Olivier Bronchain
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Olivier Bronchain has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
François-Xavier Standaert
UCLouvain, ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group
6 shared publications- François-Xavier Standaert
UCLouvain, ICTEAM Institute, Crypto Group
5 shared publications Tobias Schneider
NXP Semiconductors
3 shared publications- Dina Kamel
UCLouvain
2 shared publications Alex Olshevsky
1 shared publication- Charles Momin
UCLouvain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 October 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (3)
Information Theoretic Evaluation of Raccoon's Side-Channel Leakage
Raccoon is a lattice-based scheme submitted to the NIST 2022 call for additional post-quantum signatures. One of its main selling points is that its design is intrinsically easy to mask against side-channel attacks. So far, Raccoon's physical security guarantees were only stated in the abstract probing model. In this paper, we discuss how these probing security results translate into guarantees in more realistic leakage models. We also highlight that this translation differs from what is usually observed (e.g., in symmetric cryptography), due to the algebraic structure of Raccoon's operations. For this purpose, we perform an in-depth information theoretic evaluation of Raccoon's most innovative part, namely the AddRepNoise function which allows generating its arithmetic shares on-the-fly. Our results are twofold. First, we show that the resulting shares do not enforce a statistical security order (i.e., the need for the side-channel adversary to estimate higher-order moments of the leakage distribution), as usually expected when masking. Second, we observe that the first-order leakage on the (large) random coefficients manipulated by Raccoon cannot be efficiently turned into leakage on the (smaller) coefficients of its long-term secret. Concretely, our information theoretic evaluations for relevant leakage functions also suggest that Raccoon's masked implementations can ensure high security with less shares than suggested by a conservative analysis in the probing model.
- 7 October 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (3)
Open AccessInformation Theoretic Evaluation of Raccoon's Side-Channel Leakage
Raccoon is a lattice-based scheme submitted to the NIST 2022 call for additional post-quantum signatures. One of its main selling points is that its design is intrinsically easy to mask against side-channel attacks. So far, Raccoon's physical security guarantees were only stated in the abstract probing model. In this paper, we discuss how these probing security results translate into guarantees in more realistic leakage models. We also highlight that this translation differs from what is usually observed (e.g., in symmetric cryptography), due to the algebraic structure of Raccoon's operations. For this purpose, we perform an in-depth information theoretic evaluation of Raccoon's most innovative part, namely the AddRepNoise function which allows generating its arithmetic shares on-the-fly. Our results are twofold. First, we show that the resulting shares do not enforce a statistical security order (i.e., the need for the side-channel adversary to estimate higher-order moments of the leakage distribution), as usually expected when masking. Second, we observe that the first-order leakage on the (large) random coefficients manipulated by Raccoon cannot be efficiently turned into leakage on the (smaller) coefficients of its long-term secret. Concretely, our information theoretic evaluations for relevant leakage functions also suggest that Raccoon's masked implementations can ensure high security with less shares than suggested by a conservative analysis in the probing model.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by The Open Journal in Journal of Open Source Software
- Vol. 8 (86) , 5196
SCALib: A Side-Channel Analysis Library
Side-channel attacks exploit unintended leakage from an electronic device in order to retrieve secret data. In particular, attacks exploiting physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations to recover cryptographic keys are an important threat to embedded devices. Countermeasures against these attacks have been extensively researched for more than two decades and are often deployed in security-critical devices.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by The Open Journal in Journal of Open Source Software
- Vol. 8 (86) , 5196
Open AccessSCALib: A Side-Channel Analysis Library
Side-channel attacks exploit unintended leakage from an electronic device in order to retrieve secret data. In particular, attacks exploiting physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations to recover cryptographic keys are an important threat to embedded devices. Countermeasures against these attacks have been extensively researched for more than two decades and are often deployed in security-critical devices.
- 26 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 236-256
Systematic Study of Decryption and Re-encryption Leakage: The Case of Kyber
- 26 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 236-256
Systematic Study of Decryption and Re-encryption Leakage: The Case of Kyber
- 19 January 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 17 (15566013) , 574-584
Efficient Profiled Side-Channel Analysis of Masked Implementations, Extended
We extend the study of efficient profiled attacks on masking schemes initiated by Lerman and Markowitch (TIFS, 2019) in different directions. First, we study both the profiling complexity and the online attack complexity of different profiled distinguishers. Second, we extend the range of the noise levels of their experiments, in order to cover (higher-noise) contexts where masking is effective. Third, we further contextualize the investigated distinguishers (e.g., in terms of adversarial capabilities and a priori assumptions on the leakage probability density function). Finally, we complete the list of distinguishers considered in this previous work and add expectation-maximization, soft analytical side-channel attacks and multi-layer perceptrons in our comparisons. Our results allow shedding an interesting new light on the respective strengths and weaknesses of these different statistical tools, both in the context of a side-channel security evaluation and for concrete attacks. In particular, they confirm the experimental relevance of evaluation shortcuts leveraging the masking randomness during profiling, in order to speed up the evaluation process.
- 19 January 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 17 (15566013) , 574-584
Efficient Profiled Side-Channel Analysis of Masked Implementations, Extended
We extend the study of efficient profiled attacks on masking schemes initiated by Lerman and Markowitch (TIFS, 2019) in different directions. First, we study both the profiling complexity and the online attack complexity of different profiled distinguishers. Second, we extend the range of the noise levels of their experiments, in order to cover (higher-noise) contexts where masking is effective. Third, we further contextualize the investigated distinguishers (e.g., in terms of adversarial capabilities and a priori assumptions on the leakage probability density function). Finally, we complete the list of distinguishers considered in this previous work and add expectation-maximization, soft analytical side-channel attacks and multi-layer perceptrons in our comparisons. Our results allow shedding an interesting new light on the respective strengths and weaknesses of these different statistical tools, both in the context of a side-channel security evaluation and for concrete attacks. In particular, they confirm the experimental relevance of evaluation shortcuts leveraging the masking randomness during profiling, in order to speed up the evaluation process.
- 29 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Cryptography and Communications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 573-585
How to fool a black box machine learning based side-channel security evaluation
- 29 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Cryptography and Communications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 573-585
How to fool a black box machine learning based side-channel security evaluation
- Open Access
- 19 March 2021
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2021 (1) , 78-129
MOE: Multiplication Operated Encryption with Trojan Resilience
In order to lower costs, the fabrication of Integrated Circuits (ICs) is increasingly delegated to offshore contract foundries, making them exposed to malicious modifications, known as hardware Trojans. Recent works have demonstrated that a strong form of Trojan-resilience can be obtained from untrusted chips by exploiting secret sharing and Multi-Party Computation (MPC), yet with significant cost overheads. In this paper, we study the possibility of building a symmetric cipher enabling similar guarantees in a more efficient manner. To reach this goal, we exploit a simple round structure mixing a modular multiplication and a multiplication with a binary matrix. Besides being motivated as a new block cipher design for Trojan resilience, our research also exposes the cryptographic properties of the modular multiplication, which is of independent interest.
- 19 March 2021
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2021 (1) , 78-129
Open AccessMOE: Multiplication Operated Encryption with Trojan Resilience
In order to lower costs, the fabrication of Integrated Circuits (ICs) is increasingly delegated to offshore contract foundries, making them exposed to malicious modifications, known as hardware Trojans. Recent works have demonstrated that a strong form of Trojan-resilience can be obtained from untrusted chips by exploiting secret sharing and Multi-Party Computation (MPC), yet with significant cost overheads. In this paper, we study the possibility of building a symmetric cipher enabling similar guarantees in a more efficient manner. To reach this goal, we exploit a simple round structure mixing a modular multiplication and a multiplication with a binary matrix. Besides being motivated as a new block cipher design for Trojan resilience, our research also exposes the cryptographic properties of the modular multiplication, which is of independent interest.
- 13 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Cryptography and Communications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 587-600
A stealthy Hardware Trojan based on a Statistical Fault Attack
- 13 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Cryptography and Communications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 587-600
A stealthy Hardware Trojan based on a Statistical Fault Attack
- 12 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (1) , 39-55
Reducing risks through simplicity: high side-channel security for lazy engineers
- 12 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (1) , 39-55
Reducing risks through simplicity: high side-channel security for lazy engineers
- 3 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (2) , 171-179
Side-channel analysis of a learning parity with physical noise processor
- 3 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (2) , 171-179
Side-channel analysis of a learning parity with physical noise processor
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 713-737
Leakage Certification Revisited: Bounding Model Errors in Side-Channel Security Evaluations
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 713-737
Leakage Certification Revisited: Bounding Model Errors in Side-Channel Security Evaluations