on the role of social interactions. The existence results are then applied to examine the welfare consequences of the introduction of common goods and the adoption of new technologies.
- 28 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (2)
Games of Social Interactions With Externalities
This paper studies a class of games in which players' payoffs explicitly depend on their intrinsic preferences over the set of available alternatives, level of social interaction and the global influence of the aggregate societal choices. Using the potential functions approach, we examine the conditions under which the games admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with a special emphasis on the role of social interactions. The existence results are then applied to examine the welfare consequences of the introduction of common goods and the adoption of new technologies.
- 22 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (3) , 379-404
Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
- 22 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (3) , 379-404
Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
- 10 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory Bulletin
- Vol. 9 (2) , 177-194
Stationary equilibrium in stochastic dynamic models: Semi-Markov strategies
- 10 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory Bulletin
- Vol. 9 (2) , 177-194
Stationary equilibrium in stochastic dynamic models: Semi-Markov strategies
- 25 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory Bulletin
- Vol. 4 (2) , 355-365
An extensive form-based proof of the existence of sequential equilibrium
- 25 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory Bulletin
- Vol. 4 (2) , 355-365
An extensive form-based proof of the existence of sequential equilibrium