Sameen A. Mohsin Ali
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Sameen A. Mohsin Ali has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Mariam Mufti
University of Waterloo, Canada
1 shared publication- Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Lahore, Pakistan
1 shared publication - Sana Haroon
University of Massachusetts Boston
1 shared publication Tamara Moule
International Development Department University of Birmingham Birmingham UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2027
- Published by University of Michigan Library
Staffing the State
Bureaucrats play a critical role in managing governance and delivering public services, whether in democratic and authoritarian contexts. Leaders are responsible for managing bureaucrats—from assigning p ...
- 1 January 2027
- Published by University of Michigan Library
Staffing the State
Bureaucrats play a critical role in managing governance and delivering public services, whether in democratic and authoritarian contexts. Leaders are responsible for managing bureaucrats—from assigning p ...
- 24 April 2025
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration and Development
The Impact of Donor Engagement on Bureaucratic Ambition and Motivation in Aid Recipient Countries
Critical approaches to donor programming in non‐Western settings are essential to our understanding of bilateral and multilateral development administration. Greater emphasis on political analysis of aid provision and effectiveness is welcome, but there remains little emphasis on how working with donors shapes ambitions and motivations bureaucrats working in aid‐recipient countries, and a lack of evidence on how these shifts impact state capacity over time. Bringing the literature on the politics of aid in conversation with that on bureaucratic politics and motivation, this brief report argues for investigating how donor engagement impacts bureaucratic ambition and motivation by considering its impact on autonomy and ability to effect change. The report draws on fieldwork in Pakistan to operationalise these mechanisms, but advocates for more research to investigate whether engaging with donor agencies disengages bureaucrats from state politics and governance with consequences for state capacity and the success of donor programming.
- 24 April 2025
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration and Development
The Impact of Donor Engagement on Bureaucratic Ambition and Motivation in Aid Recipient Countries
Critical approaches to donor programming in non‐Western settings are essential to our understanding of bilateral and multilateral development administration. Greater emphasis on political analysis of aid provision and effectiveness is welcome, but there remains little emphasis on how working with donors shapes ambitions and motivations bureaucrats working in aid‐recipient countries, and a lack of evidence on how these shifts impact state capacity over time. Bringing the literature on the politics of aid in conversation with that on bureaucratic politics and motivation, this brief report argues for investigating how donor engagement impacts bureaucratic ambition and motivation by considering its impact on autonomy and ability to effect change. The report draws on fieldwork in Pakistan to operationalise these mechanisms, but advocates for more research to investigate whether engaging with donor agencies disengages bureaucrats from state politics and governance with consequences for state capacity and the success of donor programming.
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Oral History Review
- Vol. 51 (1) , 155-178
Creating an Oral History Archive of Government Work: The Women in Public Service in Pakistan Project
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Oral History Review
- Vol. 51 (1) , 155-178
Creating an Oral History Archive of Government Work: The Women in Public Service in Pakistan Project
- 10 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 52 (2) , 201-224
Political Parties and Decentralization in Pakistan
Why do politicians vote to decentralize power and resources? Drawing on structuralist and voluntarist approaches, we investigate why national party elites in Pakistan voted to devolve power to the provinces under the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution but are hesitant to devolve meaningful fiscal and administrative power to the local level. We argue that the explanation for this disjuncture lies in Pakistan’s history of military experiments with local government, its candidate-centered party system, and the re-election incentives of politicians at the national, provincial and local levels. Using interviews with local government representatives, politicians, and bureaucrats, and archival research through National Assembly, Senate debates and newspapers, we show that devolution to the provinces was a means of holding a fragile federation together. However, Pakistan’s political parties, unable to elicit credible commitment from their legislators, feared that devolving power further could result in party defections, the rise of regional leaders, and inevitably, party fragmentation.
- 10 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 52 (2) , 201-224
Political Parties and Decentralization in Pakistan
Why do politicians vote to decentralize power and resources? Drawing on structuralist and voluntarist approaches, we investigate why national party elites in Pakistan voted to devolve power to the provinces under the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution but are hesitant to devolve meaningful fiscal and administrative power to the local level. We argue that the explanation for this disjuncture lies in Pakistan’s history of military experiments with local government, its candidate-centered party system, and the re-election incentives of politicians at the national, provincial and local levels. Using interviews with local government representatives, politicians, and bureaucrats, and archival research through National Assembly, Senate debates and newspapers, we show that devolution to the provinces was a means of holding a fragile federation together. However, Pakistan’s political parties, unable to elicit credible commitment from their legislators, feared that devolving power further could result in party defections, the rise of regional leaders, and inevitably, party fragmentation.
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies
- Vol. 44 (6) , 1206-1228
Pakistan’s Health-Care System: A Case of Elite Capture
Pakistan currently ranks 154 out of 189 countries on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. In this paper, we use a ‘political settlements analysis’ to understand how the distribution of political, economic and social power explains this ranking and the inequity in Pakistan’s health system. We investigate elite power struggles over the last seven decades to explain how ad hoc policy-making, instability, patronage politics and rent-seeking have led to a maldistribution of resources, lack of oversight, and inequitable access and service provision for a burgeoning population. We argue that these factors have had two consequences: the privatisation of health care, and the opening up of a considerable sphere of influence to the donor community to direct state policy. Despite promising ongoing reform efforts, we conclude that Pakistan’s health system will remain hamstrung by the constraints of a political settlement in which elites with short-term horizons bargain for influence rather than developing an inclusive, consensus-based approach to improving governance outcomes for citizens.
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies
- Vol. 44 (6) , 1206-1228
Pakistan’s Health-Care System: A Case of Elite Capture
Pakistan currently ranks 154 out of 189 countries on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. In this paper, we use a ‘political settlements analysis’ to understand how the distribution of political, economic and social power explains this ranking and the inequity in Pakistan’s health system. We investigate elite power struggles over the last seven decades to explain how ad hoc policy-making, instability, patronage politics and rent-seeking have led to a maldistribution of resources, lack of oversight, and inequitable access and service provision for a burgeoning population. We argue that these factors have had two consequences: the privatisation of health care, and the opening up of a considerable sphere of influence to the donor community to direct state policy. Despite promising ongoing reform efforts, we conclude that Pakistan’s health system will remain hamstrung by the constraints of a political settlement in which elites with short-term horizons bargain for influence rather than developing an inclusive, consensus-based approach to improving governance outcomes for citizens.
- 17 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The European Journal of Development Research
- Vol. 34 (2) , 733-753
Networks of Effectiveness? The Impact of Politicization on Bureaucratic Performance in Pakistan
- 17 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The European Journal of Development Research
- Vol. 34 (2) , 733-753
Networks of Effectiveness? The Impact of Politicization on Bureaucratic Performance in Pakistan
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in World Development
- Vol. 135
Driving participatory reforms into the ground: The bureaucratic politics of irrigation management transfer in Pakistan
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in World Development
- Vol. 135
Driving participatory reforms into the ground: The bureaucratic politics of irrigation management transfer in Pakistan
- 22 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Commonwealth & Comparative Politics
- Vol. 58 (2) , 184-201
Party patronage and merit-based bureaucratic reform in Pakistan
How do ruling political parties accommodate their members’ demand for access to state patronage with a push for merit-based bureaucratic reform? I argue that political commitment to reform is contingent on electoral calculations within the party. Therefore, distortions in reform implementation reveal not only dynamics within the party itself, but also the significance of appointing the right bureaucrats to the right posts to regulate access to patronage. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in Punjab, I contextualise political commitment to bureaucratic reform to provide an explanation for their unsustainability and for persistently low state capacity in countries with weak, patronage-reliant parties.
- 22 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Commonwealth & Comparative Politics
- Vol. 58 (2) , 184-201
Party patronage and merit-based bureaucratic reform in Pakistan
How do ruling political parties accommodate their members’ demand for access to state patronage with a push for merit-based bureaucratic reform? I argue that political commitment to reform is contingent on electoral calculations within the party. Therefore, distortions in reform implementation reveal not only dynamics within the party itself, but also the significance of appointing the right bureaucrats to the right posts to regulate access to patronage. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in Punjab, I contextualise political commitment to bureaucratic reform to provide an explanation for their unsustainability and for persistently low state capacity in countries with weak, patronage-reliant parties.