Bradley Shaun Smith
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Bradley Shaun Smith has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
J. A. Robinson
**Professor of Private Law, University of the North West, Potchefstroom, South Africa
1 shared publication- Robbie Robinson
North-West University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd in South African Law Journal
- Vol. 140 (4) , 697-714
Notes: Prescient precedent: PAF v SCF (SCA) and a new paradigm for testing whether a trust has been abused to manipulate a spouse’s accrual (or redistribution) liability at divorce
In this note, I argue that PAF v SCF 2022 (6) SA 162 (SCA) is a groundbreaking judgment for curbing the abuse of the trust form by spouses who are married out of community of property and who engage in unscrupulous ‘divorce planning’ aimed at manipulating their personal estate values for the purposes of dividing matrimonial property at divorce. PAF not only removes several uncertainties regarding our courts’ ability to pierce the veneer of an abused trust but also broadens our conventional understanding of what trust-form abuse entails in the divorce setting, particularly by virtue of its engagement with the SCA’s earlier (prescient) judgment in Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). In the process, I argue that there is a need to reconsider the test formulated in REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) for taking the asset value of an alter-ego trust into account for accrual claims at divorce. I further assert that the new paradigm PAF ushers in requires formulating a consolidated test that takes into account this reconsideration, as well as the novel factual matrix in PAF. I conclude that this consolidated test is not only capable of being applied in the context of accrual liability, but also where a spouse is eligible to seek a redistribution order in terms of s 7 of the Divorce Act.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd in South African Law Journal
- Vol. 140 (4) , 697-714
Notes: Prescient precedent: PAF v SCF (SCA) and a new paradigm for testing whether a trust has been abused to manipulate a spouse’s accrual (or redistribution) liability at divorce
In this note, I argue that PAF v SCF 2022 (6) SA 162 (SCA) is a groundbreaking judgment for curbing the abuse of the trust form by spouses who are married out of community of property and who engage in unscrupulous ‘divorce planning’ aimed at manipulating their personal estate values for the purposes of dividing matrimonial property at divorce. PAF not only removes several uncertainties regarding our courts’ ability to pierce the veneer of an abused trust but also broadens our conventional understanding of what trust-form abuse entails in the divorce setting, particularly by virtue of its engagement with the SCA’s earlier (prescient) judgment in Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). In the process, I argue that there is a need to reconsider the test formulated in REM v VM 2017 (3) SA 371 (SCA) for taking the asset value of an alter-ego trust into account for accrual claims at divorce. I further assert that the new paradigm PAF ushers in requires formulating a consolidated test that takes into account this reconsideration, as well as the novel factual matrix in PAF. I conclude that this consolidated test is not only capable of being applied in the context of accrual liability, but also where a spouse is eligible to seek a redistribution order in terms of s 7 of the Divorce Act.
- 24 May 2017
- Published by University of the Free State in Journal for Juridical Science
- Vol. 42 (1) , 1-18
Statutory discretion or common law power? Some reflections on “veil piercing” and the consideration of (the value of) trust assets in dividing matrimonial property at divorce – Part Two
Although it is an entrenched principle of company law that the abuse of corporate personality may require the “corporate veil” of a company to be “pierced”, this possibility has only recently become a feature of South African trust law. While this is a salutary development in theory, the application and practical usefulness of this remedy remain shrouded in uncertainty. A particularly acute manifestation hereof arises where it is argued that (the value of) trust property should be considered for the purposes of dividing matrimonial property at divorce. By drawing on the established principles of “piercing” in the company context and analysing relevant case law, Part One of this article (that appeared in the December 2016 issue of this journal) concluded that the prevailing position in respect of trusts neither accords with the principles of proper trust administration nor gives effect to the legal obligations imposed on divorcing spouses by matrimonial property law. More specifically, it was argued that, while piercing the trust veil is a power that is derived from common law (as opposed to legislation), the actual exercising of this power in a divorce context is dependent on a nexus provided by the matrimonial property regime in question. From this platform, Part Two of the article provides perspectives on how the property of an abused trust should be dealt with in divorces involving the three major matrimonial property regimes that are recognised by South African family law. Potential litigation based on these contentions should contribute towards rectifying the unsatisfactory legal position that prevails.
- 24 May 2017
- Published by University of the Free State in Journal for Juridical Science
- Vol. 42 (1) , 1-18
Statutory discretion or common law power? Some reflections on “veil piercing” and the consideration of (the value of) trust assets in dividing matrimonial property at divorce – Part Two
Although it is an entrenched principle of company law that the abuse of corporate personality may require the “corporate veil” of a company to be “pierced”, this possibility has only recently become a feature of South African trust law. While this is a salutary development in theory, the application and practical usefulness of this remedy remain shrouded in uncertainty. A particularly acute manifestation hereof arises where it is argued that (the value of) trust property should be considered for the purposes of dividing matrimonial property at divorce. By drawing on the established principles of “piercing” in the company context and analysing relevant case law, Part One of this article (that appeared in the December 2016 issue of this journal) concluded that the prevailing position in respect of trusts neither accords with the principles of proper trust administration nor gives effect to the legal obligations imposed on divorcing spouses by matrimonial property law. More specifically, it was argued that, while piercing the trust veil is a power that is derived from common law (as opposed to legislation), the actual exercising of this power in a divorce context is dependent on a nexus provided by the matrimonial property regime in question. From this platform, Part Two of the article provides perspectives on how the property of an abused trust should be dealt with in divorces involving the three major matrimonial property regimes that are recognised by South African family law. Potential litigation based on these contentions should contribute towards rectifying the unsatisfactory legal position that prevails.
- 30 June 2016
- Published by University of the Free State in Journal for Juridical Science
- Vol. 41 (2) , 68-94
Statutory discretion or common law power? Some reflections on “veil piercing” and the consideration of (the value of) trust assets in dividing matrimonial property at divorce – Part One
Although it is an entrenched principle of company law that the abuse of corporate personality may require the “corporate veil” of a company to be “pierced”, this possibility has only recently become a feature of South African trust law. While this is a salutary development in theory, the application and practical usefulness of this remedy remain shrouded in uncertainty. A particularly acute manifestation hereof arises where it is argued that (the value of) trust property should be considered for the purposes of dividing matrimonial property at divorce. By drawing on the established principles of “piercing” in the company context and analysing relevant case law, Part One of this article concludes that the prevailing position in respect of trusts neither accords with the principles of proper trust administration nor gives effect to the legal obligations imposed on divorcing spouses by matrimonial property law. More specifically, it is argued that, while piercing the trust veil is a power that is derived from common law (as opposed to legislation), the actual exercising of this power in a divorce context is dependent on a nexus provided by the matrimonial property regime in question. From this platform, Part Two of this article will provide perspectives on how the property of an abused trust should be dealt with in divorces involving the three major matrimonial property regimes that are recognised by South African family law. In addition, it will be argued that potential litigation based on these contentions should contribute towards rectifying the unsatisfactory legal position that prevails.
- 30 June 2016
- Published by University of the Free State in Journal for Juridical Science
- Vol. 41 (2) , 68-94
Statutory discretion or common law power? Some reflections on “veil piercing” and the consideration of (the value of) trust assets in dividing matrimonial property at divorce – Part One
Although it is an entrenched principle of company law that the abuse of corporate personality may require the “corporate veil” of a company to be “pierced”, this possibility has only recently become a feature of South African trust law. While this is a salutary development in theory, the application and practical usefulness of this remedy remain shrouded in uncertainty. A particularly acute manifestation hereof arises where it is argued that (the value of) trust property should be considered for the purposes of dividing matrimonial property at divorce. By drawing on the established principles of “piercing” in the company context and analysing relevant case law, Part One of this article concludes that the prevailing position in respect of trusts neither accords with the principles of proper trust administration nor gives effect to the legal obligations imposed on divorcing spouses by matrimonial property law. More specifically, it is argued that, while piercing the trust veil is a power that is derived from common law (as opposed to legislation), the actual exercising of this power in a divorce context is dependent on a nexus provided by the matrimonial property regime in question. From this platform, Part Two of this article will provide perspectives on how the property of an abused trust should be dealt with in divorces involving the three major matrimonial property regimes that are recognised by South African family law. In addition, it will be argued that potential litigation based on these contentions should contribute towards rectifying the unsatisfactory legal position that prevails.
- 2 January 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South African Journal on Human Rights
- Vol. 32 (1) , 130-155
Surviving heterosexual life partners and the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987: a ‘test case’ for the fashioning of an appropriate constitutional remedy in cases of ‘judicially generated residual discrimination’
The wide powers of judicial review granted to South African courts by the Constitution have, predictably and correctly, led to the judicial broadening of the ambit of persons who qualify as a surviving ‘spouse’ for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, 1987 (‘the ISA’). Surviving heterosexual life partners, however, remain excluded. In an earlier publication, I concluded that this exclusion violates the rights to equality and dignity of these partners. Building hereon, this article considers the fashioning of the appropriate constitutional remedy. In doing so, it identifies the prevailing positive law as an example of what I term ‘judicially generated residual discrimination.’ This occurs when a new form of marginalisation arises in our constitutional democracy as the (presumably unintended) by-product of the judicial broadening of a (pre-1994) piece of legislation. Where a court finds this to constitute unfair discrimination, the nature, scope and effective date of remedial action may be complicated by the very fact that the unfair discrimination has arisen as a result of earlier, but post-Constitutional, case law. This is particularly so in the case of the ISA, because standing ‘reading-in’ orders granted by the Constitutional Court – that have never been addressed by the legislature – need to be tinkered with by the court. This requires the doctrine of precedent to be considered in a context in which it has never been considered before in South Africa (or in comparable jurisdictions such as the United States and Canada). The article proffers a remedy that addresses these issues while conforming to the constitutional demands of providing ‘appropriate relief’ by means of an order that is ‘just and equitable.’ In this manner, it also provides perspectives that may be taken into account by courts that may have to adjudicate upon similar instances of ‘judicially generated residual discrimination’ in future.
- 2 January 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South African Journal on Human Rights
- Vol. 32 (1) , 130-155
Surviving heterosexual life partners and the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987: a ‘test case’ for the fashioning of an appropriate constitutional remedy in cases of ‘judicially generated residual discrimination’
The wide powers of judicial review granted to South African courts by the Constitution have, predictably and correctly, led to the judicial broadening of the ambit of persons who qualify as a surviving ‘spouse’ for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, 1987 (‘the ISA’). Surviving heterosexual life partners, however, remain excluded. In an earlier publication, I concluded that this exclusion violates the rights to equality and dignity of these partners. Building hereon, this article considers the fashioning of the appropriate constitutional remedy. In doing so, it identifies the prevailing positive law as an example of what I term ‘judicially generated residual discrimination.’ This occurs when a new form of marginalisation arises in our constitutional democracy as the (presumably unintended) by-product of the judicial broadening of a (pre-1994) piece of legislation. Where a court finds this to constitute unfair discrimination, the nature, scope and effective date of remedial action may be complicated by the very fact that the unfair discrimination has arisen as a result of earlier, but post-Constitutional, case law. This is particularly so in the case of the ISA, because standing ‘reading-in’ orders granted by the Constitutional Court – that have never been addressed by the legislature – need to be tinkered with by the court. This requires the doctrine of precedent to be considered in a context in which it has never been considered before in South Africa (or in comparable jurisdictions such as the United States and Canada). The article proffers a remedy that addresses these issues while conforming to the constitutional demands of providing ‘appropriate relief’ by means of an order that is ‘just and equitable.’ In this manner, it also provides perspectives that may be taken into account by courts that may have to adjudicate upon similar instances of ‘judicially generated residual discrimination’ in future.
- 2 September 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family
- Vol. 24 (3) , 267-299
Rethinking the Application of the Putative Spouse Doctrine in South African Matrimonial Property Law
This article examines the application of the putative spouse doctrine in South Africa in the light of a recent judgement in which it was held that the second ‘wife’ to a bigamous civil ‘marriage’ in community of property was not entitled to any share of the estate at the death of her ‘husband’ despite the fact that she was ostensibly of the bona fide belief that she had been his only wife and that her marriage had been valid. On the basis of a comparative survey involving American and French law, the article concludes that the legal position created in South Africa by the precedent in question is untenable and in need of being developed in order to cater for future similar situations.
- 2 September 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family
- Vol. 24 (3) , 267-299
Rethinking the Application of the Putative Spouse Doctrine in South African Matrimonial Property Law
This article examines the application of the putative spouse doctrine in South Africa in the light of a recent judgement in which it was held that the second ‘wife’ to a bigamous civil ‘marriage’ in community of property was not entitled to any share of the estate at the death of her ‘husband’ despite the fact that she was ostensibly of the bona fide belief that she had been his only wife and that her marriage had been valid. On the basis of a comparative survey involving American and French law, the article concludes that the legal position created in South Africa by the precedent in question is untenable and in need of being developed in order to cater for future similar situations.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2010
- Published by Academy of Science of South Africa in Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal
- Vol. 13 (2) , 29-75
An Embarrassment of Riches or a Profusion of Confusion An Evaluation of the Continued Existence of the Civil Union Act of 2006 in the Light of Prospective Domestic Partnerships Legislation in South Africa
As it stands, South African family law currently holds that the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 applies exclusively to the solemnisation of heterosexual civil marriages while same-sex couples have no choice but to formalise their relationships in terms of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. In addition, the legal position is complicated by the fact that the latter Act not only allows both heterosexual and homosexual couples to conclude a civil union, but also provides that a civil union may take the form of either a marriage or a civil partnership, both of which enjoy the same legal recognition as, and give rise to the same legal consequences, as a civil marriage under the Marriage Act. In January 2008, a draft Domestic Partnerships Bill saw the light of day, the potential enactment of which casts significant doubt as to whether the prevailing framework should be retained. With this potential development in mind, this paper considers the desirability of maintaining the "separate but equal" status quo by: (a) comparing the South African Law Reform Commission's pre-Civil Union Act proposals with the approach eventually adopted by the legislature; (b) comparing and contrasting the post-Civil Union Act position in South Africa with that of an established and well-ordered jurisdiction such as the Netherlands and, in the light hereof, considering the cases for and against repealing the Civil Union Act; and (c) by considering the desirability and practicality of the civil partnership's potential co-existence with the Domestic Partnerships Bill (as modified in accordance with a recent study). A proposal is made that could provide a less complex and better streamlined family law dispensation in South Africa.
- 27 August 2010
- Published by Academy of Science of South Africa in Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal
- Vol. 13 (2) , 29-75
Open AccessAn Embarrassment of Riches or a Profusion of Confusion An Evaluation of the Continued Existence of the Civil Union Act of 2006 in the Light of Prospective Domestic Partnerships Legislation in South Africa
As it stands, South African family law currently holds that the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 applies exclusively to the solemnisation of heterosexual civil marriages while same-sex couples have no choice but to formalise their relationships in terms of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. In addition, the legal position is complicated by the fact that the latter Act not only allows both heterosexual and homosexual couples to conclude a civil union, but also provides that a civil union may take the form of either a marriage or a civil partnership, both of which enjoy the same legal recognition as, and give rise to the same legal consequences, as a civil marriage under the Marriage Act. In January 2008, a draft Domestic Partnerships Bill saw the light of day, the potential enactment of which casts significant doubt as to whether the prevailing framework should be retained. With this potential development in mind, this paper considers the desirability of maintaining the "separate but equal" status quo by: (a) comparing the South African Law Reform Commission's pre-Civil Union Act proposals with the approach eventually adopted by the legislature; (b) comparing and contrasting the post-Civil Union Act position in South Africa with that of an established and well-ordered jurisdiction such as the Netherlands and, in the light hereof, considering the cases for and against repealing the Civil Union Act; and (c) by considering the desirability and practicality of the civil partnership's potential co-existence with the Domestic Partnerships Bill (as modified in accordance with a recent study). A proposal is made that could provide a less complex and better streamlined family law dispensation in South Africa.
- 23 September 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family
- Vol. 22 (3) , 356-392
The South African Civil Union Act 2006: Progressive Legislation With Regressive Implications?
A ground-breaking judgment handed down by the Constitutional Court on 1 December 2005 gave parliament 1 year within which to promulgate legislation that facilitated same-sex marriage in South Africa. In response, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 came into operation on 30 November 2006. This Act provides for the solemnization and registration of a civil union in the form of either a marriage or a civil partnership. While it can be accepted that the Act allows persons of the same sex to conclude a civil union, the position of heterosexual persons appears to be less certain – a situation which requires urgent attention due to the lack of legal protection currently afforded to cohabitants who have not formalized their relationships. This problem is exacerbated by a number of anomalies created by judicial intervention (prior to the promulgation of the Act), in terms of which certain benefits of civil marriages were extended to same-sex unmarried couples while their heterosexual counterparts were left out in the cold. After elucidating the interpretative difficulties caused by the Act, attempting to shed some light on a number of the anomalies alluded to above and briefly analysing the comparable marriage and marriage-like relationships encountered in Dutch law, this contribution concludes that the Civil Union Act is a badly-drafted piece of legislation that has only served to further fragment an already disjointed legal landscape.
- 23 September 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family
- Vol. 22 (3) , 356-392
The South African Civil Union Act 2006: Progressive Legislation With Regressive Implications?
A ground-breaking judgment handed down by the Constitutional Court on 1 December 2005 gave parliament 1 year within which to promulgate legislation that facilitated same-sex marriage in South Africa. In response, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 came into operation on 30 November 2006. This Act provides for the solemnization and registration of a civil union in the form of either a marriage or a civil partnership. While it can be accepted that the Act allows persons of the same sex to conclude a civil union, the position of heterosexual persons appears to be less certain – a situation which requires urgent attention due to the lack of legal protection currently afforded to cohabitants who have not formalized their relationships. This problem is exacerbated by a number of anomalies created by judicial intervention (prior to the promulgation of the Act), in terms of which certain benefits of civil marriages were extended to same-sex unmarried couples while their heterosexual counterparts were left out in the cold. After elucidating the interpretative difficulties caused by the Act, attempting to shed some light on a number of the anomalies alluded to above and briefly analysing the comparable marriage and marriage-like relationships encountered in Dutch law, this contribution concludes that the Civil Union Act is a badly-drafted piece of legislation that has only served to further fragment an already disjointed legal landscape.