Sophie Borwein
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Sophie Borwein has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Beatrice Magistro
Department of Political Science School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs Northeastern University Boston Massachusetts USA
8 shared publications - Bart Bonikowski
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, New York University , New York, NY
7 shared publications - Jack Lucas
University of Calgary
6 shared publications - Peter John Loewen
Cornell University
5 shared publications - Bazen Gashaw Teferra
AI for Mental Health Program, St. Michael’s Hospital, Unity Health Toronto, Toronto, Canada
4 shared publications - Danielle D. DeSouza
Stanford University
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Causal Beliefs about the Economic Effects of AI among Politicians and the Public
Political disagreement over artificial intelligence may reflect different expectations about its economic consequences or judgments about appropriate government responses. Using parallel surveys of local Canadian politicians (n=1,100) and the public (n=5,510), and latent class analysis, we identify four causal theories of AI’s economic effects. Politicians are much more likely to view AI as complementing workers, while the public more often sees it a substitutionary, even after compositional adjustment. Causal theories further organize policy preferences: those with substitutionary beliefs favour policies restricting AI, while those with complementary beliefs favour adaptation. Yet politicians and citizens with similar causal theories also emphasize different policies, and these within-class differences account for a substantial share of policy gaps. Elite-public policy disagreement therefore reflects both different economic diagnoses and responses to shared diagnoses. Finally, politicians in communities shaped by past economic shocks hold more substitutionary views, suggesting political responses may change as AI’s distributional consequences become visible.
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessCausal Beliefs about the Economic Effects of AI among Politicians and the Public
Political disagreement over artificial intelligence may reflect different expectations about its economic consequences or judgments about appropriate government responses. Using parallel surveys of local Canadian politicians (n=1,100) and the public (n=5,510), and latent class analysis, we identify four causal theories of AI’s economic effects. Politicians are much more likely to view AI as complementing workers, while the public more often sees it a substitutionary, even after compositional adjustment. Causal theories further organize policy preferences: those with substitutionary beliefs favour policies restricting AI, while those with complementary beliefs favour adaptation. Yet politicians and citizens with similar causal theories also emphasize different policies, and these within-class differences account for a substantial share of policy gaps. Elite-public policy disagreement therefore reflects both different economic diagnoses and responses to shared diagnoses. Finally, politicians in communities shaped by past economic shocks hold more substitutionary views, suggesting political responses may change as AI’s distributional consequences become visible.
- Open Access
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 90 (4) , 1489-1506
Causal Beliefs and the Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We categorize these causal beliefs into four types using a novel survey instrument fielded with approximately 6,000 Americans and Canadians. Using latent class analysis, we show that while some respondents are supportive of AI, a significant portion of the public theorizes it as a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These beliefs are aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and are primed for exploitation by political entrepreneurs.
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 90 (4) , 1489-1506
Open AccessCausal Beliefs and the Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We categorize these causal beliefs into four types using a novel survey instrument fielded with approximately 6,000 Americans and Canadians. Using latent class analysis, we show that while some respondents are supportive of AI, a significant portion of the public theorizes it as a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These beliefs are aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and are primed for exploitation by political entrepreneurs.
- Open Access
- 13 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- p. 1-14
Place Consciousness and Voting in Canada
Building on Cramer’s (2016) foundational work on rural consciousness, we measure place consciousness in Canada as a unified construct capturing both in-group place identification and out-group place resentment. Using data from a large-scale Canadian survey, we then examine how place consciousness relates to federal voting behaviour across a novel typology of six urban, suburban, and rural place types. We find that place consciousness is strongest on the ends of the urban-rural continuum; in low- and high-income rural places, and in core urban contexts with large shares of knowledge economy workers. Strong place consciousness relates to Conservative voting in the former places, and Liberal voting in the latter. Place consciousness is weaker in suburban and working-class urban places, and less systematically related to voting behaviour. By examining place consciousness across place types, our findings reveal the nuanced ways in which place identity and resentment shape vote choice across Canada’s urban–rural cleavage.
- 13 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- p. 1-14
Open AccessPlace Consciousness and Voting in Canada
Building on Cramer’s (2016) foundational work on rural consciousness, we measure place consciousness in Canada as a unified construct capturing both in-group place identification and out-group place resentment. Using data from a large-scale Canadian survey, we then examine how place consciousness relates to federal voting behaviour across a novel typology of six urban, suburban, and rural place types. We find that place consciousness is strongest on the ends of the urban-rural continuum; in low- and high-income rural places, and in core urban contexts with large shares of knowledge economy workers. Strong place consciousness relates to Conservative voting in the former places, and Liberal voting in the latter. Place consciousness is weaker in suburban and working-class urban places, and less systematically related to voting behaviour. By examining place consciousness across place types, our findings reveal the nuanced ways in which place identity and resentment shape vote choice across Canada’s urban–rural cleavage.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 5 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 5 (1)
Explaining women’s skepticism toward artificial intelligence: The role of risk orientation and risk exposure
This article examines the gender gap in attitudes toward the adoption of AI in the workplace, with a focus on how gender differences in risk orientation and risk exposure drive skepticism toward AI’s economic benefits. Using original survey data from ∼3,000 respondents across Canada and the United States, we find that women consistently perceive AI to be riskier than men. We identify two key drivers behind this gender gap: women’s higher general risk aversion and their greater exposure to AI-related risks. To establish a causal relationship between risk and AI attitudes, we show experimentally that as the probability of net positive employment effects decreases, women’s support for companies adopting AI falls more sharply than men’s. Finally, structural topic modeling of open-ended responses confirms that women express greater uncertainty about AI’s benefits and more frequently anticipate little to no benefits. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate existing gender inequalities, our study highlights the critical importance of incorporating women’s perspectives into AI policy-making. Policies that do not address gender-specific risks may not only reinforce existing inequalities in employment and income but could also generate political backlash against AI adoption.
- 5 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 5 (1)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessExplaining women’s skepticism toward artificial intelligence: The role of risk orientation and risk exposure
This article examines the gender gap in attitudes toward the adoption of AI in the workplace, with a focus on how gender differences in risk orientation and risk exposure drive skepticism toward AI’s economic benefits. Using original survey data from ∼3,000 respondents across Canada and the United States, we find that women consistently perceive AI to be riskier than men. We identify two key drivers behind this gender gap: women’s higher general risk aversion and their greater exposure to AI-related risks. To establish a causal relationship between risk and AI attitudes, we show experimentally that as the probability of net positive employment effects decreases, women’s support for companies adopting AI falls more sharply than men’s. Finally, structural topic modeling of open-ended responses confirms that women express greater uncertainty about AI’s benefits and more frequently anticipate little to no benefits. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate existing gender inequalities, our study highlights the critical importance of incorporating women’s perspectives into AI policy-making. Policies that do not address gender-specific risks may not only reinforce existing inequalities in employment and income but could also generate political backlash against AI adoption.
- Open Access
- 18 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We capture these causal beliefs using a novel survey instrument fielded with 6,056 Americans and Canadians. Through latent class analysis, we show that a significant portion of the public theorizes AI to be a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These causal theories are already aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and can be easily channeled toward politics.
- 18 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe Potential for Political Backlash Against AI
Artificial intelligence is poised to reconfigure the economy and politics. Although new technologies often produce net economic gains, their costs and benefits are unequally distributed, making them susceptible to politicization. We argue that whether and how AI becomes mobilized for partisan gain will depend on the public’s causal beliefs about the winners and losers of AI. We capture these causal beliefs using a novel survey instrument fielded with 6,056 Americans and Canadians. Through latent class analysis, we show that a significant portion of the public theorizes AI to be a threat—harming consumers and replacing rather than complementing workers’ skills. These causal theories are already aligned with political preferences, predicting support for policies that delay job loss over those that help workers adapt, and polarizing voters along existing partisan lines. We conclude that fissures in the public’s attitudes toward AI already exist and can be easily channeled toward politics.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 64 (4) , 1827-1848
Urban–rural policy disagreement
Urban–rural divides are large and growing in many national elections, but the sources of this widening divide are not well understood. Recent research has pointed to policy disagreement as one possible mechanism for this growing divide; if urban and rural residents hold increasingly dissimilar policy preferences, this disagreement could produce ever‐widening urban–rural electoral divides. We investigate this possibility by creating a synthesized dataset of nearly 1000 policy issue questions across 10 distinct Canadian national election studies conducted between 1993 and 2021 ( N = 5.3 million), combined with a measure of the urban or rural character of every federal electoral district. This dataset allows us to measure urban–rural policy disagreement across a much larger range of policy issues and over a much longer time period than has previously been possible. We find strong evidence of urban–rural policy disagreement across a range of issues, and especially in areas of cultural policy, including questions relating to gun control, immigration and Indigenous affairs. We further find strong support for the ‘progressive cities’ hypothesis; in nearly all policy domains, urban residents support more left‐wing positions on policy issues than rural residents. However, we find no evidence these urban–rural policy divides have grown since the 1990s. Urban–rural policy disagreement, while large and meaningful, cannot explain the ever‐widening urban–rural political divide.
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 64 (4) , 1827-1848
Open AccessUrban–rural policy disagreement
Urban–rural divides are large and growing in many national elections, but the sources of this widening divide are not well understood. Recent research has pointed to policy disagreement as one possible mechanism for this growing divide; if urban and rural residents hold increasingly dissimilar policy preferences, this disagreement could produce ever‐widening urban–rural electoral divides. We investigate this possibility by creating a synthesized dataset of nearly 1000 policy issue questions across 10 distinct Canadian national election studies conducted between 1993 and 2021 ( N = 5.3 million), combined with a measure of the urban or rural character of every federal electoral district. This dataset allows us to measure urban–rural policy disagreement across a much larger range of policy issues and over a much longer time period than has previously been possible. We find strong evidence of urban–rural policy disagreement across a range of issues, and especially in areas of cultural policy, including questions relating to gun control, immigration and Indigenous affairs. We further find strong support for the ‘progressive cities’ hypothesis; in nearly all policy domains, urban residents support more left‐wing positions on policy issues than rural residents. However, we find no evidence these urban–rural policy divides have grown since the 1990s. Urban–rural policy disagreement, while large and meaningful, cannot explain the ever‐widening urban–rural political divide.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 59 (2) , 277-306
Income Inequality and Parent Education Spending in Canada
Comparative research documents substantial education- and income-based class gaps in parent spending on children’s education, with important repercussions for the perpetuation of intergenerational (dis)advantage. Spurred by higher levels of income inequality and associated economic transformations, some speculate these gaps may have widened, as parents feel intensified pressure to best position their children in increasingly competitive labour markets. We examine the size and evolution—over time and in response to higher inequality—of these class gaps in the Canadian provinces, a context where we propose competitive pressures may be muted by the country’s relatively unstratified post-secondary education system. Exploiting provincial and temporal variation in Statistics Canada’s Survey of Household Spending (2006–2019), we show that more highly educated parents, and to a lesser extent high-income ones, place distinct emphasis on education spending. However, we find limited evidence of changes in these spending patterns in response to income inequality or over time.
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 59 (2) , 277-306
Open AccessIncome Inequality and Parent Education Spending in Canada
Comparative research documents substantial education- and income-based class gaps in parent spending on children’s education, with important repercussions for the perpetuation of intergenerational (dis)advantage. Spurred by higher levels of income inequality and associated economic transformations, some speculate these gaps may have widened, as parents feel intensified pressure to best position their children in increasingly competitive labour markets. We examine the size and evolution—over time and in response to higher inequality—of these class gaps in the Canadian provinces, a context where we propose competitive pressures may be muted by the country’s relatively unstratified post-secondary education system. Exploiting provincial and temporal variation in Statistics Canada’s Survey of Household Spending (2006–2019), we show that more highly educated parents, and to a lesser extent high-income ones, place distinct emphasis on education spending. However, we find limited evidence of changes in these spending patterns in response to income inequality or over time.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 58 (2) , 380-396
Place Types
In this research note, we propose a new typology of geographic places for use in advancing Canadian politics research on the political effects of place. We use hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) to inductively derive place types from Aggregate Dissemination Areas (ADAs), a fine-grained unit of geography covering all of Canada, newly available from Statistics Canada. Using this approach, we uncover seven distinct place types, adding nuance to earlier more aggregated approaches focused on urban-rural (or urban-suburban-rural) distinctions. We then demonstrate our typology's utility by showing how it provides new insight into the relationship between place and politics, using the example of the 2021 Canadian federal election. We conclude with a discussion of how our approach may be used to further the study of Canadian political geography, and we make available all files necessary for researchers to merge our place types with survey data for this purpose.
- 11 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 58 (2) , 380-396
Open AccessPlace Types
In this research note, we propose a new typology of geographic places for use in advancing Canadian politics research on the political effects of place. We use hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) to inductively derive place types from Aggregate Dissemination Areas (ADAs), a fine-grained unit of geography covering all of Canada, newly available from Statistics Canada. Using this approach, we uncover seven distinct place types, adding nuance to earlier more aggregated approaches focused on urban-rural (or urban-suburban-rural) distinctions. We then demonstrate our typology's utility by showing how it provides new insight into the relationship between place and politics, using the example of the 2021 Canadian federal election. We conclude with a discussion of how our approach may be used to further the study of Canadian political geography, and we make available all files necessary for researchers to merge our place types with survey data for this purpose.
- Open Access
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Risk and the Gender Gap in Attitudes toward Artificial Intelligence
The potential for artificial intelligence to disrupt life and work has prompted debates on its regulation. This paper examines the gender gap in attitudes toward AI, focusing on how differences in risk-taking influence support for AI adoption and regulation. Using survey data from 3,000 respondents in Canada and the United States, we find that women are more skeptical of AI’s economic benefits and more likely to emphasize its risks, such as job displacement. This gap appears to be linked to women’s higher general risk aversion and greater exposure to AI-related risks. Experimental evidence shows that as AI’s benefits become more uncertain, women’s support for its adoption drops more sharply than men’s, while their support for government intervention increases. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate gender inequalities, policies that overlook women’s perspectives risk perpetuating workplace and societal disparities.
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessRisk and the Gender Gap in Attitudes toward Artificial Intelligence
The potential for artificial intelligence to disrupt life and work has prompted debates on its regulation. This paper examines the gender gap in attitudes toward AI, focusing on how differences in risk-taking influence support for AI adoption and regulation. Using survey data from 3,000 respondents in Canada and the United States, we find that women are more skeptical of AI’s economic benefits and more likely to emphasize its risks, such as job displacement. This gap appears to be linked to women’s higher general risk aversion and greater exposure to AI-related risks. Experimental evidence shows that as AI’s benefits become more uncertain, women’s support for its adoption drops more sharply than men’s, while their support for government intervention increases. Given AI’s potential to exacerbate gender inequalities, policies that overlook women’s perspectives risk perpetuating workplace and societal disparities.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 57 (2) , 402-426
Groups, Identity, and Redistributive Preferences in Canada
Recent political developments in established democracies have renewed attention to the politics of identity. Some commentators have expressed concern that polities are fracturing along increasingly narrow social identity lines, in the process, losing their ability to build solidarity around shared commitments such as redistribution. This article takes stock of the strength of Canadian social identities and their consequences for redistributive preferences. It asks: first, which group memberships form the basis of Canadians’ perceptions of shared identity, and second, do these group memberships shape preferences for redistribution? This study answers these questions using two conjoint experiments that assess respondents’ perceptions of commonality and support for redistributing to hypothetical Canadians who vary on multiple dimensions of identity and need. Findings support that Canadians perceive greater shared identity with some of their groups (their social class) over others (their region or ascriptive identity), but that they overwhelmingly prioritize redistributing toward those who need it over those with whom they share group memberships.
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 57 (2) , 402-426
Open AccessGroups, Identity, and Redistributive Preferences in Canada
Recent political developments in established democracies have renewed attention to the politics of identity. Some commentators have expressed concern that polities are fracturing along increasingly narrow social identity lines, in the process, losing their ability to build solidarity around shared commitments such as redistribution. This article takes stock of the strength of Canadian social identities and their consequences for redistributive preferences. It asks: first, which group memberships form the basis of Canadians’ perceptions of shared identity, and second, do these group memberships shape preferences for redistribution? This study answers these questions using two conjoint experiments that assess respondents’ perceptions of commonality and support for redistributing to hypothetical Canadians who vary on multiple dimensions of identity and need. Findings support that Canadians perceive greater shared identity with some of their groups (their social class) over others (their region or ascriptive identity), but that they overwhelmingly prioritize redistributing toward those who need it over those with whom they share group memberships.