A Promise Mechanism to Improve Online Reputation Systems: Evidence from an Experimental Study
Authors:
- Lingfang LiLLLingfang Li
- Yuting WuYWYuting Wu
- Erte XiaoEXErte Xiao
- Xun ZhuXZXun Zhu
Preprint
- 1 September 2026
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Online reputation systems often suffer from insufficient and biased feedback, which weakens their ability to reduce information asymmetry and support trade. We design and test whether an ex ante promise mechanism can improve information generation in such systems. Before a transaction, buyers are given the opportunity to promise that they will provide feedback afterward. We examine two ways of embedding this mechanism into an online market: a market-promise solicitation mechanism, in which the platform prompts buyers to make the promise, and a seller-promise solicitation mechanism, in which sellers themselves request the promise. While theory predicts that both mechanisms may improve reporting rates and market efficiency, laboratory experiments show that only seller-promise solicitation significantly increases feedback provision and purchasing, thereby improving market efficiency. Our data suggest that the effectiveness of seller-promise solicitation aligns with the expectation-based motivations for keeping promises.Keywords
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