DWDavid Weisstanner

David Weisstanner

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


David Weisstanner has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Health Information Seeking by People Navigating Masculinizing Transition Pathways in Switzerland: Communication Inequalities and Adaptive Approaches

    by Alexander Ort, Sabrina Stefanelli, David Weisstanner

    Transgender and non-binary (TNB) people—those whose gender identity differs from the sex assigned at birth or does not align with binary gender categories—continue to face substantial barriers to e...

  • Open Access

    The Electoral Appeal of Symbolic Class Signalling Through Cultural Consumption

    by David Weisstanner, Sarah Engler

    This letter investigates the electoral effects of symbolic class signalling through ‘cultural consumption’ in contemporary politics. We explore how politicians referring to an activity related to class-specific ‘cultural consumption’ – drinking beer in a pub or listening to classical music with a glass of wine – appeals to voters. We argue that symbolic class signalling has gained in importance due to the political realignment along the cultural dimension, and we expect radical right parties to benefit most from it. Our conjoint survey experiment with 1,550 respondents in Switzerland in January/February 2023 confirms our expectation. While many voters are biased against politicians claiming to enjoy classical music and wine, politicians drinking beer in a pub appeal particularly to radical right working-class voters without tertiary education. These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of symbolic politics and class identity in times of political transformation.


  • Open Access

    Managing the Artificial Intelligence Revolution: Perceived Risks and Social Policy Preferences Among Firm‐Level Decision Makers

    by David Weisstanner, Kees van Kersbergen

    This paper examines the political and policy implications of artificial intelligence (AI) from the perspective of managers in Danish firms. We investigate how managers perceive AI's impact on the workplace, their preferences for social and regulatory policies to address AI's societal effects, and how information about AI's economic consequences and regulation influences these preferences. Utilising a novel firm‐level survey in Denmark with experimental treatments, we find that firms perceiving AI‐related risks are more likely to support AI regulation and social investment (education and upskilling). Firms with extensive AI experience are more likely to oppose AI regulation but, paradoxically, are more likely to express concern about AI. They also tend to prefer social investment over compensation policies. While information treatments partly increased firms' expression of concern about AI, they did not significantly alter their policy preferences. Overall, our findings indicate that subjective AI risk and AI experience significantly influence managers' policy preferences, leading to a general preference for social investment over compensation, with firms expressing concern supporting regulation and those with extensive AI experience opposing it.


  • Political mobilisation and socioeconomic inequality in policy congruence

    by David Weisstanner, Carsten Jensen

    In recent years, scholars have observed that political parties’ policy positions frequently fit the preferences of well‐to‐do voters better than those of the less well‐to‐do; a phenomenon known as policy congruence inequality. While the existence of inequality in policy congruence is well‐established, we currently only have a modest understanding of the causes of it. We develop an argument proposing that the political mobilisation of citizens with low socioeconomic status (SES) both in the parliamentary channel, in the form of high turnout, and in the extra‐parliamentary channel, in the form of high union density, is pivotal. Both high turnout and union density force parties to pay more attention to the preferences of the disadvantaged, thereby creating lower policy congruence inequality. To test the argument, we have collected and harmonised election surveys and party manifestos covering 90 elections in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, covering several decades until today, yielding more than 120,000 voter–party dyads. Employing this new dataset, our results confirm that the political mobilisation of citizens with low SES is a strong predictor of policy congruence inequality. This finding nuances the conclusion of extant research by showing that low‐SES citizens are not always on the losing side politically. It also implies the important role of maintaining or maybe even increasing turnout and union membership among the disadvantaged in society. Places where either turnout or union density is slipping in these years are likely to witness further increases in policy congruence inequality in the years to come.


  • Open Access

    Rising income inequality and the relative decline in subjective social status of the working class

    by Brian Nolan, David Weisstanner

    The declining ‘subjective social status’ of the low-educated working class has been advanced as a prominent explanation for right-wing populism. The working class has certainly been adversely affected by rising income inequality over the past decades, but we do not actually know if their perceived standing in the social hierarchy has declined correspondingly over time. This article examines trends in subjective social status in two ‘most likely cases’ – Germany and the US – between 1980 and 2018. We find that the subjective social status of the working class has not declined in absolute terms. However, there is evidence for relative status declines for the working class in Germany and substantial within-class heterogeneity in both countries. These findings imply that rising income inequality has a nuanced impact on status perceptions. When assessing the role of subjective social status for political outcomes, longitudinal perspectives that consider both absolute and relative changes seem promising. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2038892 .


  • Open Access

    Stagnating incomes and preferences for redistribution: The role of absolute and relative experiences

    by David Weisstanner

    Stagnating incomes have been a widespread concern in advanced democracies over the past decades. However, despite a turn towards dynamic frameworks, the consequences of stagnation on political support for the welfare state are still unclear. This study introduces the distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ income stagnation – that is, experiencing stagnating incomes over time (without reference to other groups) and in relative comparison to other groups – and explores how they shape citizens’ attitudes towards redistribution. I argue that absolute and relative stagnation have opposite effects on redistributive preferences. Contrary to political economy theories, I expect that low absolute income growth reduces demand for redistribution, because it reduces voters’ ability and willingness to afford welfare state policies. Support for this hypothesis is provided in an empirical analysis that combines novel estimates for absolute and relative income stagnation with longitudinal survey data on redistribution preferences in 14 advanced democracies between 1985 and 2018. The distinction between absolute and relative experiences has broader implications for comparative politics research and might contribute to explain why income stagnation and rising inequality have not led to higher political demand for redistributive welfare policy.


  • Open Access

    COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income

    by David Weisstanner

    The COVID-19 pandemic has revived discussions about universal basic income (UBI) as a potential crisis response. Yet despite favorable circumstances, little actual policy change in this area was observed. This article seeks to explain this absence of policy change and to reflect on the prospects for introducing UBI schemes after the pandemic in European democracies. I argue that public opinion on UBI provides few electoral incentives to push for social policy change. Using prepandemic data from 21 European democracies and pandemic data from the UK, I show that political support for UBI has been divided between different groups who advocate conflicting policy goals and who hold divergent views about existing welfare state arrangements. While support for UBI might have increased during the pandemic, the underlying political dividing lines are likely to have remained intact. Due to these enduring divisions and the stable support for existing social policy arrangements over an untested policy, the prospects for introducing UBI schemes in the post-pandemic world remain uncertain.


  • Open Access

    Redistributive preferences: Why actual income is ultimately more important than perceived income

    by David Weisstanner, Klaus Armingeon

    An emerging consensus claims that ‘subjective’ (mis)perceptions of income inequality better explain redistributive preferences than actual ‘objective’ conditions. In this article, we critically re-assess this view. We compare perceived and actual income positions as predictors for preferences for redistribution. We argue that perceived income is partly endogenous to actual income and its effect on preferences conditional on ideology. Using an original survey experiment from Switzerland, we show that the predictive power of perceived income is lower compared to actual income. Perceived income is only associated with redistribution preferences among centre-right respondents, but not among left-wing respondents. Furthermore, providing respondents with corrective information about their true position in the income hierarchy has no effect on redistribution preferences. These findings go against the new consensus about the superior explanatory power of subjective perceptions of income inequality. We argue instead that absolute objective conditions should be at the centre of explaining redistributive preferences.


  • Open Access

    Between-Class Earnings Inequality in 30 European Countries

    by Tim Goedemé, Marii Paskov, David Weisstanner, Brian Nolan

    This article studies earnings inequality between social classes across 30 European countries. Class inequality in earnings is found across the board although there are some exceptions. However, the degree of class inequality varies strongly across countries being larger in Western and Southern European countries and smaller in Eastern and Northern European countries. Furthermore, we find that differences in class composition in terms of observed characteristics associated with earnings account for a substantial proportion of these between-class differences. Differences between classes in the returns to education and other characteristics play less of a role. In all these respects there is a sizeable cross-national variation. This points to important differences between countries in how earnings are structured by social class.


  • Open Access

    Objective Conditions Count, Political Beliefs Decide: The Conditional Effects of Self-Interest and Ideology on Redistribution Preferences

    by Klaus Armingeon, David Weisstanner

    How can we explain variation in demand for redistribution among cross-pressured voters? We argue that redistributive preferences reflect an interaction between material self-interest and political ideology. The self-interest argument predicts growing opposition to redistribution as income increases, while the argument of ideologically driven preferences suggests that left-leaning citizens are more supportive of redistribution than right-leaning citizens. Focusing on cross-pressured voters, we expect that the difference in redistribution preferences between left- and right-leaning citizens is smaller at the bottom of the income hierarchy than at the top. Among the group of left-leaning citizens, the role of material self-interest is expected to be smaller than among right-leaning citizens. We provide evidence in line with our argument analysing data from the European Social Survey in 25 European democracies between 2008 and 2018.