Teppo Felin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Teppo Felin has a total of 122 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Nicolai J. Foss
Copenhagen Business Sch, Dept Strateg Management & Globalizat, Copenhagen, Denmark
7 shared publications- Todd R. Zenger
David Eccles School of Business University of Utah Salt Lake City Utah USA
7 shared publications - Stuart Kauffman
Institute for Systems Biology, Seattle, USA; Biochemistry and Biophysics, University of Pennsylvania, USA
6 shared publications Todd Zenger
University of Utah
6 shared publicationsAnn Langley
5 shared publicationsTim Rowley
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Management Studies
Leaders as Theorists
Research on leadership has long focused on two extremes, either on individual traits (or styles and behaviours) or on relationships and context. We argue that neither extreme explains where leadership originates from or how it produces the collective outcomes it is credited with. We propose a third view that is neither a compromise between nor a variant of these extremes. We argue that leaders are theorists. Leaders are forward‐looking actors who, at any level of an organization, formulate causal theories and frame problems. The value of leader theories is realized, amplified or constrained through social mechanisms. Theorizing is not one activity among many – it is the act that constitutes leading itself. The very factors foregrounded by recent work in leadership (like context, trust, and relationality) are not the starting point of leadership but emerge as leaders advocate, adopt, test, and scale theories. The leader‐as‐theorist agenda is normative and interventionist, highlighting how leader theorizing and causal reasoning can be improved and taught. We close by laying out a research agenda for studying leaders as theorists.
- 10 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Management Studies
Open AccessLeaders as Theorists
Research on leadership has long focused on two extremes, either on individual traits (or styles and behaviours) or on relationships and context. We argue that neither extreme explains where leadership originates from or how it produces the collective outcomes it is credited with. We propose a third view that is neither a compromise between nor a variant of these extremes. We argue that leaders are theorists. Leaders are forward‐looking actors who, at any level of an organization, formulate causal theories and frame problems. The value of leader theories is realized, amplified or constrained through social mechanisms. Theorizing is not one activity among many – it is the act that constitutes leading itself. The very factors foregrounded by recent work in leadership (like context, trust, and relationality) are not the starting point of leadership but emerge as leaders advocate, adopt, test, and scale theories. The leader‐as‐theorist agenda is normative and interventionist, highlighting how leader theorizing and causal reasoning can be improved and taught. We close by laying out a research agenda for studying leaders as theorists.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 16-30
Can AI Do Strategy? A Dialogue and Debate
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 16-30
Can AI Do Strategy? A Dialogue and Debate
- Open Access
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 181
Technology: Theory-driven experimentation and combinatorial salience
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 181
Open AccessTechnology: Theory-driven experimentation and combinatorial salience
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 9 (4) , 297-310
Theory-Based Decisions: Foundations and Introduction
Theories are foundational for decision making. We point to a normative agenda that emphasizes the need for decision makers—including managers, firms, entrepreneurs, and startups—to develop their own theories. Our argument is that decision makers should be like scientists and use the scientific method—theories, causal reasoning, and experimentation—to problem solve and generate new data and value. In this paper and special issue introduction, we discuss the foundations of the theory-based view (TBV), particularly as it relates to forward-looking reasoning and decision making under uncertainty. Rather than handing prescriptive theories to others, the goal of the TBV is to provide the scaffolding for economic actors themselves to develop their own, idiosyncratic theories. Theories are built on heterogeneous beliefs and causal reasoning that enable the generation of unique paths to value. We discuss the implications of this argument for key theories within strategy and economics, along with highlighting research opportunities at the nexus of the TBV and topics such as learning, entrepreneurship, finance, ownership and leadership. We also introduce the special issue papers and discuss their contributions to the TBV. Funding: We appreciate ION Management Science Laboratory at Bocconi for funding the special issue conference and related activities. A. Gambardella also acknowledges support from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme [Grant 101021061].
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 9 (4) , 297-310
Theory-Based Decisions: Foundations and Introduction
Theories are foundational for decision making. We point to a normative agenda that emphasizes the need for decision makers—including managers, firms, entrepreneurs, and startups—to develop their own theories. Our argument is that decision makers should be like scientists and use the scientific method—theories, causal reasoning, and experimentation—to problem solve and generate new data and value. In this paper and special issue introduction, we discuss the foundations of the theory-based view (TBV), particularly as it relates to forward-looking reasoning and decision making under uncertainty. Rather than handing prescriptive theories to others, the goal of the TBV is to provide the scaffolding for economic actors themselves to develop their own, idiosyncratic theories. Theories are built on heterogeneous beliefs and causal reasoning that enable the generation of unique paths to value. We discuss the implications of this argument for key theories within strategy and economics, along with highlighting research opportunities at the nexus of the TBV and topics such as learning, entrepreneurship, finance, ownership and leadership. We also introduce the special issue papers and discuss their contributions to the TBV. Funding: We appreciate ION Management Science Laboratory at Bocconi for funding the special issue conference and related activities. A. Gambardella also acknowledges support from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme [Grant 101021061].
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 9 (4) , 346-371
Theory Is All You Need: AI, Human Cognition, and Causal Reasoning
Scholars argue that artificial intelligence (AI) can generate genuine novelty and new knowledge and, in turn, that AI and computational models of cognition will replace human decision making under uncertainty. We disagree. We argue that AI’s data-based prediction is different from human theory-based causal logic and reasoning. We highlight problems with the decades-old analogy between computers and minds as input–output devices, using large language models as an example. Human cognition is better conceptualized as a form of theory-based causal reasoning rather than AI’s emphasis on information processing and data-based prediction. AI uses a probability-based approach to knowledge and is largely backward looking and imitative, whereas human cognition is forward-looking and capable of generating genuine novelty. We introduce the idea of data–belief asymmetries to highlight the difference between AI and human cognition, using the example of heavier-than-air flight to illustrate our arguments. Theory-based causal reasoning provides a cognitive mechanism for humans to intervene in the world and to engage in directed experimentation to generate new data. Throughout the article, we discuss the implications of our argument for understanding the origins of novelty, new knowledge, and decision making under uncertainty.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 9 (4) , 346-371
Top Cited PapersTheory Is All You Need: AI, Human Cognition, and Causal Reasoning
Scholars argue that artificial intelligence (AI) can generate genuine novelty and new knowledge and, in turn, that AI and computational models of cognition will replace human decision making under uncertainty. We disagree. We argue that AI’s data-based prediction is different from human theory-based causal logic and reasoning. We highlight problems with the decades-old analogy between computers and minds as input–output devices, using large language models as an example. Human cognition is better conceptualized as a form of theory-based causal reasoning rather than AI’s emphasis on information processing and data-based prediction. AI uses a probability-based approach to knowledge and is largely backward looking and imitative, whereas human cognition is forward-looking and capable of generating genuine novelty. We introduce the idea of data–belief asymmetries to highlight the difference between AI and human cognition, using the example of heavier-than-air flight to illustrate our arguments. Theory-based causal reasoning provides a cognitive mechanism for humans to intervene in the world and to engage in directed experimentation to generate new data. Throughout the article, we discuss the implications of our argument for understanding the origins of novelty, new knowledge, and decision making under uncertainty.
- Open Access
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Studies
- p. 1-10
Microfoundations as a toolkit for international business research
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Studies
- p. 1-10
Open AccessMicrofoundations as a toolkit for international business research
- 28 October 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1372-1392
Disruptive evolution: harnessing functional excess, experimentation, and science as tool
We explore the limitations of the adaptationist view of evolution and propose an alternative. While gradual adaptation can explain some biological and economic diversity, it cannot account for radical innovation (especially during the past 10,000 years). We argue that ubiquitously available but dormant “functional excess” provides the raw material for evolutionary disruptions. Harnessing this excess requires directed experimentation and what we call “protoscientific” problem solving. We highlight the implications of these arguments for evolutionary theory, including evolutionary economics and strategy.
- 28 October 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1372-1392
Disruptive evolution: harnessing functional excess, experimentation, and science as tool
We explore the limitations of the adaptationist view of evolution and propose an alternative. While gradual adaptation can explain some biological and economic diversity, it cannot account for radical innovation (especially during the past 10,000 years). We argue that ubiquitously available but dormant “functional excess” provides the raw material for evolutionary disruptions. Harnessing this excess requires directed experimentation and what we call “protoscientific” problem solving. We highlight the implications of these arguments for evolutionary theory, including evolutionary economics and strategy.
- 17 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Strategic Organization
- Vol. 21 (2) , 476-488
Microfoundations of ecosystems: The theory-led firm and capability growth
We argue that firm-specific theories are critical for understanding the emergence and evolution of ecosystems. We first highlight how existing research on ecosystems lacks microfoundations and tends to be overly structural. We focus on the theory-led firm—the role that a firm-specific theory plays in capability development and the associated growth of ecosystems. Ecosystems are contingent on firm-specific theories of value. We also discuss the implications of our arguments for search- and demand-based approaches to ecosystems and point toward a theory-based and supply-side alternative.
- 17 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Strategic Organization
- Vol. 21 (2) , 476-488
Microfoundations of ecosystems: The theory-led firm and capability growth
We argue that firm-specific theories are critical for understanding the emergence and evolution of ecosystems. We first highlight how existing research on ecosystems lacks microfoundations and tends to be overly structural. We focus on the theory-led firm—the role that a firm-specific theory plays in capability development and the associated growth of ecosystems. Ecosystems are contingent on firm-specific theories of value. We also discuss the implications of our arguments for search- and demand-based approaches to ecosystems and point toward a theory-based and supply-side alternative.
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2022 (1)
The What, Why, and How of Organizational Intelligence: Beyond Individuals, Networks, and Technology
What does it mean for organizations to act intelligently? The concept of organizational intelligence has been of a topic of research since the early days of the field, yet there is a surprising pau...
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2022 (1)
The What, Why, and How of Organizational Intelligence: Beyond Individuals, Networks, and Technology
What does it mean for organizations to act intelligently? The concept of organizational intelligence has been of a topic of research since the early days of the field, yet there is a surprising pau...
- Open Access
- 7 April 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 13, 807261
A Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†
In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as “intuitive statisticians” while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as “probing organisms.” We first highlight how ecological rationality’s focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: (a) the problem of cue salience, and (b) the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies ecological rationality, which originate from themisapplicationof concepts in psychophysics (e.g., signal detection, just-noticeable-differences). We then work through the most popular experimental task in the ecological rationality literature—the city size task—to illustrate how psychophysical assumptions have informally been linked to ecological rationality. After highlighting these problems, we contrast ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Generative rationality builds on biology—in contrast to ecological rationality’s focus on statistics. We argue that in uncertain environments cues are rarely given or available for statistical processing. Therefore we focus on the psychogenesis of awareness rather than psychophysics of cues. For any agent or organism, environments “teem” with indefinite cues, meanings and potential objects, the salience or relevance of which is scarcely obvious based on their statistical or physical properties. We focus on organism-specificity and the organism-directed probing that shapes awareness and perception. Cues in teeming environments are noticed when they serve as cues-for-something, requiring what might be called a “cue-to-clue” transformation. In this sense, awareness toward a cue or cues is actively “grown.” We thus argue that perception might more productively be seen as thepresentationof cues and objects rather than theirrepresentation. This generative approach not only applies to relatively mundane organism (including human) interactions with their environments—as well as organism-object relationships and their embodied nature—but also has significant implications for understanding the emergence of novelty in economic settings. We conclude with a discussion of how our arguments link with—but modify—Herbert Simon’s popular “scissors” metaphor, as it applies to bounded rationality and its implications for decision making in uncertain, teeming environments.
- 7 April 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 13, 807261
Open AccessA Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†
In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as “intuitive statisticians” while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as “probing organisms.” We first highlight how ecological rationality’s focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: (a) the problem of cue salience, and (b) the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies ecological rationality, which originate from themisapplicationof concepts in psychophysics (e.g., signal detection, just-noticeable-differences). We then work through the most popular experimental task in the ecological rationality literature—the city size task—to illustrate how psychophysical assumptions have informally been linked to ecological rationality. After highlighting these problems, we contrast ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Generative rationality builds on biology—in contrast to ecological rationality’s focus on statistics. We argue that in uncertain environments cues are rarely given or available for statistical processing. Therefore we focus on the psychogenesis of awareness rather than psychophysics of cues. For any agent or organism, environments “teem” with indefinite cues, meanings and potential objects, the salience or relevance of which is scarcely obvious based on their statistical or physical properties. We focus on organism-specificity and the organism-directed probing that shapes awareness and perception. Cues in teeming environments are noticed when they serve as cues-for-something, requiring what might be called a “cue-to-clue” transformation. In this sense, awareness toward a cue or cues is actively “grown.” We thus argue that perception might more productively be seen as thepresentationof cues and objects rather than theirrepresentation. This generative approach not only applies to relatively mundane organism (including human) interactions with their environments—as well as organism-object relationships and their embodied nature—but also has significant implications for understanding the emergence of novelty in economic settings. We conclude with a discussion of how our arguments link with—but modify—Herbert Simon’s popular “scissors” metaphor, as it applies to bounded rationality and its implications for decision making in uncertain, teeming environments.