Jaesoo Kim
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jaesoo Kim has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dongsoo Shin
Department of Economics, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA 95053, USA
2 shared publications - Jay Pil Choi
Michigan State University and Yonsei University
1 shared publication - Se Hoon Bang
Korea Development Institute 47 Hoegiro Dongdaemun‐gu Seoul Korea
1 shared publication - Subhasish M. Chowdhury
University of Bath - Department of Economics
1 shared publication - Subir. K. Chakrabarti
Department of Economics, Indiana University Indianapolis (IUI), Indianapolis, USA
1 shared publication - Thomas D. Jeitschko
Michigan State University - Department of Economics
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Vertical Relationships with Hidden Interactions
In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract. The principal employs two agents who learn their task environments through their involvement. The principal cannot observe the task environments. It is important to note that hidden interactions, such as acts of sabotage or help between the agents, have the potential to alter each other’s task environments. Our analysis encompasses two distinct organizational structures: competition and cooperation. Without hidden interactions, the competitive structure is optimal because the cooperative structure only provides the agents with more flexibility to collusively misrepresent their task environments. With hidden interactions, however, the cooperative structure induces the agents to help each other to improve the task environments while removing sabotaging incentives at no cost once collusion is deterred. As a result, the cooperative structure can be optimal in such a case. We discuss the link between production technology and organizational structure, finding that complementarity in production favors cooperative structures.
Open AccessVertical Relationships with Hidden Interactions
In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract. The principal employs two agents who learn their task environments through their involvement. The principal cannot observe the task environments. It is important to note that hidden interactions, such as acts of sabotage or help between the agents, have the potential to alter each other’s task environments. Our analysis encompasses two distinct organizational structures: competition and cooperation. Without hidden interactions, the competitive structure is optimal because the cooperative structure only provides the agents with more flexibility to collusively misrepresent their task environments. With hidden interactions, however, the cooperative structure induces the agents to help each other to improve the task environments while removing sabotaging incentives at no cost once collusion is deterred. As a result, the cooperative structure can be optimal in such a case. We discuss the link between production technology and organizational structure, finding that complementarity in production favors cooperative structures.
- 22 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (3) , 379-404
Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
- 22 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (3) , 379-404
Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
- 7 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 26 (3) , 571-589
Bundling and joint marketing by rival firms
We study joint marketing by firms who price discriminate between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasers) and those who purchase from both (bundle purchasers). Firms either set the price of the bundle and then compete along side the bundle; or they determine a rebate that is applied to joint purchasers and then set prices. Even though the pricing structure in the joint marketing scheme is determined noncooperatively, the commitment to the joint marketing agreement allows firms to leverage their stand‐alone prices—leading to higher profits and lower consumer surplus in either case, compared to both uniform pricing and independent price discrimination without a joint marketing agreement. Nevertheless the two schemes differ dramatically, in that rebates increase joint purchasing, whereas bundle pricing diminishes bundle purchases.
- 7 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 26 (3) , 571-589
Bundling and joint marketing by rival firms
We study joint marketing by firms who price discriminate between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasers) and those who purchase from both (bundle purchasers). Firms either set the price of the bundle and then compete along side the bundle; or they determine a rebate that is applied to joint purchasers and then set prices. Even though the pricing structure in the joint marketing scheme is determined noncooperatively, the commitment to the joint marketing agreement allows firms to leverage their stand‐alone prices—leading to higher profits and lower consumer surplus in either case, compared to both uniform pricing and independent price discrimination without a joint marketing agreement. Nevertheless the two schemes differ dramatically, in that rebates increase joint purchasing, whereas bundle pricing diminishes bundle purchases.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 64 (4) , 773-807
Price Discrimination with Demarketing
We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller offers different price‐quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information. With demarketing, consumers must make a costly effort to purchase and/or utilize the product, whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the effort so that the consumer's purchasing decision is independent of the cost of effort. Our result suggests that, for small or large effort costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate effort costs, however, demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with high valuation to make transaction effort. By doing so, the seller can price discriminate more effectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can offer special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing can be optimal even for large costs of effort.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 64 (4) , 773-807
Price Discrimination with Demarketing
We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller offers different price‐quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information. With demarketing, consumers must make a costly effort to purchase and/or utilize the product, whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the effort so that the consumer's purchasing decision is independent of the cost of effort. Our result suggests that, for small or large effort costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate effort costs, however, demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with high valuation to make transaction effort. By doing so, the seller can price discriminate more effectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can offer special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing can be optimal even for large costs of effort.
- 22 April 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 118 (4) , 816-840
Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
We investigate simultaneous inter‐ and intra‐group conflict in the shadow of within‐group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group‐conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group‐conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent‐dissipation is non‐monotonic with the within‐group power asymmetry.
- 22 April 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 118 (4) , 816-840
Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
We investigate simultaneous inter‐ and intra‐group conflict in the shadow of within‐group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group‐conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group‐conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent‐dissipation is non‐monotonic with the within‐group power asymmetry.
- 4 June 2014
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 62 (2) , 286-308
Reverse Price Discrimination with Bayesian Buyers
This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer (Reverse Price Discrimination). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets.
- 4 June 2014
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 62 (2) , 286-308
Reverse Price Discrimination with Bayesian Buyers
This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer (Reverse Price Discrimination). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets.