Minqiang Li
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Minqiang Li has a total of 71 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Guofang Nan
International Business School, Hainan University, Haikou, P. R. China
14 shared publications - Haiyang Feng
College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
7 shared publications - Nan Feng
College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
7 shared publications - Fuzan Chen
Tianjin University
6 shared publications Nan Feng
6 shared publications- Zan Zhang
Tianjin University - College of Management and Economics
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 26 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 73 (00189391) , 1753-1768
Anomaly Detection in Industrial Internet of Things: A Graph Learning Approach With Spatiotemporal Interactions
In real-world industrial activities, large industrial systems typically have complex network structures composed of multiple devices, where the operating status of devices is reflected by real-time data collected from sensors. The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) enables real-time data exchange between industrial devices, facilitating more efficient and convenient control of production activities. However, this also means that data anomalies are no longer confined to individual devices; they can spread to other normal devices through data interaction, potentially leading to severe consequences. Detecting data anomalies in large-scale industrial networks with hundreds of nodes and handling multiple heterogeneous data streams while preventing the propagation of anomalies is a complex and critical task. To address this challenge, we propose H-IIoTAD, a spatio-temporal interaction-based graph neural network for anomaly detection in IIoT systems. Our approach introduces a novel neighbor feature aggregation mechanism that dynami cally adjusts aggregation weights based on the anomaly levels of neighboring nodes. Furthermore, inspired by differentiable graph pooling techniques, we design a hierarchical representation learning strategy that aggregates node features into process-level and subsystem-level representations. This enables hierarchical anomaly detection and propagation analysis. To ensure research rigor, we conduct extensive experiments on the real-world HAI (HAI-22.04 and HAI-23.05) and SWaT industrial datasets. We further perform temporal stability analyses, ablation studies of key modules, and evaluations across 58 diverse anomaly scenarios to assess the robustness of the proposed approach. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach effectively detects anomalies under diverse anomaly scenarios and provides interpretable insights into anomaly propagation patterns.
- 26 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 73 (00189391) , 1753-1768
Anomaly Detection in Industrial Internet of Things: A Graph Learning Approach With Spatiotemporal Interactions
In real-world industrial activities, large industrial systems typically have complex network structures composed of multiple devices, where the operating status of devices is reflected by real-time data collected from sensors. The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) enables real-time data exchange between industrial devices, facilitating more efficient and convenient control of production activities. However, this also means that data anomalies are no longer confined to individual devices; they can spread to other normal devices through data interaction, potentially leading to severe consequences. Detecting data anomalies in large-scale industrial networks with hundreds of nodes and handling multiple heterogeneous data streams while preventing the propagation of anomalies is a complex and critical task. To address this challenge, we propose H-IIoTAD, a spatio-temporal interaction-based graph neural network for anomaly detection in IIoT systems. Our approach introduces a novel neighbor feature aggregation mechanism that dynami cally adjusts aggregation weights based on the anomaly levels of neighboring nodes. Furthermore, inspired by differentiable graph pooling techniques, we design a hierarchical representation learning strategy that aggregates node features into process-level and subsystem-level representations. This enables hierarchical anomaly detection and propagation analysis. To ensure research rigor, we conduct extensive experiments on the real-world HAI (HAI-22.04 and HAI-23.05) and SWaT industrial datasets. We further perform temporal stability analyses, ablation studies of key modules, and evaluations across 58 diverse anomaly scenarios to assess the robustness of the proposed approach. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach effectively detects anomalies under diverse anomaly scenarios and provides interpretable insights into anomaly propagation patterns.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 36 (4) , 2151-2169
A Study of Ride-Hailing Platforms’ Business Models in the Presence of Surge Demand
Practice- and Policy-Oriented Abstract This study analyzes whether a ride-hailing platform should adopt a closed business model, that is, serving riders only with platform-owned vehicles, or an open business model, that is, allowing private vehicles to utilize the platform to provide services. Analytical results reveal that the open business model leads to more service supply (supply-augmenting effect) and a lower price increase (price discrimination–hindering effect) in the surge period, both benefiting riders. It also reduces the number of idle vehicles in the normal period, thus resulting in more efficient utilization of vehicle resources. Interestingly, the platform does not always benefit from adopting the open business model. In sum, the open business model always benefits the riders, private drivers, and the society as a whole, but it may not be more profitable for the platform. This interesting result calls for policymakers to incentivize the platform so that it adopts the open business model instead of the closed one.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 36 (4) , 2151-2169
A Study of Ride-Hailing Platforms’ Business Models in the Presence of Surge Demand
Practice- and Policy-Oriented Abstract This study analyzes whether a ride-hailing platform should adopt a closed business model, that is, serving riders only with platform-owned vehicles, or an open business model, that is, allowing private vehicles to utilize the platform to provide services. Analytical results reveal that the open business model leads to more service supply (supply-augmenting effect) and a lower price increase (price discrimination–hindering effect) in the surge period, both benefiting riders. It also reduces the number of idle vehicles in the normal period, thus resulting in more efficient utilization of vehicle resources. Interestingly, the platform does not always benefit from adopting the open business model. In sum, the open business model always benefits the riders, private drivers, and the society as a whole, but it may not be more profitable for the platform. This interesting result calls for policymakers to incentivize the platform so that it adopts the open business model instead of the closed one.
- 11 June 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 72 (00189391) , 2569-2582
Technology Sharing Strategies for New Product Diffusion With Consideration of Firms’ Risk Aversion
This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on the incentive for an incumbent to share its new technology with a potential entrant. While competition emerges with technology sharing, the involvement of additional firm in the development of the new-technology-based products increases the lowest willingness to pay (LWTP) of consumers for the products. A gametheoretic model is developed to analyze the two-firm competition. Results show that asymmetric risk preferences of firms can lead to their asymmetric competitive advantages (or disadvantages), which increase (decrease) the quantity of products offered by the less risk-averse firm (the more risk-averse firm) under high product substitutability. Generally, the more risk-averse the incumbent is, the more likely is it to freely share its technology; however, if competitive disadvantage exists for the entrant, then the less risk-averse incumbent is more likely to share. Moreover, the incumbent earns more (less) from licensing than from wholesaling when it is substantially less (more) risk-averse than the entrant. Interestingly, while the enhancement in the consumers' LWTP generally promotes technology sharing, it may restrain the lowly risk-averse incumbent from wholesaling to the highly risk-averse entrant in that the first-mover advantage of the entrant can mitigate its competitive disadvantage.
- 11 June 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 72 (00189391) , 2569-2582
Technology Sharing Strategies for New Product Diffusion With Consideration of Firms’ Risk Aversion
This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on the incentive for an incumbent to share its new technology with a potential entrant. While competition emerges with technology sharing, the involvement of additional firm in the development of the new-technology-based products increases the lowest willingness to pay (LWTP) of consumers for the products. A gametheoretic model is developed to analyze the two-firm competition. Results show that asymmetric risk preferences of firms can lead to their asymmetric competitive advantages (or disadvantages), which increase (decrease) the quantity of products offered by the less risk-averse firm (the more risk-averse firm) under high product substitutability. Generally, the more risk-averse the incumbent is, the more likely is it to freely share its technology; however, if competitive disadvantage exists for the entrant, then the less risk-averse incumbent is more likely to share. Moreover, the incumbent earns more (less) from licensing than from wholesaling when it is substantially less (more) risk-averse than the entrant. Interestingly, while the enhancement in the consumers' LWTP generally promotes technology sharing, it may restrain the lowly risk-averse incumbent from wholesaling to the highly risk-averse entrant in that the first-mover advantage of the entrant can mitigate its competitive disadvantage.
- 13 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Electronic Commerce Research
- Vol. 26 (2) , 2131-2152
A bidirectional sequential recommender system based on multi-source price factors
- 13 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Electronic Commerce Research
- Vol. 26 (2) , 2131-2152
A bidirectional sequential recommender system based on multi-source price factors
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 72 (00189391) , 937-951
Optimal Hybrid Pricing Scheme of Internet Content Providers in a Duopoly Market
By offering both subscription and ad-supported content options, Internet content providers (ICPs) can monetize both sides of the market, generating revenue from subscribers for ad-free content and from advertisers targeting free users through cross-side network effects. This hybrid revenue model targets two user segments: subscribers and free users, which form the foundation for the hybrid pricing scheme. This study investigates the equilibrium pricing strategies of two ICPs competing in the subscription market, examining the impacts of market characteristics, including subscription competition, users' price sensitivity, advertising intensity, and the standalone-value difference between the ICPs' subscription options, on users' content choices and the interaction between subscription and advertising profits. We find that as subscription competition decreases, the ICP offering a greater standalone value can achieve a higher subscription profit by raising its subscription fee, especially when advertising intensity, users' price sensitivity, and the standalone-value difference are relatively small. However, when the standalone-value difference is significant, the ICP with a lower standalone value can generate a higher subscription profit by raising its subscription fee, as subscribers switch from its rival to the lower-priced option. In the context of lower subscription competition (or higher users' price sensitivity), the ICPs can reduce their advertising prices as some subscribers convert to free users, leveraging advertiser-side network effects to attract more advertisers and boost their total profits. In contrast, the ICPs can raise their advertising prices with higher advertising intensity, while the conversion of free users to subscribers reduces their advertiser demands, particularly under relatively strong advertiser-side network effects, leading the ICPs to focus more on the subscription segment to enhance their total profits. Thus, ICPs can strategically target different market segments to drive the growth of their total profits.
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 72 (00189391) , 937-951
Optimal Hybrid Pricing Scheme of Internet Content Providers in a Duopoly Market
By offering both subscription and ad-supported content options, Internet content providers (ICPs) can monetize both sides of the market, generating revenue from subscribers for ad-free content and from advertisers targeting free users through cross-side network effects. This hybrid revenue model targets two user segments: subscribers and free users, which form the foundation for the hybrid pricing scheme. This study investigates the equilibrium pricing strategies of two ICPs competing in the subscription market, examining the impacts of market characteristics, including subscription competition, users' price sensitivity, advertising intensity, and the standalone-value difference between the ICPs' subscription options, on users' content choices and the interaction between subscription and advertising profits. We find that as subscription competition decreases, the ICP offering a greater standalone value can achieve a higher subscription profit by raising its subscription fee, especially when advertising intensity, users' price sensitivity, and the standalone-value difference are relatively small. However, when the standalone-value difference is significant, the ICP with a lower standalone value can generate a higher subscription profit by raising its subscription fee, as subscribers switch from its rival to the lower-priced option. In the context of lower subscription competition (or higher users' price sensitivity), the ICPs can reduce their advertising prices as some subscribers convert to free users, leveraging advertiser-side network effects to attract more advertisers and boost their total profits. In contrast, the ICPs can raise their advertising prices with higher advertising intensity, while the conversion of free users to subscribers reduces their advertiser demands, particularly under relatively strong advertiser-side network effects, leading the ICPs to focus more on the subscription segment to enhance their total profits. Thus, ICPs can strategically target different market segments to drive the growth of their total profits.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2024
- Published by KEAI Publishing in Journal of Management Science and Engineering
- Vol. 9 (3) , 390-418
Should competing sellers adopt the data analytics service to enable product improvement in online marketplace
- 1 September 2024
- Published by KEAI Publishing in Journal of Management Science and Engineering
- Vol. 9 (3) , 390-418
Open AccessShould competing sellers adopt the data analytics service to enable product improvement in online marketplace
- 18 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 46 (1) , 67-87
Cross‐licensing or not: The optimal choices of competing ICT firms in a duopoly market
Cross‐licensing, which grants each party the right to produce products using the other's patents, is a prevalent strategy for information and communications technology (ICT) firms to improve product quality and respond to intense competition. This study focuses on the cross‐licensing choices of two competing ICT firms that engage in price competition with substitutable products of different quality levels. Using a game‐theoretical model, we find that each firm will have a higher (lower) profit as its competitor's product quality improves in a price‐sensitive (quality‐sensitive) market. Signing a cross‐licensing agreement is profitable for the two firms when their quality improvements are roughly symmetric or when customers are sensitive to the price difference but less sensitive to the quality difference. Furthermore, we examine the quality‐to‐price ratio, which reflects customer perceived value, and find that cross‐licensing may achieve a win–win–win situation for both firms and customers when there is no significant difference in quality improvements between the two firms or when the competition intensity is moderate. The rationale behind these results hinges on the integration of the quality improvement effect and the quality differentiation effect. The results explain the observations of ICT firms' cross‐licensing practices and provide managerial implications for ICT firms and policymakers.
- 18 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 46 (1) , 67-87
Cross‐licensing or not: The optimal choices of competing ICT firms in a duopoly market
Cross‐licensing, which grants each party the right to produce products using the other's patents, is a prevalent strategy for information and communications technology (ICT) firms to improve product quality and respond to intense competition. This study focuses on the cross‐licensing choices of two competing ICT firms that engage in price competition with substitutable products of different quality levels. Using a game‐theoretical model, we find that each firm will have a higher (lower) profit as its competitor's product quality improves in a price‐sensitive (quality‐sensitive) market. Signing a cross‐licensing agreement is profitable for the two firms when their quality improvements are roughly symmetric or when customers are sensitive to the price difference but less sensitive to the quality difference. Furthermore, we examine the quality‐to‐price ratio, which reflects customer perceived value, and find that cross‐licensing may achieve a win–win–win situation for both firms and customers when there is no significant difference in quality improvements between the two firms or when the competition intensity is moderate. The rationale behind these results hinges on the integration of the quality improvement effect and the quality differentiation effect. The results explain the observations of ICT firms' cross‐licensing practices and provide managerial implications for ICT firms and policymakers.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Association for Information Systems in Journal of the Association for Information Systems
- Vol. 25 (2) , 239-266
Optimal Launch Timing of Bug Bounty Programs for Software Products under Different Licensing Models
An increasing number of software firms are utilizing bug bounty programs (BBPs) to detect bugs and enhance their product quality by leveraging the contributions of external ethical hackers. Although launching a BBP involves bounties as well as the costs of processing bug reports and fixing bugs, software firms can save failure costs and enjoy the benefits of greater user trust. The costs and benefits resulting from launching a BBP vary with launch timings and software licensing models. Hence, we investigate the optimal BBP launch strategies for software firms, using perpetual or subscription licensing models. Our findings reveal that under perpetual licensing, the firm has only two viable launch strategies: simultaneous launch, i.e., launching the software and the BBP simultaneously, and no launch. Under subscription licensing, however, delayed launch, i.e., launching the BBP later than the software release time, occurs as the optimal strategy when the failure cost is not high and the benefit of user trust is significant. Two distinct patterns in the relationship between the firm’s bug-fixing capability and its payoff are identified: a U-shaped pattern and an inverted U-shaped pattern. We uncover the conditions under which a firm should opt not to launch a BBP as its bug-fixing capability improves. This study offers insights into how firms can be motivated to launch BBPs to improve the overall reliability of their software.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Association for Information Systems in Journal of the Association for Information Systems
- Vol. 25 (2) , 239-266
Optimal Launch Timing of Bug Bounty Programs for Software Products under Different Licensing Models
An increasing number of software firms are utilizing bug bounty programs (BBPs) to detect bugs and enhance their product quality by leveraging the contributions of external ethical hackers. Although launching a BBP involves bounties as well as the costs of processing bug reports and fixing bugs, software firms can save failure costs and enjoy the benefits of greater user trust. The costs and benefits resulting from launching a BBP vary with launch timings and software licensing models. Hence, we investigate the optimal BBP launch strategies for software firms, using perpetual or subscription licensing models. Our findings reveal that under perpetual licensing, the firm has only two viable launch strategies: simultaneous launch, i.e., launching the software and the BBP simultaneously, and no launch. Under subscription licensing, however, delayed launch, i.e., launching the BBP later than the software release time, occurs as the optimal strategy when the failure cost is not high and the benefit of user trust is significant. Two distinct patterns in the relationship between the firm’s bug-fixing capability and its payoff are identified: a U-shaped pattern and an inverted U-shaped pattern. We uncover the conditions under which a firm should opt not to launch a BBP as its bug-fixing capability improves. This study offers insights into how firms can be motivated to launch BBPs to improve the overall reliability of their software.