Beatrice Magistro
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Interests
Beatrice Magistro has a total of 43 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bart Bonikowski
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, New York University , New York, NY
8 shared publications - Sophie Borwein
University of British Columbia
8 shared publications - Peter John Loewen
Cornell University
6 shared publications - Blake Lee-Whiting
University of Western Ontario, London, Canada
5 shared publications - R. Michael Alvarez
California Institute of Technology
5 shared publications - Ramit Debnath
University of Cambridge
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 107 (5) , e70194
The Convergence of Zero‐Sum Thinking and Illiberalism in the United States
Objective: Liberal democracies are under mounting pressure as citizens increasingly support policies that curtail fundamental rights. Prior research has often attributed illiberal attitudes to one partisan camp. We show that zero‐sum thinking—the belief that one group or person's gains necessarily come at another's expense—is a powerful cross‐partisan psychological predictor of such attitudes. Methods: In a nationally representative survey experiment (), we asked respondents whether existential threats justify restricting fundamental rights under one of three randomized issue frames: climate change (a liberal issue), illegal immigration (a conservative issue), or no specific threat. Results: We find that zero‐sum thinking strongly predicts support for illiberal attitudes across all treatment conditions: an interquartile‐range increase in zero‐sum thinking is associated with an 11–13 percentage point increase in illiberal attitudes, regardless of partisan affiliation. Framing effects are confined to low zero‐sum thinkers, who respond predictably to partisan cues: Democrats favor restrictions for climate change, while Republicans do so when they address illegal immigration. High zero‐sum thinkers, by contrast, hit a “threat ceiling,” exhibiting uniformly high support for coercive measures with little sensitivity to partisan framing.
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 107 (5) , e70194
Open AccessThe Convergence of Zero‐Sum Thinking and Illiberalism in the United States
Objective: Liberal democracies are under mounting pressure as citizens increasingly support policies that curtail fundamental rights. Prior research has often attributed illiberal attitudes to one partisan camp. We show that zero‐sum thinking—the belief that one group or person's gains necessarily come at another's expense—is a powerful cross‐partisan psychological predictor of such attitudes. Methods: In a nationally representative survey experiment (), we asked respondents whether existential threats justify restricting fundamental rights under one of three randomized issue frames: climate change (a liberal issue), illegal immigration (a conservative issue), or no specific threat. Results: We find that zero‐sum thinking strongly predicts support for illiberal attitudes across all treatment conditions: an interquartile‐range increase in zero‐sum thinking is associated with an 11–13 percentage point increase in illiberal attitudes, regardless of partisan affiliation. Framing effects are confined to low zero‐sum thinkers, who respond predictably to partisan cues: Democrats favor restrictions for climate change, while Republicans do so when they address illegal immigration. High zero‐sum thinkers, by contrast, hit a “threat ceiling,” exhibiting uniformly high support for coercive measures with little sensitivity to partisan framing.
- Open Access
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Causal Beliefs about the Economic Effects of AI among Politicians and the Public
Political disagreement over artificial intelligence may reflect different expectations about its economic consequences or judgments about appropriate government responses. Using parallel surveys of local Canadian politicians (n=1,100) and the public (n=5,510), and latent class analysis, we identify four causal theories of AI’s economic effects. Politicians are much more likely to view AI as complementing workers, while the public more often sees it a substitutionary, even after compositional adjustment. Causal theories further organize policy preferences: those with substitutionary beliefs favour policies restricting AI, while those with complementary beliefs favour adaptation. Yet politicians and citizens with similar causal theories also emphasize different policies, and these within-class differences account for a substantial share of policy gaps. Elite-public policy disagreement therefore reflects both different economic diagnoses and responses to shared diagnoses. Finally, politicians in communities shaped by past economic shocks hold more substitutionary views, suggesting political responses may change as AI’s distributional consequences become visible.
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessCausal Beliefs about the Economic Effects of AI among Politicians and the Public
Political disagreement over artificial intelligence may reflect different expectations about its economic consequences or judgments about appropriate government responses. Using parallel surveys of local Canadian politicians (n=1,100) and the public (n=5,510), and latent class analysis, we identify four causal theories of AI’s economic effects. Politicians are much more likely to view AI as complementing workers, while the public more often sees it a substitutionary, even after compositional adjustment. Causal theories further organize policy preferences: those with substitutionary beliefs favour policies restricting AI, while those with complementary beliefs favour adaptation. Yet politicians and citizens with similar causal theories also emphasize different policies, and these within-class differences account for a substantial share of policy gaps. Elite-public policy disagreement therefore reflects both different economic diagnoses and responses to shared diagnoses. Finally, politicians in communities shaped by past economic shocks hold more substitutionary views, suggesting political responses may change as AI’s distributional consequences become visible.
- Open Access
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 90 (4) , 1489-1506
Causal Beliefs and the Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We categorize these causal beliefs into four types using a novel survey instrument fielded with approximately 6,000 Americans and Canadians. Using latent class analysis, we show that while some respondents are supportive of AI, a significant portion of the public theorizes it as a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These beliefs are aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and are primed for exploitation by political entrepreneurs.
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 90 (4) , 1489-1506
Open AccessCausal Beliefs and the Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We categorize these causal beliefs into four types using a novel survey instrument fielded with approximately 6,000 Americans and Canadians. Using latent class analysis, we show that while some respondents are supportive of AI, a significant portion of the public theorizes it as a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These beliefs are aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and are primed for exploitation by political entrepreneurs.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 214
Threat of China’s nuclear dominance boosts Americans’ support for nuclear energy
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 214
Threat of China’s nuclear dominance boosts Americans’ support for nuclear energy
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 5 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 5 (1)
Explaining women’s skepticism toward artificial intelligence: The role of risk orientation and risk exposure
This article examines the gender gap in attitudes toward the adoption of AI in the workplace, with a focus on how gender differences in risk orientation and risk exposure drive skepticism toward AI’s economic benefits. Using original survey data from ∼3,000 respondents across Canada and the United States, we find that women consistently perceive AI to be riskier than men. We identify two key drivers behind this gender gap: women’s higher general risk aversion and their greater exposure to AI-related risks. To establish a causal relationship between risk and AI attitudes, we show experimentally that as the probability of net positive employment effects decreases, women’s support for companies adopting AI falls more sharply than men’s. Finally, structural topic modeling of open-ended responses confirms that women express greater uncertainty about AI’s benefits and more frequently anticipate little to no benefits. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate existing gender inequalities, our study highlights the critical importance of incorporating women’s perspectives into AI policy-making. Policies that do not address gender-specific risks may not only reinforce existing inequalities in employment and income but could also generate political backlash against AI adoption.
- 5 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 5 (1)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessExplaining women’s skepticism toward artificial intelligence: The role of risk orientation and risk exposure
This article examines the gender gap in attitudes toward the adoption of AI in the workplace, with a focus on how gender differences in risk orientation and risk exposure drive skepticism toward AI’s economic benefits. Using original survey data from ∼3,000 respondents across Canada and the United States, we find that women consistently perceive AI to be riskier than men. We identify two key drivers behind this gender gap: women’s higher general risk aversion and their greater exposure to AI-related risks. To establish a causal relationship between risk and AI attitudes, we show experimentally that as the probability of net positive employment effects decreases, women’s support for companies adopting AI falls more sharply than men’s. Finally, structural topic modeling of open-ended responses confirms that women express greater uncertainty about AI’s benefits and more frequently anticipate little to no benefits. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate existing gender inequalities, our study highlights the critical importance of incorporating women’s perspectives into AI policy-making. Policies that do not address gender-specific risks may not only reinforce existing inequalities in employment and income but could also generate political backlash against AI adoption.
- Open Access
- 18 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We capture these causal beliefs using a novel survey instrument fielded with 6,056 Americans and Canadians. Through latent class analysis, we show that a significant portion of the public theorizes AI to be a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These causal theories are already aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and can be easily channeled toward politics.
- 18 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We capture these causal beliefs using a novel survey instrument fielded with 6,056 Americans and Canadians. Through latent class analysis, we show that a significant portion of the public theorizes AI to be a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These causal theories are already aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and can be easily channeled toward politics.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Climate
- Vol. 4 (6) , e0000643
Political ideology and views toward solar geoengineering in the United States
Political polarization remains a significant barrier to effective climate action in the United States. Conservatives often express skepticism toward climate change policies emphasizing government intervention, while liberals are generally more supportive of these efforts. Solar geoengineering (SG), an emerging technology proposed to cool the Earth’s atmosphere, offers a climate intervention that may transcend entrenched ideological divides. SG remains relatively unknown to the public and has not yet been widely framed in partisan terms. Moreover, its perceived nature as a technological solution could appeal to conservatives resistant to traditional climate measures. This study investigates the relationship between political ideology and public attitudes toward SG, conditional on respondents’ familiarity with the technology. Using a nationally representative sample of 2,109 American voters and applying linear probability and multinomial logistic regression models, we find that greater familiarity with SG is associated with reduced political polarization regarding SG’s perceived effectiveness, associated risks, and preferred climate strategies. Our findings suggest that increasing public awareness of SG could foster bipartisan engagement with climate policy, helping bridge the ideological divide.
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Climate
- Vol. 4 (6) , e0000643
Open AccessPolitical ideology and views toward solar geoengineering in the United States
Political polarization remains a significant barrier to effective climate action in the United States. Conservatives often express skepticism toward climate change policies emphasizing government intervention, while liberals are generally more supportive of these efforts. Solar geoengineering (SG), an emerging technology proposed to cool the Earth’s atmosphere, offers a climate intervention that may transcend entrenched ideological divides. SG remains relatively unknown to the public and has not yet been widely framed in partisan terms. Moreover, its perceived nature as a technological solution could appeal to conservatives resistant to traditional climate measures. This study investigates the relationship between political ideology and public attitudes toward SG, conditional on respondents’ familiarity with the technology. Using a nationally representative sample of 2,109 American voters and applying linear probability and multinomial logistic regression models, we find that greater familiarity with SG is associated with reduced political polarization regarding SG’s perceived effectiveness, associated risks, and preferred climate strategies. Our findings suggest that increasing public awareness of SG could foster bipartisan engagement with climate policy, helping bridge the ideological divide.
- 17 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 553-586
How populism harms prosperity: Unified populist rule reduces investment, innovation, and productivity
- 17 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 553-586
How populism harms prosperity: Unified populist rule reduces investment, innovation, and productivity
- Open Access
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Risk and the Gender Gap in Attitudes toward Artificial Intelligence
The potential for artificial intelligence to disrupt life and work has prompted debates on its regulation. This paper examines the gender gap in attitudes toward AI, focusing on how differences in risk-taking influence support for AI adoption and regulation. Using survey data from 3,000 respondents in Canada and the United States, we find that women are more skeptical of AI’s economic benefits and more likely to emphasize its risks, such as job displacement. This gap appears to be linked to women’s higher general risk aversion and greater exposure to AI-related risks. Experimental evidence shows that as AI’s benefits become more uncertain, women’s support for its adoption drops more sharply than men’s, while their support for government intervention increases. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate gender inequalities, policies that overlook women’s perspectives risk perpetuating workplace and societal disparities.
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessRisk and the Gender Gap in Attitudes toward Artificial Intelligence
The potential for artificial intelligence to disrupt life and work has prompted debates on its regulation. This paper examines the gender gap in attitudes toward AI, focusing on how differences in risk-taking influence support for AI adoption and regulation. Using survey data from 3,000 respondents in Canada and the United States, we find that women are more skeptical of AI’s economic benefits and more likely to emphasize its risks, such as job displacement. This gap appears to be linked to women’s higher general risk aversion and greater exposure to AI-related risks. Experimental evidence shows that as AI’s benefits become more uncertain, women’s support for its adoption drops more sharply than men’s, while their support for government intervention increases. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate gender inequalities, policies that overlook women’s perspectives risk perpetuating workplace and societal disparities.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Party or Policy? The Role of Policy Partisanship in Voter Decision-Making
Which matters more for voters, the political party or the policy positions of electoral candidates? We contribute to this long standing debate by analyzing the relative importance of policy content and party cues in the multi-party Canadian context. Using the Canadian case allows us to disentangle the effects of policy and party on voter decision-making, which are closely intertwined in the more polarized and extensively studied U.S. case. First, we employ a conjoint survey experiment to test whether the effect of an electoral candidate’s policy position on their evaluation by voters depends on the implicit party cues that are embedded in the policy. We find that while Canadians often associate policies with specific parties, they do not seem to use these implicit party cues in their evaluation of the candidates, focusing on policy congruence instead. Second, we test whether explicit party cues reduce the weight of policy information in candidate evaluations and find that they do not. Overall, our findings suggest that party cues are not as useful for voters in multi-party systems with low polarization, and that voters rely on policy information to make decisions in these contexts.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessParty or Policy? The Role of Policy Partisanship in Voter Decision-Making
Which matters more for voters, the political party or the policy positions of electoral candidates? We contribute to this long standing debate by analyzing the relative importance of policy content and party cues in the multi-party Canadian context. Using the Canadian case allows us to disentangle the effects of policy and party on voter decision-making, which are closely intertwined in the more polarized and extensively studied U.S. case. First, we employ a conjoint survey experiment to test whether the effect of an electoral candidate’s policy position on their evaluation by voters depends on the implicit party cues that are embedded in the policy. We find that while Canadians often associate policies with specific parties, they do not seem to use these implicit party cues in their evaluation of the candidates, focusing on policy congruence instead. Second, we test whether explicit party cues reduce the weight of policy information in candidate evaluations and find that they do not. Overall, our findings suggest that party cues are not as useful for voters in multi-party systems with low polarization, and that voters rely on policy information to make decisions in these contexts.