Saswati Sarkar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Saswati Sarkar has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mohammad Hassan Lotfi
Department of ESE University of Pennsylvania 19104 Philadelphia PA
7 shared publications - Xingran Chen
Department of Electrical and System Engineering University of Pennsylvania 19104. PA
6 shared publications - Jungyeol Kim
Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
4 shared publications - Arnob Ghosh
Electrical and Systems Engineering Dept University of Pennsylvania USA
3 shared publications - George Kesidis
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA
3 shared publications - Mohammad Hassan Lotfi
Capital One Financial Corp, 25843 McLean, Virginia United States
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 14 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
- Vol. 70 (12) , 8478-8494
Group Testing With Correlation Under Edge-Faulty Graphs
In applications of group testing in networks, e.g. identifying individuals who are infected by a disease spread over a network, exploiting correlation among network nodes provides fundamental opportunities in reducing the number of tests needed. We model and analyze group testing on n correlated nodes whose interactions are specified by a graph G . We model correlation through an edge-faulty random graph formed from G in which each edge is dropped with probability 1 – r , and in the newly formed graph, all nodes in the same component have the same state. We consider three classes of graphs: cycles and trees, d -regular graphs and stochastic block models or SBM, and obtain lower and upper bounds on the number of tests needed to identify the defective nodes. Roughly speaking, we use correlation among the states of the nodes to transform the problem into that of a smaller graph with independent node states. This enhancement is quantified through the ratio of the diminished node count to the overall count of nodes, n ; thus, a lower ratio signifies superior performance. The lower bounds are derived by illustrating a strong dependence of the number of tests needed on the expected number of components. In this regard, we establish a new approximation for the distribution of component sizes in “ d -regular trees” which may be of independent interest and leads to a lower bound on the expected number of components in d -regular graphs. The upper bounds are found by forming dense subgraphs in which nodes are more likely to be in the same state. When G is a cycle or tree, we show an improvement by a factor of log(1/ r ). For grid, a graph with almost 2n edges, the improvement is by a factor of (1 – r ) log(1/ r ), indicating drastic improvement compared to trees. When G has a larger number of edges, as in SBM, the improvement can scale in n .
- 14 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
- Vol. 70 (12) , 8478-8494
Group Testing With Correlation Under Edge-Faulty Graphs
In applications of group testing in networks, e.g. identifying individuals who are infected by a disease spread over a network, exploiting correlation among network nodes provides fundamental opportunities in reducing the number of tests needed. We model and analyze group testing on n correlated nodes whose interactions are specified by a graph G . We model correlation through an edge-faulty random graph formed from G in which each edge is dropped with probability 1 – r , and in the newly formed graph, all nodes in the same component have the same state. We consider three classes of graphs: cycles and trees, d -regular graphs and stochastic block models or SBM, and obtain lower and upper bounds on the number of tests needed to identify the defective nodes. Roughly speaking, we use correlation among the states of the nodes to transform the problem into that of a smaller graph with independent node states. This enhancement is quantified through the ratio of the diminished node count to the overall count of nodes, n ; thus, a lower ratio signifies superior performance. The lower bounds are derived by illustrating a strong dependence of the number of tests needed on the expected number of components. In this regard, we establish a new approximation for the distribution of component sizes in “ d -regular trees” which may be of independent interest and leads to a lower bound on the expected number of components in d -regular graphs. The upper bounds are found by forming dense subgraphs in which nodes are more likely to be in the same state. When G is a cycle or tree, we show an improvement by a factor of log(1/ r ). For grid, a graph with almost 2n edges, the improvement is by a factor of (1 – r ) log(1/ r ), indicating drastic improvement compared to trees. When G has a larger number of edges, as in SBM, the improvement can scale in n .
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 32 (2) , 1540-1555
Capturing the Spread of Information in Heterogeneous V2X Through Scalable Computation
Emerging V2X technology enables vehicles to exchange messages with each other (V2V) and with signaling infrastructure (I2V) on the roadways. Information propagation in transportation networks is highly influenced by both vehicle mobility and wireless communication. As for vehicle mobility, realistic traffic flow changes with time, exhibiting sharp time-triggered transitions, due to external factors such as traffic lights. Thus, mobility process is temporally heterogeneous and not smooth, which fundamentally alters the dynamics of V2X (V2V and I2V together) message propagation in a complex manner. As for wireless communication, communication heterogeneity is an integral component of V2X systems -different types of vehicles may have different communication capabilities, and V2V and I2V communications coexist. We propose a mathematical framework, based on a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC), for characterizing the spatio-temporal spread of V2X information (1) when the traffic flow exhibits sharp time-triggered transitions and (2) when there exists communication heterogeneity comprising of different V2V commutation capabilities, different wireless communication conditions, and both V2V and I2V. We prove that the state evolutions under the CTMC model converge to a set of differential equations in the asymptotic limit of a large number of vehicles, enabling computations that gracefully scale with increase in network size and the number of vehicles. Our framework can accommodate arbitrary traffic synchronization patterns corresponding for example to incorporate the presence of an arbitrary number of traffic signals. Furthermore, numerical computations using this mathematical framework answer several questions that influence the practice of V2X network design and security.
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 32 (2) , 1540-1555
Capturing the Spread of Information in Heterogeneous V2X Through Scalable Computation
Emerging V2X technology enables vehicles to exchange messages with each other (V2V) and with signaling infrastructure (I2V) on the roadways. Information propagation in transportation networks is highly influenced by both vehicle mobility and wireless communication. As for vehicle mobility, realistic traffic flow changes with time, exhibiting sharp time-triggered transitions, due to external factors such as traffic lights. Thus, mobility process is temporally heterogeneous and not smooth, which fundamentally alters the dynamics of V2X (V2V and I2V together) message propagation in a complex manner. As for wireless communication, communication heterogeneity is an integral component of V2X systems -different types of vehicles may have different communication capabilities, and V2V and I2V communications coexist. We propose a mathematical framework, based on a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC), for characterizing the spatio-temporal spread of V2X information (1) when the traffic flow exhibits sharp time-triggered transitions and (2) when there exists communication heterogeneity comprising of different V2V commutation capabilities, different wireless communication conditions, and both V2V and I2V. We prove that the state evolutions under the CTMC model converge to a set of differential equations in the asymptotic limit of a large number of vehicles, enabling computations that gracefully scale with increase in network size and the number of vehicles. Our framework can accommodate arbitrary traffic synchronization patterns corresponding for example to incorporate the presence of an arbitrary number of traffic signals. Furthermore, numerical computations using this mathematical framework answer several questions that influence the practice of V2X network design and security.
- Open Access
Impact of opinion dynamics on the public health damage inflicted by COVID-19 in the presence of societal heterogeneities
Certain behavioral practices such as wearing surgical masks, observing social distancing, and accepting vaccines impede the spread of COVID-19 and contain the severity of symptoms in the infected individuals. Opinions regarding whether to observe such behavioral practices evolve over time through interactions via networks that overlap with but are not identical to the physical interaction networks over which the disease progresses. This necessitates the joint study of COVID-19 evolution and opinion dynamics. We develop a mathematical model that can be easily adapted to a wide range of behavioral practices and captures in a computationally tractable manner the joint evolution of the disease and relevant opinions in populations of large sizes. Populations of large sizes are typically heterogeneous in that they comprise individuals of different age groups, genders, races, and underlying health conditions. Such groups have different propensities to imbibe severe forms of the disease, different physical contact, and social interaction patterns and rates. These lead to different disease and opinion dynamics in them. Our model is able to capture such diversities. Computations using our model reveal that opinion dynamics have a strong impact on fatality and hospitalization counts and the number of man-days lost due to symptoms both in the regular form of the disease and the extended forms, more commonly known as long COVID. We show that opinion dynamics in certain groups have a disproportionate impact on the overall public health attributes because they have high physical interaction rates, even when they have the lowest propensity to imbibe severe forms of the disease. This identifies a social vulnerability that mal-actors can utilize to inflict heavy public health damages through opinion campaigns targeting specific segments. Once such vulnerabilities are identified, which we accomplish, adequate precautions may be designed to enhance resilience to such targeted attacks and better protect public health.
Open AccessImpact of opinion dynamics on the public health damage inflicted by COVID-19 in the presence of societal heterogeneities
Certain behavioral practices such as wearing surgical masks, observing social distancing, and accepting vaccines impede the spread of COVID-19 and contain the severity of symptoms in the infected individuals. Opinions regarding whether to observe such behavioral practices evolve over time through interactions via networks that overlap with but are not identical to the physical interaction networks over which the disease progresses. This necessitates the joint study of COVID-19 evolution and opinion dynamics. We develop a mathematical model that can be easily adapted to a wide range of behavioral practices and captures in a computationally tractable manner the joint evolution of the disease and relevant opinions in populations of large sizes. Populations of large sizes are typically heterogeneous in that they comprise individuals of different age groups, genders, races, and underlying health conditions. Such groups have different propensities to imbibe severe forms of the disease, different physical contact, and social interaction patterns and rates. These lead to different disease and opinion dynamics in them. Our model is able to capture such diversities. Computations using our model reveal that opinion dynamics have a strong impact on fatality and hospitalization counts and the number of man-days lost due to symptoms both in the regular form of the disease and the extended forms, more commonly known as long COVID. We show that opinion dynamics in certain groups have a disproportionate impact on the overall public health attributes because they have high physical interaction rates, even when they have the lowest propensity to imbibe severe forms of the disease. This identifies a social vulnerability that mal-actors can utilize to inflict heavy public health damages through opinion campaigns targeting specific segments. Once such vulnerabilities are identified, which we accomplish, adequate precautions may be designed to enhance resilience to such targeted attacks and better protect public health.
- Open Access
Countering the potential re-emergence of a deadly infectious disease - information warfare, identifying strategic threats, launching countermeasures
Eradicated infectious diseases like smallpox can re-emerge through accident or designs of bioterrorists, and perpetrate heavy casualties. Currently, only a small percentage of the populace is vaccinated, and their protection is likely to have waned. Most therefore are susceptible today. And when the disease re-emerges the susceptible individuals may be manipulated by disinformation on Social Media to refuse vaccines. Thus, a combination of countermeasures consisting of antiviral drugs and vaccines and a range of policies for their application need to be investigated. Opinions as to receptivity of vaccines evolve with time through social exchanges over networks that overlap with but are not identical to the disease propagation networks. These couple the spread of the biological and information contagion and necessitate a joint investigation of the two. Towards these, we develop a computationally tractable metapopulation epidemiological model that captures the joint spatio-temporal evolution of smallpox and opinion dynamics. The computations based on the model show that opinion dynamics has a substantial impact on the fatality count. Towards understanding how perpetrators are likely to seed the infection we identify a) the initial distribution of infected individuals that maximize the overall fatality count regardless of mobility patterns, and b) which habitation structures are more vulnerable to outbreaks. We assess the relative efficacy of different countermeasures and conclude that a combination of vaccines and drugs minimizes the fatalities, and by itself, for smallpox, drugs reduce fatalities more than the vaccine. Accordingly, we assess the efficacies of three separate policies for administering the drugs and identify the best among them for various parameter combinations. When the availability of the drug is finite, we show that increase in its supply substantially reduces the overall fatality. Our findings lead to policy recommendations for public health and urban design authorities towards thwarting smallpox and other infectious disease outbreaks.
Open AccessCountering the potential re-emergence of a deadly infectious disease - information warfare, identifying strategic threats, launching countermeasures
Eradicated infectious diseases like smallpox can re-emerge through accident or designs of bioterrorists, and perpetrate heavy casualties. Currently, only a small percentage of the populace is vaccinated, and their protection is likely to have waned. Most therefore are susceptible today. And when the disease re-emerges the susceptible individuals may be manipulated by disinformation on Social Media to refuse vaccines. Thus, a combination of countermeasures consisting of antiviral drugs and vaccines and a range of policies for their application need to be investigated. Opinions as to receptivity of vaccines evolve with time through social exchanges over networks that overlap with but are not identical to the disease propagation networks. These couple the spread of the biological and information contagion and necessitate a joint investigation of the two. Towards these, we develop a computationally tractable metapopulation epidemiological model that captures the joint spatio-temporal evolution of smallpox and opinion dynamics. The computations based on the model show that opinion dynamics has a substantial impact on the fatality count. Towards understanding how perpetrators are likely to seed the infection we identify a) the initial distribution of infected individuals that maximize the overall fatality count regardless of mobility patterns, and b) which habitation structures are more vulnerable to outbreaks. We assess the relative efficacy of different countermeasures and conclude that a combination of vaccines and drugs minimizes the fatalities, and by itself, for smallpox, drugs reduce fatalities more than the vaccine. Accordingly, we assess the efficacies of three separate policies for administering the drugs and identify the best among them for various parameter combinations. When the availability of the drug is finite, we show that increase in its supply substantially reduces the overall fatality. Our findings lead to policy recommendations for public health and urban design authorities towards thwarting smallpox and other infectious disease outbreaks.
- Open Access
Tracing and testing the COVID-19 contact chain: cost-benefit tradeoffs
Traditional contact tracing for COVID-19 tests the direct contacts of those who test positive even if the contacts do not show any symptom. But, why should the testing stop at direct contacts, and not test secondary, tertiary contacts or even contacts further down? The question arises because by the time an infected individual is tested the infection starting from him may have infected a chain of individuals. One deterrent in testing long chains of individuals right away may be that it substantially increases the testing load, or does it? We investigate the costs and benefits of testing the contact chain of an individual who tests positive. For this investigation, we utilize multiple human contact networks, spanning two real-world data sets of spatio-temporal records of human presence over certain periods of time, as also networks of a classical synthetic variety. Over the diverse set of contact patterns, we discover that testing the contact chain can both substantially reduce over time both the cumulative infection count and the testing load. We consider elements of human behavior that enhance the spread of the disease and lower the efficacy of testing strategies, and show that testing the contact chain enhances the resilience to adverse impacts of these elements. We also discover a phenomenon of diminishing return beyond a threshold value on the depth of the chain to be tested in one go, the threshold then provides the most desirable tradeoff between benefit in terms of reducing the cumulative infection count, enhancing resilience to adverse impacts of human behavior, and cost in terms of increasing the testing load.
Open AccessTracing and testing the COVID-19 contact chain: cost-benefit tradeoffs
Traditional contact tracing for COVID-19 tests the direct contacts of those who test positive even if the contacts do not show any symptom. But, why should the testing stop at direct contacts, and not test secondary, tertiary contacts or even contacts further down? The question arises because by the time an infected individual is tested the infection starting from him may have infected a chain of individuals. One deterrent in testing long chains of individuals right away may be that it substantially increases the testing load, or does it? We investigate the costs and benefits of testing the contact chain of an individual who tests positive. For this investigation, we utilize multiple human contact networks, spanning two real-world data sets of spatio-temporal records of human presence over certain periods of time, as also networks of a classical synthetic variety. Over the diverse set of contact patterns, we discover that testing the contact chain can both substantially reduce over time both the cumulative infection count and the testing load. We consider elements of human behavior that enhance the spread of the disease and lower the efficacy of testing strategies, and show that testing the contact chain enhances the resilience to adverse impacts of these elements. We also discover a phenomenon of diminishing return beyond a threshold value on the depth of the chain to be tested in one go, the threshold then provides the most desirable tradeoff between benefit in terms of reducing the cumulative infection count, enhancing resilience to adverse impacts of human behavior, and cost in terms of increasing the testing load.
- 12 June 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 7 (4) , 2815-2829
The Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part II)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider interactions between two service providers, a MNO and an MVNO, when the EUs 1) must choose one of them 2) have the option to defect to an outside option should the SP duo offer unsatisfactory access fees or qualities of service. We formulate a multi-stage hybrid of cooperative bargaining and non-cooperative games in which the two SPs jointly determine their spectrum acquisitions, allocations and mutual money flows through the bargaining game, and subsequently individually determine the access fees for the EUs through the non-cooperative game. We identify when the overall equilibrium solutions exist, when it is unique and characterize the equilibrium solutions when they exist. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. The hybrid framework allows us to determine whether and by how much the different entities benefit due to the cooperation in spectrum acquisition decision.
- 12 June 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 7 (4) , 2815-2829
The Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part II)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider interactions between two service providers, a MNO and an MVNO, when the EUs 1) must choose one of them 2) have the option to defect to an outside option should the SP duo offer unsatisfactory access fees or qualities of service. We formulate a multi-stage hybrid of cooperative bargaining and non-cooperative games in which the two SPs jointly determine their spectrum acquisitions, allocations and mutual money flows through the bargaining game, and subsequently individually determine the access fees for the EUs through the non-cooperative game. We identify when the overall equilibrium solutions exist, when it is unique and characterize the equilibrium solutions when they exist. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. The hybrid framework allows us to determine whether and by how much the different entities benefit due to the cooperation in spectrum acquisition decision.
- Open Access
The Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part II)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider interactions between two service providers, an MNO and an MVNO, when the EUs 1) must choose one of them 2) have the option to defect to an outside option should the SP duo offer unsatisfactory access fees or qualities of service. We formulate a multi-stage hybrid of cooperative bargaining and non-cooperative games in which the two SPs jointly determine their spectrum acquisitions, allocations and mutual money flows through the bargaining game, and subsequently individually determine the access fees for the EUs through the non-cooperative game. We identify when the overall equilibrium solutions exist, when it is unique and characterize the equilibrium solutions when they exist. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. The hybrid framework allows us to determine whether and by how much the different entities benefit due to the cooperation in spectrum acquisition decision.
Open AccessThe Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part II)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider interactions between two service providers, an MNO and an MVNO, when the EUs 1) must choose one of them 2) have the option to defect to an outside option should the SP duo offer unsatisfactory access fees or qualities of service. We formulate a multi-stage hybrid of cooperative bargaining and non-cooperative games in which the two SPs jointly determine their spectrum acquisitions, allocations and mutual money flows through the bargaining game, and subsequently individually determine the access fees for the EUs through the non-cooperative game. We identify when the overall equilibrium solutions exist, when it is unique and characterize the equilibrium solutions when they exist. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. The hybrid framework allows us to determine whether and by how much the different entities benefit due to the cooperation in spectrum acquisition decision.
- Open Access
The Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part I)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider a base case and two generalizations: (i) one MNO and one MVNO, (ii) one MNO, one MVNO and an outside option, and (iii) two MNOs and one MVNO. In each of these cases, we model the interactions of the service providers (SPs) using a sequential game, identify when the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) exists, when it is unique and characterize the SPNE when it exists. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. We identify metrics to quantify the interplay between cooperation and competition, and evaluate those as also the SPNEs to show that cooperation between MNO and MVNO can enhance the payoffs of both, while increased competition due to the presence of additional MNOs is beneficial to EUs but reduces the payoffs of the SPs.
Open AccessThe Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part I)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider a base case and two generalizations: (i) one MNO and one MVNO, (ii) one MNO, one MVNO and an outside option, and (iii) two MNOs and one MVNO. In each of these cases, we model the interactions of the service providers (SPs) using a sequential game, identify when the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) exists, when it is unique and characterize the SPNE when it exists. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. We identify metrics to quantify the interplay between cooperation and competition, and evaluate those as also the SPNEs to show that cooperation between MNO and MVNO can enhance the payoffs of both, while increased competition due to the presence of additional MNOs is beneficial to EUs but reduces the payoffs of the SPs.
- 27 May 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 28 (4) , 1435-1448
Is Non-Neutrality Profitable for the Stakeholders of the Internet Market?
We consider a system in which there exists two ISPs, one ``big'' Content Provider (CP), and a continuum of End-Users (EUs). One of the ISPs is neutral and the other is non-neutral. We consider that the CP can differentiate between ISPs by controlling the quality of the content she is offering on each one. We also consider that EUs have different levels of innate preferences for ISPs. We formulate a sequential game, and explicitly characterize all the possible Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the game. We prove that if an SPNE exists, it would be one of the five possible strategies each of which we explicitly characterize. We prove that when EUs have sufficiently low innate preferences for ISPs, a unique SPNE exists in which the neutral ISP would be driven out of the market. We also prove that when these preferences are sufficiently high, there exists a unique SPNE with a non-neutral outcome in which both ISPs are active. Numerical results reveal that the neutral ISP receives a lower payoff and the non-neutral ISP receives a higher payoff (most of the time) in a non-neutral scenario. However, we identify scenarios in which the non-neutral ISP loses payoff by adopting non-neutrality. We also show that a non-neutral regime yields a higher welfare for EUs in comparison to a neutral one if the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, the sensitivity of EUs (respectively, the CP) to the quality is low (respectively, high), or a combinations of these factors.
- 27 May 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 28 (4) , 1435-1448
Is Non-Neutrality Profitable for the Stakeholders of the Internet Market?
We consider a system in which there exists two ISPs, one ``big'' Content Provider (CP), and a continuum of End-Users (EUs). One of the ISPs is neutral and the other is non-neutral. We consider that the CP can differentiate between ISPs by controlling the quality of the content she is offering on each one. We also consider that EUs have different levels of innate preferences for ISPs. We formulate a sequential game, and explicitly characterize all the possible Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the game. We prove that if an SPNE exists, it would be one of the five possible strategies each of which we explicitly characterize. We prove that when EUs have sufficiently low innate preferences for ISPs, a unique SPNE exists in which the neutral ISP would be driven out of the market. We also prove that when these preferences are sufficiently high, there exists a unique SPNE with a non-neutral outcome in which both ISPs are active. Numerical results reveal that the neutral ISP receives a lower payoff and the non-neutral ISP receives a higher payoff (most of the time) in a non-neutral scenario. However, we identify scenarios in which the non-neutral ISP loses payoff by adopting non-neutrality. We also show that a non-neutral regime yields a higher welfare for EUs in comparison to a neutral one if the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, the sensitivity of EUs (respectively, the CP) to the quality is low (respectively, high), or a combinations of these factors.
- Open Access
- 18 May 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 7 (4) , 2799-2814
The Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part I)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider a base case and two generalizations: (\romannumeral1) one MNO and one MVNO, (\romannumeral2) one MNO, one MVNO and an outside option, and (\romannumeral3) two MNOs and one MVNO. In each of these cases, we model the interactions of the service providers (SPs) using a sequential game, identify when the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) exists, when it is unique and characterize the SPNE when it exists. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. We identify metrics to quantify the interplay between cooperation and competition, and evaluate those as also the SPNEs to show that cooperation between MNO and MVNO can enhance the payoffs of both, while increased competition due to the presence of additional MNOs is beneficial to EUs but reduces the payoffs of the SPs.
- 18 May 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 7 (4) , 2799-2814
Open AccessThe Interplay of Competition and Cooperation Among Service Providers (Part I)
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider a base case and two generalizations: (\romannumeral1) one MNO and one MVNO, (\romannumeral2) one MNO, one MVNO and an outside option, and (\romannumeral3) two MNOs and one MVNO. In each of these cases, we model the interactions of the service providers (SPs) using a sequential game, identify when the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) exists, when it is unique and characterize the SPNE when it exists. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. We identify metrics to quantify the interplay between cooperation and competition, and evaluate those as also the SPNEs to show that cooperation between MNO and MVNO can enhance the payoffs of both, while increased competition due to the presence of additional MNOs is beneficial to EUs but reduces the payoffs of the SPs.