AGArnob Ghosh

Arnob Ghosh

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Arnob Ghosh has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The value of Side Information in Secondary Spectrum Markets

    by Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar, Randall Berry

    In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channels to the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the availability of unused channels of its competitors. We consider a model were a primary can acquire its competitor's channel state information (C-CSI) at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether to acquire C-CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. We first characterize the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game for a symmetric model where the C-CSI is perfect. We show that the payoff of a primary is independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost. We then generalize our analysis to allow for imperfect estimation and cases where the two primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel availabilities. Our results show interestingly that the payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. We also show that surprisingly, the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI acquisition cost decreases when primaries have different availabilities.

  • Open Access

    Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly: Part II

    by Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar

    We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell secondary access to its channel at multiple locations. Transmission qualities of a channel evolve randomly. Each primary needs to select a price and a set of non-interfering locations (which is an independent set in the conflict graph of the region) at which to offer its channel without knowing the transmission qualities of the channels of its competitors. We formulate the above problem as a non-cooperative game. We consider two scenarios-i) when the region is small, ii) when the region is large. In the first setting, we focus on a class of conflict graphs, known as mean valid graphs which commonly arise when the region is small. We explicitly compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE); the NE is threshold type in that primaries only choose independent set whose cardinality is greater than a certain threshold. The threshold on the cardinality increases with increase in quality of the channel on sale. We show that the symmetric NE strategy profile is unique in a special class of conflict graphs (linear graph). In the second setting, we consider node symmetric conflict graphs which arises when the number of locations is large (potentially, infinite). We explicitly compute a symmetric NE that randomizes equally among the maximum independent sets at a given channel state vector. In the NE a primary only selects the maximum independent set at a given channel state vector. We show that the two symmetric NEs computed in two settings exhibit important structural difference.

  • Open Access

    Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly

    by Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar

    We investigate a spectrum oligopoly where primary users allow secondary access in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission qualities of the licensed bands fluctuate randomly. Each primary needs to select the price of its channel with the knowledge of its own channel state but not that of its competitors. Secondaries choose among the channels available on sale based on their states and prices. We formulate the price selection as a non-cooperative game and prove that a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy profile exists uniquely. We explicitly compute this strategy profile and analytically and numerically evaluate its efficiency. Our structural results provide certain key insights about the unique symmetric NE.