JGJoseph Gardiner

Joseph Gardiner

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Joseph Gardiner has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Building an Open Source Operational Technology Pentesting Platform: Lessons From LINICS

    by Awais Rashid, Joseph Gardiner, Louise Evans

    Information technology security professionals have access to open source platforms such as Kali Linux. But no equivalent exists for operational technology (OT). We discuss architecting, building, and releasing LINICS (Linux for ICS), an OT pentesting and security analysis open source platform.

  • Open Access

    "If You Build it, They will Come" - A Blueprint for ICS-focused Capture-The-Flag Competitions

    by Joseph Gardiner, Stanislav Abaimov, Jacob Williams, Feras Shahbi, Konstantinos Anastasakis, Partha Das Chowdhury, Winston Ellis, Maria Sameen, Emmanouil Samanis, Awais Rashid

    Industrial control systems (ICS) are the specialist systems responsible for operating many aspects of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), including power generation and distribution, water treatment, and transport systems. With the increasing cyber threats against such systems comes a requirement for a suitably skilled workforce to protect them. However, there exists a skills gap in this area. Capture-the-flag (CTF) competitions can provide valuable learning experiences for participants. In this work, we use our experience of running multiple ICS-themed CTFs to prepare a set of blueprints for organizing a similarly themed CTF. We then discuss the implementation of our event, mapped to this blueprint, and then present the results of a participant survey to explore the learning benefits of the event.


  • Open Access

    Capture The Industrial Flag: Lessons from hosting an ICS cybersecurity exercise

    by Stanislav Abaimov, Joseph Gardiner, Emmanouil Samanis, Jacob Williams, Marios Samanis, Feras Shahbi, Awais Rashid

    Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are integral to critical infrastructure, necessitating advanced cybersecurity training. Addressing the urgent need for specialized cybersecurity training, this paper details the UK's first Capture-The-Flag (CTF) event tailored to ICS. This event, held in 2023, was designed in a jeopardy-style format, featuring a comprehensive suite of challenges that mirrored real-world industrial vulnerabilities. It targeted a diverse audience, encompassing participants from both industrial and academic spheres, and emphasized the need for practical, hands-on experience in ICS cybersecurity. This paper describes the design considerations, experience, and recommendations to designing similar CTF events. The event highlighted the benefits of incorporating pre-event training to better acquaint participants with terminologies and protocols, specific to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and Operational Technology (OT). Providing insights into the event's design, execution, and the unique learning opportunities it presented, this paper contributes valuable perspectives for future cybersecurity education and training initiatives, particularly in enhancing practical skills in ICS security.


  • Open Access

    Threat models over space and time: A case study of end‐to‐end‐encrypted messaging applications

    by Partha Das Chowdhury, Maria Sameen, Jenny Blessing, Nicholas Boucher, Joseph Gardiner, Tom Burrows, Ross Anderson, Awais Rashid

    Threat modeling is one of the foundations of secure systems engineering and must take heed of the context within which systems operate. In this work, we explore the extent to which real‐world systems engineering reflects a changing threat context. We examine the desktop clients of six widely used end‐to‐end‐encrypted mobile messaging applications to understand the extent to which they adjusted their threat model over space (when enabling clients on new platforms, such as desktop clients) and time (as new threats emerged). We experimented with short‐lived adversarial access against these desktop clients and analyzed the results using two popular threat elicitation frameworks, STRIDE and LINDDUN. The results demonstrate that system designers need to track threats in the evolving context within which systems operate and, more importantly, mitigate them by rescoping trust boundaries so that they remain consistent with administrative boundaries. A nuanced understanding of the relationship between trust and administration is vital for robust security, including the provision of safe defaults.


  • Open Access

    The Internet of Insecure Cows - A Security Analysis of Wireless Smart Devices Used for Dairy Farming

    by Samuel Barnes-Thornton, Joseph Gardiner, Awais Rashid

    IoT devices are becoming increasingly common in the world of agriculture with farmers now relying on technology to keep their businesses running. From crop management and greenhouse automation to entirely autonomous milking parlours, technology is being used in more ways than ever to improve efficiency. The benefits are huge, with the ability for farms to expand due to lower requirements for manual labour and other resources like water usage, so much so that in places it would now be infeasible for farmers to go back to traditional ways of working. Unfortunately, this technological advancement also brings with it an increase in the risk of cyber attacks. If one of these succeeds it could cause catastrophic effects for both individual farms and the security of the wider food supply chain. This project provides a comprehensive analysis of the security of collars used for health monitoring of cows in a smart dairy farm. This is the first practical cyber security analysis of such devices that are currently in use on farms. We have successfully reverse-engineered the wireless protocol and demonstrated the ability to inject false data into the system, posing as one of the sensors. Testing has shown that both the system to receive signals from the sensors and the data endpoint software are vulnerable to data injection. This paper highlights the specific threats from the vulnerabilities and identifies potential countermeasures that could be integrated into the sensors in the future.


  • Open Access

    Everything Is Awesome! or Is It? Cyber Security Risks in Critical Infrastructure

    by Awais Rashid, Joseph Gardiner, Benjamin Green, Barnaby Craggs


  • Open Access

    Oops I Did it Again

    by Joseph Gardiner, Barnaby Craggs, Benjamin Green, Awais Rashid

    Research efforts in the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have dramatically increased over the past few years. However, there is a limiting factor when work cannot be evaluated on real-world systems due to safety and operational reasons. This has led to multiple deployments of ICS testbeds covering multiple sectors including water treatment, power distribution and transportation networks. Over the last five years, we have designed and constructed ICS testbeds to support cyber security research. Our prior work in building testbeds culminated in a set of design principles and lessons learnt, formulated to support other researchers in designing and building their own ICS testbeds. In the last two years we have taken these lessons and used them to guide our own greenfield large-scale, complex and process-diverse security testbed affording a rare opportunity to design and build from the ground up -- one in which we have been able to look back and validate those past lessons and principles. In this work we describe the process of building our new ICS and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) testbed, and give an overview of its architecture. We then reflect on our past lessons, and contribute five previously unrecognised additional lessons based on this experience.


  • Open Access

    On the Security of Machine Learning in Malware C&C Detection

    by Joseph Gardiner, Shishir Nagaraja

    One of the main challenges in security today is defending against malware attacks. As trends and anecdotal evidence show, preventing these attacks, regardless of their indiscriminate or targeted nature, has proven difficult: intrusions happen and devices get compromised, even at security-conscious organizations. As a consequence, an alternative line of work has focused on detecting and disrupting the individual steps that follow an initial compromise and are essential for the successful progression of the attack. In particular, several approaches and techniques have been proposed to identify the command and control (C8C) channel that a compromised system establishes to communicate with its controller. A major oversight of many of these detection techniques is the design’s resilience to evasion attempts by the well-motivated attacker. C8C detection techniques make widespread use of a machine learning (ML) component. Therefore, to analyze the evasion resilience of these detection techniques, we first systematize works in the field of C8C detection and then, using existing models from the literature, go on to systematize attacks against the ML components used in these approaches.