DGDaniel Garcia

Daniel Garcia

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Daniel Garcia has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers

    Strategic Responses to Algorithmic Recommendations: Evidence from Hotel Pricing

    by Daniel Garcia, Juha Tolvanen, Alexander K. Wagner

    We study the interaction between algorithmic advice and human decisions using high-resolution hotel-room pricing data. We document that price setting frictions, arising from adjustment costs of human decision makers, induce a conflict of interest with the algorithmic advisor. A model of advice with costly price adjustments shows that, in equilibrium, algorithmic price recommendations are strategically biased and lead to suboptimal pricing by human decision makers. We quantify the losses from the strategic bias in recommendations using as structural model and estimate the potential benefits that would result from a shift to fully automated algorithmic pricing. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Funding: D. Garcia gratefully acknowledges that this research was funded in part by the Austrian Science Fund [Grant FWF-FG6]. A. K. Wagner gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Anniversary Fund of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank [Project 18878]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03740 .


  • Dynamic Pricing with Uncertain Capacities

    by Daniel Garcia, Maarten C. W. Janssen, Radostina Shopova

    In markets, such as those for airline tickets and hotel accommodations, firms sell time-dated products and have private information about unsold capacities. We show that competition under private information may explain observed phenomena, such as increased price dispersion and higher expected prices toward the deadline. We also show that private information severely limits the market power of firms and that information exchange about capacity increases firms’ profits. Finally, we inquire into the incentives to unilaterally disclose information or to engage in espionage about rival’s capacity and show that they increase firms’ profits compared with the private information setting. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This work was partially funded by the Austrian Science Foundation FWF under [Project FG 6]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4613 .


  • Demand Estimation Using Managerial Responses to Automated Price Recommendations

    by Daniel Garcia, Juha Tolvanen, Alexander K. Wagner

    We provide a new framework to identify demand elasticities in markets where managers rely on algorithmic recommendations for price setting and apply it to a data set containing bookings for a sample of midsized hotels in Europe. Using nonbinding algorithmic price recommendations and observed delay in price adjustments by decision makers, we demonstrate that a control-function approach, combined with state-of-the-art model-selection techniques, can be used to isolate exogenous price variation and identify demand elasticities across hotel room types and over time. We confirm these elasticity estimates with a difference-in-differences approach that leverages the same delays in price adjustments by decision makers. However, the difference-in-differences estimates are more noisy and only yield consistent estimates if data are pooled across hotels. We then apply our control-function approach to two classic questions in the dynamic pricing literature: the evolution of price elasticity of demand over and the effects of a transitory price change on future demand due to the presence of strategic buyers. Finally, we discuss how our empirical framework can be applied directly to other decision-making situations in which recommendation systems are used. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: D. Garcia acknowledges financial support from the Austrian Science Fund [Single Project “Understanding Consumer Search” FWF-P 30922]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4261 .


  • Consumer search with observational learning

    by Daniel Garcia, Sandro Shelegia

    This article studies observational learning in a consumer search environment. Consumers observe the purchasing decision of a predecessor with similar preferences. Consumers rationally emulate by initiating their search at the firm from which their predecessor purchased, free‐riding on search effort, and reacting less to price changes. Prices are nonmonotone in search costs and may be as low as marginal costs. We discuss several extensions and show that the effect of emulation on prices is stronger when (i) the number of firms increases, (ii) consumers' first visits are more elastic with respect to market shares, and (iii) prices are adjusted more frequently.


  • The Double Diamond Paradox

    by Daniel Garcia, Jun Honda, Maarten Janssen

    We study vertical relations in markets with consumer and retailer search. We obtain three important new results. First, we provide a novel explanation for price dispersion that does not depend on some form of heterogeneity among consumers. Price dispersion takes on the form of a bimodal distribution. Second, under competitive conditions (many retailers or small consumer search cost), social welfare is significantly smaller than in the double marginalization outcome. Manufacturers' regular price is significantly above the monopoly price, squeezing retailers' markups and providing an alternative explanation for incomplete cost pass-through. Third, firms' prices are decreasing in consumer search cost. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D83, L13, L60, L81)


  • Information Provision in Procurement Auctions

    by Joaquín Coleff, Daniel Garcia