Marco Caselli
Marco Caselli has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andreas Peter
University of Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany
4 shared publications - Herson Esquivel-Vargas
University of Twente
2 shared publications - Andrea Continella
University of Twente, Enschede, Netherlands
1 shared publication - Bret Jordan1 shared publication
- Christin Seifert
Marburg University
1 shared publication - Daniel Schlette
University of Regensburg
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 330-349
Inferring Recovery Steps from Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 330-349
Inferring Recovery Steps from Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports
- 18 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 170-192
Identifying Near-Optimal Single-Shot Attacks on ICSs with Limited Process Knowledge
- 18 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 170-192
Identifying Near-Optimal Single-Shot Attacks on ICSs with Limited Process Knowledge
- Open Access
On the Integration of Course of Action Playbooks into Shareable Cyber Threat Intelligence
Motivated by the introduction of CACAO, the first open standard that harmonizes the way we document courses of action in a machine-readable format for interoperability, and the benefits for cybersecurity operations derived from utilizing, and coupling and sharing course of action playbooks with cyber threat intelligence, we introduce a uniform metadata template that supports managing and integrating course of action playbooks into knowledge representation and knowledge management systems. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach through two use-case implementations. We utilize the playbook metadata template to introduce functionality and integrate course of action playbooks, such as CACAO, into the MISP threat intelligence platform and the OASIS Threat Actor Context ontology.
Open AccessOn the Integration of Course of Action Playbooks into Shareable Cyber Threat Intelligence
Motivated by the introduction of CACAO, the first open standard that harmonizes the way we document courses of action in a machine-readable format for interoperability, and the benefits for cybersecurity operations derived from utilizing, and coupling and sharing course of action playbooks with cyber threat intelligence, we introduce a uniform metadata template that supports managing and integrating course of action playbooks into knowledge representation and knowledge management systems. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach through two use-case implementations. We utilize the playbook metadata template to introduce functionality and integrate course of action playbooks, such as CACAO, into the MISP threat intelligence platform and the OASIS Threat Actor Context ontology.
- 11 June 2020
- Vol. 12223, 44-64
Putting Attacks in Context: A Building Automation Testbed for Impact Assessment from the Victim’s Perspective
Cybersecurity research relies on the reproducibility and deep understanding of attacks to devise appropriate solutions. Different kinds of testbeds are typically used to systematically execute attacks and evaluate defenses. Testbeds are widely used to demonstrate Building Automation and Control System (BACS) attacks and defenses, considered too risky to be executed on real infrastructures. However, those testbeds implement arbitrary configurations of building services that do not resemble real-world deployments. In this work, we present the first BACS testbed specially designed to assess the impact of cyberattacks from the victim’s perspective. It features general purpose building services such as illumination, ventilation, and temperature control, whose configuration is easily adapted to emulate the requirements of real-world locations. In this way, the context added to our testbed allows us to better understand the impact of BACS attacks through concrete and realistic scenarios. Moreover, by analyzing different configurations of the BACS (i.e., contexts), we found out that identical attacks may have dramatically different impacts. Thus, reinforcing our view on the relevance of adding context to BACS testbeds.
- 11 June 2020
- Vol. 12223, 44-64
Putting Attacks in Context: A Building Automation Testbed for Impact Assessment from the Victim’s Perspective
Cybersecurity research relies on the reproducibility and deep understanding of attacks to devise appropriate solutions. Different kinds of testbeds are typically used to systematically execute attacks and evaluate defenses. Testbeds are widely used to demonstrate Building Automation and Control System (BACS) attacks and defenses, considered too risky to be executed on real infrastructures. However, those testbeds implement arbitrary configurations of building services that do not resemble real-world deployments. In this work, we present the first BACS testbed specially designed to assess the impact of cyberattacks from the victim’s perspective. It features general purpose building services such as illumination, ventilation, and temperature control, whose configuration is easily adapted to emulate the requirements of real-world locations. In this way, the context added to our testbed allows us to better understand the impact of BACS attacks through concrete and realistic scenarios. Moreover, by analyzing different configurations of the BACS (i.e., contexts), we found out that identical attacks may have dramatically different impacts. Thus, reinforcing our view on the relevance of adding context to BACS testbeds.
- Open Access
Automated Retrieval of ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques for Cyber Threat Reports
Over the last years, threat intelligence sharing has steadily grown, leading cybersecurity professionals to access increasingly larger amounts of heterogeneous data. Among those, cyber attacks' Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) have proven to be particularly valuable to characterize threat actors' behaviors and, thus, improve defensive countermeasures. Unfortunately, this information is often hidden within human-readable textual reports and must be extracted manually. In this paper, we evaluate several classification approaches to automatically retrieve TTPs from unstructured text. To implement these approaches, we take advantage of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, an open knowledge base of adversarial tactics and techniques, to train classifiers and label results. Finally, we present rcATT, a tool built on top of our findings and freely distributed to the security community to support cyber threat report automated analysis.
Open AccessAutomated Retrieval of ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques for Cyber Threat Reports
Over the last years, threat intelligence sharing has steadily grown, leading cybersecurity professionals to access increasingly larger amounts of heterogeneous data. Among those, cyber attacks' Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) have proven to be particularly valuable to characterize threat actors' behaviors and, thus, improve defensive countermeasures. Unfortunately, this information is often hidden within human-readable textual reports and must be extracted manually. In this paper, we evaluate several classification approaches to automatically retrieve TTPs from unstructured text. To implement these approaches, we take advantage of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, an open knowledge base of adversarial tactics and techniques, to train classifiers and label results. Finally, we present rcATT, a tool built on top of our findings and freely distributed to the security community to support cyber threat report automated analysis.
- Open Access
- 2 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 20 (1) , 21-38
Measuring and visualizing cyber threat intelligence quality
The very raison d’être of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is to provide meaningful knowledge about cyber security threats. The exchange and collaborative generation of CTI by the means of sharing platforms has proven to be an important aspect of practical application. It is evident to infer that inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated threat intelligence is a major problem as only high-quality CTI can be helpful to detect and defend against cyber attacks. Additionally, while the amount of available CTI is increasing it is not warranted that quality remains unaffected. In conjunction with the increasing number of available CTI, it is thus in the best interest of every stakeholder to be aware of the quality of a CTI artifact. This allows for informed decisions and permits detailed analyses. Our work makes a twofold contribution to the challenge of assessing threat intelligence quality. We first propose a series of relevant quality dimensions and configure metrics to assess the respective dimensions in the context of CTI. In a second step, we showcase the extension of an existing CTI analysis tool to make the quality assessment transparent to security analysts. Furthermore, analysts’ subjective perceptions are, where necessary, included in the quality assessment concept.
- 2 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 20 (1) , 21-38
Open AccessMeasuring and visualizing cyber threat intelligence quality
The very raison d’être of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is to provide meaningful knowledge about cyber security threats. The exchange and collaborative generation of CTI by the means of sharing platforms has proven to be an important aspect of practical application. It is evident to infer that inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated threat intelligence is a major problem as only high-quality CTI can be helpful to detect and defend against cyber attacks. Additionally, while the amount of available CTI is increasing it is not warranted that quality remains unaffected. In conjunction with the increasing number of available CTI, it is thus in the best interest of every stakeholder to be aware of the quality of a CTI artifact. This allows for informed decisions and permits detailed analyses. Our work makes a twofold contribution to the challenge of assessing threat intelligence quality. We first propose a series of relevant quality dimensions and configure metrics to assess the respective dimensions in the context of CTI. In a second step, we showcase the extension of an existing CTI analysis tool to make the quality assessment transparent to security analysts. Furthermore, analysts’ subjective perceptions are, where necessary, included in the quality assessment concept.