Klaus Armingeon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Klaus Armingeon has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Weisstanner
University of Lucerne
2 shared publications - Kai Guthmann
Bern, Switzerland
2 shared publications Kai Guthmann
1 shared publicationLucio Baccaro
1 shared publication- Lucio Baccaro
University of Geneva; and
1 shared publication - Philipp Lutz
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 18 (2) , 256-280
Muddling between responsiveness and responsibility: the Swiss case of a non-implementation of a constitutional rule
- 24 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 18 (2) , 256-280
Muddling between responsiveness and responsibility: the Swiss case of a non-implementation of a constitutional rule
- 27 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 385-408
Herausforderungen der Sozialpolitik durch den sozio-ökonomischen Strukturwandel
- 27 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 385-408
Herausforderungen der Sozialpolitik durch den sozio-ökonomischen Strukturwandel
- 27 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 515-536
Inter- und supranationale Herausforderungen der nationalen Sozialpolitik
- 27 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 515-536
Inter- und supranationale Herausforderungen der nationalen Sozialpolitik
- Open Access
- 26 March 2018
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 24 (1) , 43-52
Die Entwicklung der schweizerischen Altersvorsorge
- 26 March 2018
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 24 (1) , 43-52
Open AccessDie Entwicklung der schweizerischen Altersvorsorge
- 19 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 25 (4) , 546-566
Position-taking in the Euro crisis
The decisions faced by members of the European Union (EU) during the sovereign debt crisis focused on fiscal policies in the Eurozone and structural reforms in the countries that experienced fiscal problems. Who sided with whom in these decision processes and why? We posit that states in strong economic positions will minimize the expense of supporting weaker economies because those economically strong states do not see austerity measures for themselves in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, less competitive states seek to avoid austerity measures because, even if an austerity outcome that imposes heavy costs on their state is inevitable, vocal opposition to the measures will minimize the electoral costs incurred by the government. States that are neither competitive nor uncompetitive should avoid taking an open position and simply support a majority coalition. Empirically, we show that the competiveness of a given state’s national economy is the major explanatory factor for the position it ultimately takes.
- 19 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 25 (4) , 546-566
Position-taking in the Euro crisis
The decisions faced by members of the European Union (EU) during the sovereign debt crisis focused on fiscal policies in the Eurozone and structural reforms in the countries that experienced fiscal problems. Who sided with whom in these decision processes and why? We posit that states in strong economic positions will minimize the expense of supporting weaker economies because those economically strong states do not see austerity measures for themselves in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, less competitive states seek to avoid austerity measures because, even if an austerity outcome that imposes heavy costs on their state is inevitable, vocal opposition to the measures will minimize the electoral costs incurred by the government. States that are neither competitive nor uncompetitive should avoid taking an open position and simply support a majority coalition. Empirically, we show that the competiveness of a given state’s national economy is the major explanatory factor for the position it ultimately takes.
- 6 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 435-446
Die Beschädigung der Demokratie in der Krise der EU
- 6 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 435-446
Die Beschädigung der Demokratie in der Krise der EU
- 23 December 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 39 (4) , 628-647
Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation
What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.
- 23 December 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 39 (4) , 628-647
Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation
What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.
- 12 November 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 14 (1) , 1-26
How the Euro divides the union: the effect of economic adjustment on support for democracy in Europe
As often pointed out in the literature on the European debt crisis, the policy programme of austerity and internal devaluation imposed on countries in the Eurozone's periphery exhibits a lack of democratic legitimacy. This article analyses the consequences these developments have for democratic support at both the European and national levels. We show that through the policies of economic adjustment, a majority of citizens in crisis countries has become ‘detached’ from their democratic political system. By cutting loose the Eurozone's periphery from the rest of Europe in terms of democratic legitimacy, the Euro has divided the union, instead of uniting it as foreseen by its architects. Our results are based on aggregated Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 28 European Union (EU) member states between 2002 and 2014. We employ quantitative time-series cross-sectional regression analyses. Moreover, we estimate the causal effect of economic adjustment in a comparative case study of four cases using the synthetic control method.
- 12 November 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 14 (1) , 1-26
How the Euro divides the union: the effect of economic adjustment on support for democracy in Europe
As often pointed out in the literature on the European debt crisis, the policy programme of austerity and internal devaluation imposed on countries in the Eurozone's periphery exhibits a lack of democratic legitimacy. This article analyses the consequences these developments have for democratic support at both the European and national levels. We show that through the policies of economic adjustment, a majority of citizens in crisis countries has become ‘detached’ from their democratic political system. By cutting loose the Eurozone's periphery from the rest of Europe in terms of democratic legitimacy, the Euro has divided the union, instead of uniting it as foreseen by its architects. Our results are based on aggregated Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 28 European Union (EU) member states between 2002 and 2014. We employ quantitative time-series cross-sectional regression analyses. Moreover, we estimate the causal effect of economic adjustment in a comparative case study of four cases using the synthetic control method.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 165-183
The Crisis and Germany: The Trading State Unleashed
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 165-183
The Crisis and Germany: The Trading State Unleashed
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 53 (3) , 423-442
Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011
The Great Recession that started in 2007/2008 has been the worst economic downturn since the crisis of the 1930s in Europe. It led to a major sovereign debt crisis, which is arguably the biggest challenge for the European Union (EU) and its common currency. Not since the 1950s have advanced democracies experienced such a dramatic external imposition of austerity and structural reform policies through inter‐ or supranational organisations such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or as implicitly requested by international financial markets. Did this massive interference with the room for maneuver of parliaments and governments in many countries erode support for national democracy in the crisis since 2007? Did citizens realise that their national democratic institutions were no longer able to effectively decide on major economic and social policies, on economic and welfare state institutions? And did they react by concluding that this constrained democracy no longer merited further support? These are the questions guiding this article, which compares 26 EU countries in 2007–2011 and re‐analyses 78 national surveys. Aggregate data from these surveys is analysed in a time‐series cross‐section design to examine changes in democratic support at the country level. The hypotheses also are tested at the individual level by estimating a series of cross‐classified multilevel logistic regression models. Support for national democracy – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis. This was caused both by international organisations and markets interfering with national democratic procedures and by the deteriorating situation of the national economy as perceived by individual citizens.
- 1 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 53 (3) , 423-442
Top Cited PapersDemocracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011
The Great Recession that started in 2007/2008 has been the worst economic downturn since the crisis of the 1930s in Europe. It led to a major sovereign debt crisis, which is arguably the biggest challenge for the European Union (EU) and its common currency. Not since the 1950s have advanced democracies experienced such a dramatic external imposition of austerity and structural reform policies through inter‐ or supranational organisations such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or as implicitly requested by international financial markets. Did this massive interference with the room for maneuver of parliaments and governments in many countries erode support for national democracy in the crisis since 2007? Did citizens realise that their national democratic institutions were no longer able to effectively decide on major economic and social policies, on economic and welfare state institutions? And did they react by concluding that this constrained democracy no longer merited further support? These are the questions guiding this article, which compares 26 EU countries in 2007–2011 and re‐analyses 78 national surveys. Aggregate data from these surveys is analysed in a time‐series cross‐section design to examine changes in democratic support at the country level. The hypotheses also are tested at the individual level by estimating a series of cross‐classified multilevel logistic regression models. Support for national democracy – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis. This was caused both by international organisations and markets interfering with national democratic procedures and by the deteriorating situation of the national economy as perceived by individual citizens.