Barnaby Craggs
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Barnaby Craggs has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Awais Rashid
University of Bristol
6 shared publications - Adam Joinson
School of Management, University of Bath
2 shared publications - Dirk van der Linden
School of Computer Science, Northumbria University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom
2 shared publications - Joseph Gardiner
University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom
2 shared publications - Tobias D. Weickert2 shared publications
Adam Joinson
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 170
Can secure habits counter phishing? An exploration using a novel in-tray simulation
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 170
Open AccessCan secure habits counter phishing? An exploration using a novel in-tray simulation
- Open Access
- 16 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 71-83
Adopting a Systemic Design Approach to Cyber Security Incident Response
- 16 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 71-83
Open AccessAdopting a Systemic Design Approach to Cyber Security Incident Response
- Open Access
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 128
Is cybersecurity research missing a trick? Integrating insights from the psychology of habit into research and practice
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 128
Open AccessIs cybersecurity research missing a trick? Integrating insights from the psychology of habit into research and practice
- Open Access
- 20 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-17
Everything Is Awesome! or Is It? Cyber Security Risks in Critical Infrastructure
- 20 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-17
Open AccessEverything Is Awesome! or Is It? Cyber Security Risks in Critical Infrastructure
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 46-49
A Just Culture Is Fundamental: Extending Security Ergonomics by Design
Human error when developing and using smart cyber physical systems is inevitable. Earlier work has set out Security Ergonomics by Design—principles by which developers of systems can ensure that the active user error cannot occur when latent system failures introduced in development are in play. This paper underpins these principles by showing there is a fundamental need to adopt a Just Culture within which i) user error is captured for improvement in the development cycle, and ii) to provide software engineers assurance that their own mistakes are not automatically punished but rather treated as learnings that can be fed back into building safer and more secure practice.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 46-49
A Just Culture Is Fundamental: Extending Security Ergonomics by Design
Human error when developing and using smart cyber physical systems is inevitable. Earlier work has set out Security Ergonomics by Design—principles by which developers of systems can ensure that the active user error cannot occur when latent system failures introduced in development are in play. This paper underpins these principles by showing there is a fundamental need to adopt a Just Culture within which i) user error is captured for improvement in the development cycle, and ii) to provide software engineers assurance that their own mistakes are not automatically punished but rather treated as learnings that can be fed back into building safer and more secure practice.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 21-30
Trust Beyond Computation Alone: Human Aspects of Trust in Blockchain Technologies
Blockchains - with their inherent properties of transaction transparency, distributed consensus, immutability and cryptographic verifiability - are increasingly seen as a means to underpin innovative products and services in a range of sectors from finance through to energy and healthcare. Discussions, too often, make assertions that the trustless nature of blockchain technologies enables and actively promotes their suitability - there being no need to trust third parties or centralised control. Yet humans need to be able to trust systems, and others with whom the system enables transactions. In this paper, we highlight that understanding this need for trust is critical for the development of blockchain-based systems. Through an online study with 125 users of the most well-known of blockchain based systems - the cryptocurrency Bitcoin - we uncover that human and institutional aspects of trust are pervasive. Our analysis highlights that, when designing future blockchain-based technologies, we ought to not only consider computational trust but also the wider eco-system, how trust plays a part in users engaging/disengaging with such eco-systems and where design choices impact upon trust. From this, we distill a set of guidelines for software engineers developing blockchain-based systems for societal applications.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 21-30
Trust Beyond Computation Alone: Human Aspects of Trust in Blockchain Technologies
Blockchains - with their inherent properties of transaction transparency, distributed consensus, immutability and cryptographic verifiability - are increasingly seen as a means to underpin innovative products and services in a range of sectors from finance through to energy and healthcare. Discussions, too often, make assertions that the trustless nature of blockchain technologies enables and actively promotes their suitability - there being no need to trust third parties or centralised control. Yet humans need to be able to trust systems, and others with whom the system enables transactions. In this paper, we highlight that understanding this need for trust is critical for the development of blockchain-based systems. Through an online study with 125 users of the most well-known of blockchain based systems - the cryptocurrency Bitcoin - we uncover that human and institutional aspects of trust are pervasive. Our analysis highlights that, when designing future blockchain-based technologies, we ought to not only consider computational trust but also the wider eco-system, how trust plays a part in users engaging/disengaging with such eco-systems and where design choices impact upon trust. From this, we distill a set of guidelines for software engineers developing blockchain-based systems for societal applications.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 75-86
Oops I Did it Again
Research efforts in the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have dramatically increased over the past few years. However, there is a limiting factor when work cannot be evaluated on real-world systems due to safety and operational reasons. This has led to multiple deployments of ICS testbeds covering multiple sectors including water treatment, power distribution and transportation networks. Over the last five years, we have designed and constructed ICS testbeds to support cyber security research. Our prior work in building testbeds culminated in a set of design principles and lessons learnt, formulated to support other researchers in designing and building their own ICS testbeds. In the last two years we have taken these lessons and used them to guide our own greenfield large-scale, complex and process-diverse security testbed affording a rare opportunity to design and build from the ground up -- one in which we have been able to look back and validate those past lessons and principles. In this work we describe the process of building our new ICS and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) testbed, and give an overview of its architecture. We then reflect on our past lessons, and contribute five previously unrecognised additional lessons based on this experience.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 75-86
Open AccessOops I Did it Again
Research efforts in the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have dramatically increased over the past few years. However, there is a limiting factor when work cannot be evaluated on real-world systems due to safety and operational reasons. This has led to multiple deployments of ICS testbeds covering multiple sectors including water treatment, power distribution and transportation networks. Over the last five years, we have designed and constructed ICS testbeds to support cyber security research. Our prior work in building testbeds culminated in a set of design principles and lessons learnt, formulated to support other researchers in designing and building their own ICS testbeds. In the last two years we have taken these lessons and used them to guide our own greenfield large-scale, complex and process-diverse security testbed affording a rare opportunity to design and build from the ground up -- one in which we have been able to look back and validate those past lessons and principles. In this work we describe the process of building our new ICS and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) testbed, and give an overview of its architecture. We then reflect on our past lessons, and contribute five previously unrecognised additional lessons based on this experience.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET)
- p. 44 (8 pp.)
A Reference Architecture for IIoT and Industrial Control Systems Testbeds
Conducting cyber security research within live operational technology and industrial Internet of Things environments is, understandably, not practical and as such research needs to be undertaken within non-live mimics or testbeds. However, testbeds and especially those which are built using real-world infrastructure are expensive to develop and maintain. Moreover, such testbeds tend to be representative of a single industry vertical (often based upon the skill set or research focus) and built in isolation. In this paper we present a reference architecture, developed whilst designing and building the Bristol Cyber Security Group ICS/IIoT testbed for critical national infrastructure security research.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET)
- p. 44 (8 pp.)
A Reference Architecture for IIoT and Industrial Control Systems Testbeds
Conducting cyber security research within live operational technology and industrial Internet of Things environments is, understandably, not practical and as such research needs to be undertaken within non-live mimics or testbeds. However, testbeds and especially those which are built using real-world infrastructure are expensive to develop and maintain. Moreover, such testbeds tend to be representative of a single industry vertical (often based upon the skill set or research focus) and built in isolation. In this paper we present a reference architecture, developed whilst designing and building the Bristol Cyber Security Group ICS/IIoT testbed for critical national infrastructure security research.
- Open Access
- 18 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Industrial Information Integration
- Vol. 14, 50-58
Developing for non-human users: Reflecting on practical implications in the ubiquitous computing era
- 18 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Industrial Information Integration
- Vol. 14, 50-58
Open AccessDeveloping for non-human users: Reflecting on practical implications in the ubiquitous computing era
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 606-613
A Cross-Virtual Machine Network Channel Attack via Mirroring and TAP Impersonation
Data privacy and security is a leading concern for providers and customers of cloud computing, where Virtual Machines (VMs) can co-reside within the same underlying physical machine. Side channel attacks within multi-tenant virtualized cloud environments are an established problem, where attackers are able to monitor and exfiltrate data from co-resident VMs. Virtualization services have attempted to mitigate such attacks by preventing VM-to-VM interference on shared hardware by providing logical resource isolation between co-located VMs via an internal virtual network. However, such approaches are also insecure, with attackers capable of performing network channel attacks which bypass mitigation strategies using vectors such as ARP Spoofing, TCP/IP steganography, and DNS poisoning. In this paper we identify a new vulnerability within the internal cloud virtual network, showing that through a combination of TAP impersonation and mirroring, a malicious VM can successfully redirect and monitor network traffic of VMs co-located within the same physical machine. We demonstrate the feasibility of this attack in a prominent cloud platform - OpenStack - under various security requirements and system conditions, and propose countermeasures for mitigation.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 606-613
A Cross-Virtual Machine Network Channel Attack via Mirroring and TAP Impersonation
Data privacy and security is a leading concern for providers and customers of cloud computing, where Virtual Machines (VMs) can co-reside within the same underlying physical machine. Side channel attacks within multi-tenant virtualized cloud environments are an established problem, where attackers are able to monitor and exfiltrate data from co-resident VMs. Virtualization services have attempted to mitigate such attacks by preventing VM-to-VM interference on shared hardware by providing logical resource isolation between co-located VMs via an internal virtual network. However, such approaches are also insecure, with attackers capable of performing network channel attacks which bypass mitigation strategies using vectors such as ARP Spoofing, TCP/IP steganography, and DNS poisoning. In this paper we identify a new vulnerability within the internal cloud virtual network, showing that through a combination of TAP impersonation and mirroring, a malicious VM can successfully redirect and monitor network traffic of VMs co-located within the same physical machine. We demonstrate the feasibility of this attack in a prominent cloud platform - OpenStack - under various security requirements and system conditions, and propose countermeasures for mitigation.