Fan Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Fan Zhang has a total of 88 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sen Yang
Yale University, IC3, New Haven, USA
7 shared publications Ari Juels
Cornell Tech
4 shared publications- Luyao Zhang
Duke Kunshan University, Suzhou, China
4 shared publications - Burak Öz
Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany and Flashbots, Munich, Germany
3 shared publications Elaine Shi
Cornell University; IC3, Ithaca, NY, USA
3 shared publications- Fei Wu
King's College London, London, United Kingdom
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7148-7162
Censorship Resistance vs Throughput in Multi-Proposer BFT Protocols
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7148-7162
Open AccessCensorship Resistance vs Throughput in Multi-Proposer BFT Protocols
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3340-3354
Relect: Single Secret Leader Election via FHE with Reduced Computation and Communication and Transparent Setup
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3340-3354
Open AccessRelect: Single Secret Leader Election via FHE with Reduced Computation and Communication and Transparent Setup
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7178-7192
Insecurity Through Obscurity: Veiled Vulnerabilities in Closed-Source Contracts
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7178-7192
Open AccessInsecurity Through Obscurity: Veiled Vulnerabilities in Closed-Source Contracts
- Open Access
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 54 (1) , 13-15
Geographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Validator location affects resilience to regional shocks and fairness in reward access, yet in major blockchains, geographical locations are not encoded in the rules but arise from economic incentives. When some regions offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate, as seen in Ethereum. In this paper, we study validators' geographic positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design by modeling how its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, interact with the geographic distribution of validators and information sources. We analyze the model under a mean-field approximation and complement it with agent-based simulations calibrated using real-world latency data. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral: both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 54 (1) , 13-15
Open AccessGeographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Validator location affects resilience to regional shocks and fairness in reward access, yet in major blockchains, geographical locations are not encoded in the rules but arise from economic incentives. When some regions offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate, as seen in Ethereum. In this paper, we study validators' geographic positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design by modeling how its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, interact with the geographic distribution of validators and information sources. We analyze the model under a mean-field approximation and complement it with agent-based simulations calibrated using real-world latency data. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral: both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- Open Access
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 13-15
Geographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 13-15
Open AccessGeographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
- Open Access
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-42
Geographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Where validators operate affects resilience to regional shocks (e.g., outages, natural disasters, or government intervention) as well as fairness in reward access. Yet major blockchain protocols do not encode geographical location in their rules; instead, validator locations emerge from a combination of economic incentives, regulatory constraints, infrastructure availability, and validator deployment choices. When certain locations offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate to maximize expected rewards, as observed in Ethereum, where validators cluster along the Atlantic corridor, which exhibits favorable latency. In this paper, we propose a formal model of validators' geographical positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design, capturing the interaction between its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, and the geographical distribution of validators and information sources. We analytically characterize the model under a mean-field approximation and complement this analysis with an agent-based simulation calibrated with real-world latency data to quantify how these incentives translate into geographical concentration under heterogeneous geographic and infrastructural conditions. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral. Both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-42
Open AccessGeographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Where validators operate affects resilience to regional shocks (e.g., outages, natural disasters, or government intervention) as well as fairness in reward access. Yet major blockchain protocols do not encode geographical location in their rules; instead, validator locations emerge from a combination of economic incentives, regulatory constraints, infrastructure availability, and validator deployment choices. When certain locations offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate to maximize expected rewards, as observed in Ethereum, where validators cluster along the Atlantic corridor, which exhibits favorable latency. In this paper, we propose a formal model of validators' geographical positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design, capturing the interaction between its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, and the geographical distribution of validators and information sources. We analytically characterize the model under a mean-field approximation and complement this analysis with an agent-based simulation calibrated with real-world latency data to quantify how these incentives translate into geographical concentration under heterogeneous geographic and infrastructural conditions. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral. Both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty
Modern blockchains increasingly rely on parallel execution to improve throughput. We show several industry and academic transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) struggle to simultaneously account for execution parallelism while remaining performant and fair. First, if parallelism affects fees, adversarial protocol manipulations that offset possible benefits to throughput by introducing fake transactions become rational: users can insert functionally useless parallel transactions solely to reduce fees, and schedulers can create useless sequential transactions to increase revenue. Execution contingency, a core feature of expressive programming languages, both exacerbates the aforementioned threats and introduces new ones: (1) users may overpay for unused resources, and (2) scheduler revenue is harmed when reserved scheduling slots go unused due to contingency. We introduce a framework for this challenging setting, and prove an impossibility, highlighting an inherent tension: both parallelism and contingency involve a trade-off between minimizing risks for users and schedulers, as favoring one comes at the expense of the other. To complete the picture, we introduce fee mechanisms and prove that they achieve the boundaries of this trade-off. Our results provide rigorous foundations for evaluating designs advanced by notable blockchains, such as Sui and Monad.
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPerils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty
Modern blockchains increasingly rely on parallel execution to improve throughput. We show several industry and academic transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) struggle to simultaneously account for execution parallelism while remaining performant and fair. First, if parallelism affects fees, adversarial protocol manipulations that offset possible benefits to throughput by introducing fake transactions become rational: users can insert functionally useless parallel transactions solely to reduce fees, and schedulers can create useless sequential transactions to increase revenue. Execution contingency, a core feature of expressive programming languages, both exacerbates the aforementioned threats and introduces new ones: (1) users may overpay for unused resources, and (2) scheduler revenue is harmed when reserved scheduling slots go unused due to contingency. We introduce a framework for this challenging setting, and prove an impossibility, highlighting an inherent tension: both parallelism and contingency involve a trade-off between minimizing risks for users and schedulers, as favoring one comes at the expense of the other. To complete the picture, we introduce fee mechanisms and prove that they achieve the boundaries of this trade-off. Our results provide rigorous foundations for evaluating designs advanced by notable blockchains, such as Sui and Monad.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
RediSwap: MEV Redistribution Mechanism for CFMMs
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
Open AccessRediSwap: MEV Redistribution Mechanism for CFMMs
- Open Access
- 9 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
- Vol. 9 (OOPSLA2) , 1372-1399
Agora: Trust Less and Open More in Verification for Confidential Computing
Confidential computing (CC), designed for security-critical scenarios, uses remote attestation to guarantee code integrity on cloud servers. However, CC alone cannot provide assurance of high-level security properties (e.g., no data leak) on the code. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework, Agora, scrupulously designed to provide a trustworthy and open verification platform for CC. To prompt trustworthiness, we observe that certain verification tasks can be delegated to untrusted entities, while the corresponding (smaller) validators are securely housed within the trusted computing base (TCB). Moreover, through a novel blockchain-based bounty task manager, it also utilizes crowdsourcing to remove trust in complex theorem provers. These synergistic techniques successfully ameliorate the TCB size burden associated with two procedures: binary analysis and theorem proving. To prompt openness, Agora supports a versatile assertion language that allows verification of various security policies. Moreover, the design of Agora enables untrusted parties to participate in any complex processes out of Agora’s TCB. By implementing verification workflows for software-based fault isolation, information flow control, and side-channel mitigation policies, our evaluation demonstrates the efficacy of Agora.
- 9 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
- Vol. 9 (OOPSLA2) , 1372-1399
Open AccessAgora: Trust Less and Open More in Verification for Confidential Computing
Confidential computing (CC), designed for security-critical scenarios, uses remote attestation to guarantee code integrity on cloud servers. However, CC alone cannot provide assurance of high-level security properties (e.g., no data leak) on the code. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework, Agora, scrupulously designed to provide a trustworthy and open verification platform for CC. To prompt trustworthiness, we observe that certain verification tasks can be delegated to untrusted entities, while the corresponding (smaller) validators are securely housed within the trusted computing base (TCB). Moreover, through a novel blockchain-based bounty task manager, it also utilizes crowdsourcing to remove trust in complex theorem provers. These synergistic techniques successfully ameliorate the TCB size burden associated with two procedures: binary analysis and theorem proving. To prompt openness, Agora supports a versatile assertion language that allows verification of various security policies. Moreover, the design of Agora enables untrusted parties to participate in any complex processes out of Agora’s TCB. By implementing verification workflows for software-based fault isolation, information flow control, and side-channel mitigation policies, our evaluation demonstrates the efficacy of Agora.