Alexander K. Wagner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alexander K. Wagner has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Anja Achtziger
3 shared publicationsCarlos Alós-Ferrer
3 shared publications- Georg D. Granic
Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
3 shared publications - Juha Tolvanen
Department of Economics, Tor Vergata University of Rome, 00133 Rome, Italy
3 shared publications - Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YD, United Kingdom; and Department of Economics, University Jaume I, 12006 Castellón, Spain
2 shared publications - Daniel Garcia
Department of Economics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Aggregate Nash Attainability and Boundary Equilibria under Behavioral Heterogeneity
We study which Nash equilibria of a finite normal-form game can still arise as aggregate play when each player role is represented by a population containing both behavioral and optimizing agents. In each role, a fixed fraction of agents follows an exogenous action distribution, while the remaining agents best respond to aggregate play. A Nash equilibrium survives if and only if, for every role and every action, the behavioral mass assigned to that action does not exceed its Nash equilibrium probability. When this condition holds, optimizing agents choose the residual distribution and aggregate play reproduces the original Nash equilibrium. When it fails, behavioral types assign too much probability mass to some action, and exact aggregate recovery is impossible. We further show that any additional aggregate equilibria generated by behavioral heterogeneity must lie on the boundary of the aggregate-feasible set and are sustained by behavioral types playing non-optimal actions. Behavioral heterogeneity may thus prune some Nash equilibria and create genuinely new ones, and we characterize both.
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAggregate Nash Attainability and Boundary Equilibria under Behavioral Heterogeneity
We study which Nash equilibria of a finite normal-form game can still arise as aggregate play when each player role is represented by a population containing both behavioral and optimizing agents. In each role, a fixed fraction of agents follows an exogenous action distribution, while the remaining agents best respond to aggregate play. A Nash equilibrium survives if and only if, for every role and every action, the behavioral mass assigned to that action does not exceed its Nash equilibrium probability. When this condition holds, optimizing agents choose the residual distribution and aggregate play reproduces the original Nash equilibrium. When it fails, behavioral types assign too much probability mass to some action, and exact aggregate recovery is impossible. We further show that any additional aggregate equilibria generated by behavioral heterogeneity must lie on the boundary of the aggregate-feasible set and are sustained by behavioral types playing non-optimal actions. Behavioral heterogeneity may thus prune some Nash equilibria and create genuinely new ones, and we characterize both.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 609-626
Strategic Responses to Algorithmic Recommendations: Evidence from Hotel Pricing
We study the interaction between algorithmic advice and human decisions using high-resolution hotel-room pricing data. We document that price setting frictions, arising from adjustment costs of human decision makers, induce a conflict of interest with the algorithmic advisor. A model of advice with costly price adjustments shows that, in equilibrium, algorithmic price recommendations are strategically biased and lead to suboptimal pricing by human decision makers. We quantify the losses from the strategic bias in recommendations using as structural model and estimate the potential benefits that would result from a shift to fully automated algorithmic pricing. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Funding: D. Garcia gratefully acknowledges that this research was funded in part by the Austrian Science Fund [Grant FWF-FG6]. A. K. Wagner gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Anniversary Fund of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank [Project 18878]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03740 .
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 609-626
Top Cited PapersStrategic Responses to Algorithmic Recommendations: Evidence from Hotel Pricing
We study the interaction between algorithmic advice and human decisions using high-resolution hotel-room pricing data. We document that price setting frictions, arising from adjustment costs of human decision makers, induce a conflict of interest with the algorithmic advisor. A model of advice with costly price adjustments shows that, in equilibrium, algorithmic price recommendations are strategically biased and lead to suboptimal pricing by human decision makers. We quantify the losses from the strategic bias in recommendations using as structural model and estimate the potential benefits that would result from a shift to fully automated algorithmic pricing. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Funding: D. Garcia gratefully acknowledges that this research was funded in part by the Austrian Science Fund [Grant FWF-FG6]. A. K. Wagner gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Anniversary Fund of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank [Project 18878]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03740 .
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (11) , 7918-7939
Demand Estimation Using Managerial Responses to Automated Price Recommendations
We provide a new framework to identify demand elasticities in markets where managers rely on algorithmic recommendations for price setting and apply it to a data set containing bookings for a sample of midsized hotels in Europe. Using nonbinding algorithmic price recommendations and observed delay in price adjustments by decision makers, we demonstrate that a control-function approach, combined with state-of-the-art model-selection techniques, can be used to isolate exogenous price variation and identify demand elasticities across hotel room types and over time. We confirm these elasticity estimates with a difference-in-differences approach that leverages the same delays in price adjustments by decision makers. However, the difference-in-differences estimates are more noisy and only yield consistent estimates if data are pooled across hotels. We then apply our control-function approach to two classic questions in the dynamic pricing literature: the evolution of price elasticity of demand over and the effects of a transitory price change on future demand due to the presence of strategic buyers. Finally, we discuss how our empirical framework can be applied directly to other decision-making situations in which recommendation systems are used. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: D. Garcia acknowledges financial support from the Austrian Science Fund [Single Project “Understanding Consumer Search” FWF-P 30922]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4261 .
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (11) , 7918-7939
Demand Estimation Using Managerial Responses to Automated Price Recommendations
We provide a new framework to identify demand elasticities in markets where managers rely on algorithmic recommendations for price setting and apply it to a data set containing bookings for a sample of midsized hotels in Europe. Using nonbinding algorithmic price recommendations and observed delay in price adjustments by decision makers, we demonstrate that a control-function approach, combined with state-of-the-art model-selection techniques, can be used to isolate exogenous price variation and identify demand elasticities across hotel room types and over time. We confirm these elasticity estimates with a difference-in-differences approach that leverages the same delays in price adjustments by decision makers. However, the difference-in-differences estimates are more noisy and only yield consistent estimates if data are pooled across hotels. We then apply our control-function approach to two classic questions in the dynamic pricing literature: the evolution of price elasticity of demand over and the effects of a transitory price change on future demand due to the presence of strategic buyers. Finally, we discuss how our empirical framework can be applied directly to other decision-making situations in which recommendation systems are used. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: D. Garcia acknowledges financial support from the Austrian Science Fund [Single Project “Understanding Consumer Search” FWF-P 30922]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4261 .
- Open Access
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 116 (2) , 734-750
Ambiguous Platforms and Correlated Preferences: Experimental Evidence
This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, a model of electoral competition that allows for platforms where candidates may be ambiguous about which policy they will implement if elected. We argue that uncertainty about the policy preferences of the electorate, combined with perceived similarity of voters and candidates, can lead to the latter running on these ambiguous platforms. By appealing to voters from both ends of the spectrum, such platforms can ensure electoral success for noncentrist candidates in a sufficiently polarized society. Ambiguous platforms pose a threat to democratic representation because winning noncentrists always implement policies in favor of a minority and against the preferences of the majority. In our laboratory experiment, ambiguous platforms are chosen frequently by candidates and gain notable support from voters. Our main treatment variation provides causal evidence that ambiguous platforms are more popular among noncentrist voters if one of the candidates is a known centrist.
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 116 (2) , 734-750
Open AccessAmbiguous Platforms and Correlated Preferences: Experimental Evidence
This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, a model of electoral competition that allows for platforms where candidates may be ambiguous about which policy they will implement if elected. We argue that uncertainty about the policy preferences of the electorate, combined with perceived similarity of voters and candidates, can lead to the latter running on these ambiguous platforms. By appealing to voters from both ends of the spectrum, such platforms can ensure electoral success for noncentrist candidates in a sufficiently polarized society. Ambiguous platforms pose a threat to democratic representation because winning noncentrists always implement policies in favor of a minority and against the preferences of the majority. In our laboratory experiment, ambiguous platforms are chosen frequently by candidates and gain notable support from voters. Our main treatment variation provides causal evidence that ambiguous platforms are more popular among noncentrist voters if one of the candidates is a known centrist.
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 32 (4) , 101285
Where power resides in committees
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 32 (4) , 101285
Where power resides in committees
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 74, 161-166
Social preferences and self-control
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 74, 161-166
Social preferences and self-control
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 53, 1-16
The impact of self-control depletion on social preferences in the ultimatum game
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 53, 1-16
The impact of self-control depletion on social preferences in the ultimatum game
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 52 (1) , 65-97
Preference reversals: Time and again
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 52 (1) , 65-97
Preference reversals: Time and again
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 76, 239-252
On the effects of group identity in strategic environments
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 76, 239-252
On the effects of group identity in strategic environments
- 1 March 2015
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-14
Money, depletion, and prosociality in the dictator game.
- 1 March 2015
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-14
Money, depletion, and prosociality in the dictator game.