Robert W. Batterman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Robert W. Batterman has a total of 104 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adina L. Roskies
University of California Santa Barbara
1 shared publication - Alan C. Love
University of Minnesota
1 shared publication - Alan Hájek
Philoso-phy of Science, Cambridge University Press, Journals Fulfillment Department, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS, England
1 shared publication Alan Richardson
University of Edinburgh
1 shared publication- Alex Rosenberg
Duke University
1 shared publication - Alexander A. Bauer
Queens College, CUNY
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (3) , f1-f4
PSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (3) , f1-f4
Open AccessPSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 19 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Introduction
This chapter introduces a conception of the relative autonomy of upper-scale, continuum theories from lower-scale more fundamental molecular and atomic theories. It contrasts a notion of foundational philosophical problems with an understanding of autonomy and fundamentality. It lays out the key ingredients required to argue for a middle-out, mesoscale approach to many-body systems, including hydrodynamic descriptions, representative volume elements, and fluctuation and dissipation.
- 19 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Introduction
This chapter introduces a conception of the relative autonomy of upper-scale, continuum theories from lower-scale more fundamental molecular and atomic theories. It contrasts a notion of foundational philosophical problems with an understanding of autonomy and fundamentality. It lays out the key ingredients required to argue for a middle-out, mesoscale approach to many-body systems, including hydrodynamic descriptions, representative volume elements, and fluctuation and dissipation.
- 9 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (1-2) , 1159-1184
Steel and bone: mesoscale modeling and middle-out strategies in physics and biology
- 9 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (1-2) , 1159-1184
Steel and bone: mesoscale modeling and middle-out strategies in physics and biology
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
- Vol. 61, 20-34
Biology meets physics: Reductionism and multi-scale modeling of morphogenesis
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
- Vol. 61, 20-34
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessBiology meets physics: Reductionism and multi-scale modeling of morphogenesis
- 7 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Statistical Physics
- Vol. 167 (3-4) , 559-574
Philosophical Implications of Kadanoff’s Work on the Renormalization Group
- 7 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Statistical Physics
- Vol. 167 (3-4) , 559-574
Philosophical Implications of Kadanoff’s Work on the Renormalization Group
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 July 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 81 (3) , 349-376
Minimal Model Explanations
This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, mechanical, difference-making, and so on, strategies prominent in the philosophical literature. We contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of these models is not that they have certain features in common with real systems. Rather, the models are explanatory because of a story about why a class of systems will all display the same large-scale behavior because the details that distinguish them are irrelevant. This story explains patterns across extremely diverse systems and shows how minimal models can be used to understand real systems.
- 1 July 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 81 (3) , 349-376
Top Cited PapersMinimal Model Explanations
This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, mechanical, difference-making, and so on, strategies prominent in the philosophical literature. We contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of these models is not that they have certain features in common with real systems. Rather, the models are explanatory because of a story about why a class of systems will all display the same large-scale behavior because the details that distinguish them are irrelevant. This story explains patterns across extremely diverse systems and shows how minimal models can be used to understand real systems.