Erte Xiao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Erte Xiao has a total of 47 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Houser
Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, USA
21 shared publications Fangfang Tan
5 shared publicationsCristina Bicchieri
Departments of Philosophy and Legal Studies, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA
4 shared publications- Cristina Bicchieri
University of Pennsylvania
4 shared publications David M. Levy
4 shared publicationsKail Padgitt
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Promise Mechanism to Improve Online Reputation Systems: Evidence from an Experimental Study
Online reputation systems often suffer from insufficient and biased feedback, which weakens their ability to reduce information asymmetry and support trade. We design and test whether an ex ante promise mechanism can improve information generation in such systems. Before a transaction, buyers are given the opportunity to promise that they will provide feedback afterward. We examine two ways of embedding this mechanism into an online market: a market-promise solicitation mechanism, in which the platform prompts buyers to make the promise, and a seller-promise solicitation mechanism, in which sellers themselves request the promise. While theory predicts that both mechanisms may improve reporting rates and market efficiency, laboratory experiments show that only seller-promise solicitation significantly increases feedback provision and purchasing, thereby improving market efficiency. Our data suggest that the effectiveness of seller-promise solicitation aligns with the expectation-based motivations for keeping promises.
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Promise Mechanism to Improve Online Reputation Systems: Evidence from an Experimental Study
Online reputation systems often suffer from insufficient and biased feedback, which weakens their ability to reduce information asymmetry and support trade. We design and test whether an ex ante promise mechanism can improve information generation in such systems. Before a transaction, buyers are given the opportunity to promise that they will provide feedback afterward. We examine two ways of embedding this mechanism into an online market: a market-promise solicitation mechanism, in which the platform prompts buyers to make the promise, and a seller-promise solicitation mechanism, in which sellers themselves request the promise. While theory predicts that both mechanisms may improve reporting rates and market efficiency, laboratory experiments show that only seller-promise solicitation significantly increases feedback provision and purchasing, thereby improving market efficiency. Our data suggest that the effectiveness of seller-promise solicitation aligns with the expectation-based motivations for keeping promises.
- 15 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Rejecting Work Inequality: Women Say “No” to Unequal Workloads or Unequal Earnings?
Pay inequality can arise from unequal earnings for the same job or an unequal workload for the same earnings. Although existing research focuses on aversion to unequal earnings, little is known about aversion to unequal workloads, particularly gender differences. We show that female workers are more willing to accept unequal workload than unequal earnings allocations. By contrast, male workers exhibit similar responses to the workload and earnings inequality. The findings highlight that women’s lower aversion to unequal workloads can contribute to the gender earnings gap. Promoting equal workload allocation can be crucial in addressing the gender gap in the labor market. This paper was accepted by Marie Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This research was supported by research grants from Bryant University and the Department of Economics at Monash University. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07896 .
- 15 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Rejecting Work Inequality: Women Say “No” to Unequal Workloads or Unequal Earnings?
Pay inequality can arise from unequal earnings for the same job or an unequal workload for the same earnings. Although existing research focuses on aversion to unequal earnings, little is known about aversion to unequal workloads, particularly gender differences. We show that female workers are more willing to accept unequal workload than unequal earnings allocations. By contrast, male workers exhibit similar responses to the workload and earnings inequality. The findings highlight that women’s lower aversion to unequal workloads can contribute to the gender earnings gap. Promoting equal workload allocation can be crucial in addressing the gender gap in the labor market. This paper was accepted by Marie Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This research was supported by research grants from Bryant University and the Department of Economics at Monash University. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07896 .
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Rejecting Work Inequality: Women Say “No” to Unequal Workloads or Unequal Earnings?
Pay inequality can arise from unequal earnings for the same job or an unequal workload for the same earnings. While existing research focuses on aversion to unequal earnings, little is known about aversion to unequal workloads, particularly gender differences. We show that female workers are more willing to accept unequal workload than unequal earnings allocations. By contrast, male workers exhibit similar responses to the workload and earnings inequality. The findings highlight that women's lower aversion to unequal workloads can contribute to the gender earnings gap. Promoting equal workload allocation can be crucial in addressing the gender gap in the labor market.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRejecting Work Inequality: Women Say “No” to Unequal Workloads or Unequal Earnings?
Pay inequality can arise from unequal earnings for the same job or an unequal workload for the same earnings. While existing research focuses on aversion to unequal earnings, little is known about aversion to unequal workloads, particularly gender differences. We show that female workers are more willing to accept unequal workload than unequal earnings allocations. By contrast, male workers exhibit similar responses to the workload and earnings inequality. The findings highlight that women's lower aversion to unequal workloads can contribute to the gender earnings gap. Promoting equal workload allocation can be crucial in addressing the gender gap in the labor market.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 117
Incentivizing participation with full completion: The Power of self-selected rewards
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 117
Open AccessIncentivizing participation with full completion: The Power of self-selected rewards
- Open Access
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 44-67
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 44-67
Open AccessThe motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (9) , 5378-5393
Incentives to Persevere
Achieving success often requires persistent effort. We study the effectiveness of two reward mechanisms, all-or-nothing and piece-rate, to incentivize full completion of repeated tasks over time. Our theoretical analysis shows that exogenously imposing the all-or-nothing mechanism can be ineffective due to the potential discouragement effect. In contrast, empowering individuals to choose between the two reward mechanisms can significantly improve the full completion rate. Data from a series of field experiments and follow-up replications provide robust evidence that the all-or-nothing mechanism is effective only when it is presented as an option. Our results highlight the importance of choice in incentivizing persistent effort. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Monash University [Grant MUM-BTBL-2016-010], Australia-Malaysia 2021–2022 Research Collaboration Development Scheme (Monash Faculty of Business and Economic), and University of Technology Sydney Business School. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4649 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (9) , 5378-5393
Incentives to Persevere
Achieving success often requires persistent effort. We study the effectiveness of two reward mechanisms, all-or-nothing and piece-rate, to incentivize full completion of repeated tasks over time. Our theoretical analysis shows that exogenously imposing the all-or-nothing mechanism can be ineffective due to the potential discouragement effect. In contrast, empowering individuals to choose between the two reward mechanisms can significantly improve the full completion rate. Data from a series of field experiments and follow-up replications provide robust evidence that the all-or-nothing mechanism is effective only when it is presented as an option. Our results highlight the importance of choice in incentivizing persistent effort. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Monash University [Grant MUM-BTBL-2016-010], Australia-Malaysia 2021–2022 Research Collaboration Development Scheme (Monash Faculty of Business and Economic), and University of Technology Sydney Business School. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4649 .
- 12 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 200, 897-913
Sign me up! Promoting volunteering with a compound task mechanism
- 12 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 200, 897-913
Sign me up! Promoting volunteering with a compound task mechanism
- Open Access
- 4 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Deviant or Wrong? The Effect of Norm Information on the Efficacy of Punishment
Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.
- 4 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDeviant or Wrong? The Effect of Norm Information on the Efficacy of Punishment
Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 196
Inertia in partnerships: The role of gender
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 196
Inertia in partnerships: The role of gender
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 122, 328-340
In-group bias in prisons
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 122, 328-340
In-group bias in prisons