Kaiming Zheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Kaiming Zheng has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Debing Ni
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
2 shared publications - Nana Wan
School of Economics and Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, PR China
2 shared publications - Wei Chen
College of Management Science, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu, China
2 shared publications - Zhengkai Wang
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
2 shared publications Debing Ni
1 shared publication- Jianchang Fan
School of Marketing and Logistics Management, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210023, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 June 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 16 (13) , 5561
Order or Collaborate? Manufacturers Utilize 3D-Printed Parts to Sustainably Facilitate Increased Product Variety
3D printing (3DP) has garnered significant attention from industries, prompting traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP to sustainably facilitate increased product variety. Observing manufacturers’ two adoption strategies, ordering parts and collaboratively printing 3DP parts, in a real-world setting, we utilize a wholesale price contract and a Nash Bargaining contract to describe these two strategies and then develop a supply-chain model including a 3DP supplier (Supplier) and a traditional manufacturer (Manufacturer). Further, we employ backward induction to solve the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the model to reveal differences between these two strategies and the impact of 3DP’s improved resource efficiency. According to equilibrium outcomes, analytical results show that first, as long as the unit cost of each 3DP part is not overly high and 3DP’s resource efficiency is not extremely low, the Manufacturer is willing to implement 3DP to increase product variety. Second, a rise in the resource efficiency can create a “win-win” scenario for the Manufacturer and the Supplier. Third, supply-chain collaboration can be achieved when the Manufacturer’s and the Supplier’s bargaining powers approach equality. Interestingly, a Nash bargaining contract can incentivize the manufacturer to substitute a base product with a variety of products, a change facilitated by an increase in the retail price of this base product. The managerial implication of this research is that enhanced resource efficiency can lead to less environmental pollution in the collaboration model by resulting in the sale of lower quantities of the base product, which would otherwise consume more resources and generate greater environmental pollution.
- 28 June 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 16 (13) , 5561
Open AccessOrder or Collaborate? Manufacturers Utilize 3D-Printed Parts to Sustainably Facilitate Increased Product Variety
3D printing (3DP) has garnered significant attention from industries, prompting traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP to sustainably facilitate increased product variety. Observing manufacturers’ two adoption strategies, ordering parts and collaboratively printing 3DP parts, in a real-world setting, we utilize a wholesale price contract and a Nash Bargaining contract to describe these two strategies and then develop a supply-chain model including a 3DP supplier (Supplier) and a traditional manufacturer (Manufacturer). Further, we employ backward induction to solve the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the model to reveal differences between these two strategies and the impact of 3DP’s improved resource efficiency. According to equilibrium outcomes, analytical results show that first, as long as the unit cost of each 3DP part is not overly high and 3DP’s resource efficiency is not extremely low, the Manufacturer is willing to implement 3DP to increase product variety. Second, a rise in the resource efficiency can create a “win-win” scenario for the Manufacturer and the Supplier. Third, supply-chain collaboration can be achieved when the Manufacturer’s and the Supplier’s bargaining powers approach equality. Interestingly, a Nash bargaining contract can incentivize the manufacturer to substitute a base product with a variety of products, a change facilitated by an increase in the retail price of this base product. The managerial implication of this research is that enhanced resource efficiency can lead to less environmental pollution in the collaboration model by resulting in the sale of lower quantities of the base product, which would otherwise consume more resources and generate greater environmental pollution.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 19 (7) , 4740-4763
Dual-channel supply chain coordination strategies considering electricity quality
The introduction of tradable electricity platforms in China has enriched the channels for consumers to purchase electricity and intensified the competition among channels. The quality of electricity is an essential factor affecting consumer purchasing behavior. This paper mainly focuses on the influence of the competition among channels on electricity quality.We construct a dual-channel electricity supply chain, in which electricity generators sell electricity directly to consumers or resell it through electricity retailers. We use the backward induction method of game theory to solve the equilibrium solutions in centralized, decentralized, and coordinated decisions. By analyzing and comparing the equilibrium solutions, we draw the following conclusions; (1) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits increase with the sensitivity coefficient of electricity quality and price competition coefficient. (2) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits decrease with the investment cost coefficient of quality improvement. (3) The increase in transmission and distribution costs reduces the electricity quality while increasing the electricity price through both channels. Furthermore, the increase leads to an increase in electricity demand and the profit of the electricity retailer through the resale channel. However, it reduces the electricity demand and the profit of the electricity generator through the direct sales channel. (4) A combined contract consisting of revenue sharing and quality improvement investment cost-sharing can lead to coordination.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 19 (7) , 4740-4763
Dual-channel supply chain coordination strategies considering electricity quality
The introduction of tradable electricity platforms in China has enriched the channels for consumers to purchase electricity and intensified the competition among channels. The quality of electricity is an essential factor affecting consumer purchasing behavior. This paper mainly focuses on the influence of the competition among channels on electricity quality.We construct a dual-channel electricity supply chain, in which electricity generators sell electricity directly to consumers or resell it through electricity retailers. We use the backward induction method of game theory to solve the equilibrium solutions in centralized, decentralized, and coordinated decisions. By analyzing and comparing the equilibrium solutions, we draw the following conclusions; (1) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits increase with the sensitivity coefficient of electricity quality and price competition coefficient. (2) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits decrease with the investment cost coefficient of quality improvement. (3) The increase in transmission and distribution costs reduces the electricity quality while increasing the electricity price through both channels. Furthermore, the increase leads to an increase in electricity demand and the profit of the electricity retailer through the resale channel. However, it reduces the electricity demand and the profit of the electricity generator through the direct sales channel. (4) A combined contract consisting of revenue sharing and quality improvement investment cost-sharing can lead to coordination.
- Open Access
- 21 October 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (20) , 13655
The Role of False-Claims Ban Regulation in Greenwashing of Firms with Imprecise Greenness Information
The observation that firms are greenwashing in their advertisements to consumers has attracted regulatory false claim concerns; thus, we built a three-stage game theoretical model to explore how a firm’s efficiency in greenness information acquisition and a false claims ban (FCB) regulatory policy induce greenwashing (non-greenwashing) in the green advertising market. We solved the model with the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Based on the PBEs, we obtained the following results. (1) A FCB regulatory policy is necessary to rule out any intentional greenwashing PBE. (2) In the presence of a strict FCB regulatory policy (with a large enough FCB penalty), if the precision of the firm’s observed signals is lower (or higher) than a threshold, uninformative non-greenwashing (both unintentional and uninformative non-greenwashing) PBEs arise, and the threshold increases in the FCB penalty. (3) A strict FCB regulatory policy and a high level of efficiency (regarding the firm’s greenness information acquisition) can (together) rule out greenwashing; the threshold of the efficiency of the firm’s greenness information acquisition is independent of the regulatory policy. Managerial implications are also discussed.
- 21 October 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (20) , 13655
Open AccessThe Role of False-Claims Ban Regulation in Greenwashing of Firms with Imprecise Greenness Information
The observation that firms are greenwashing in their advertisements to consumers has attracted regulatory false claim concerns; thus, we built a three-stage game theoretical model to explore how a firm’s efficiency in greenness information acquisition and a false claims ban (FCB) regulatory policy induce greenwashing (non-greenwashing) in the green advertising market. We solved the model with the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Based on the PBEs, we obtained the following results. (1) A FCB regulatory policy is necessary to rule out any intentional greenwashing PBE. (2) In the presence of a strict FCB regulatory policy (with a large enough FCB penalty), if the precision of the firm’s observed signals is lower (or higher) than a threshold, uninformative non-greenwashing (both unintentional and uninformative non-greenwashing) PBEs arise, and the threshold increases in the FCB penalty. (3) A strict FCB regulatory policy and a high level of efficiency (regarding the firm’s greenness information acquisition) can (together) rule out greenwashing; the threshold of the efficiency of the firm’s greenness information acquisition is independent of the regulatory policy. Managerial implications are also discussed.
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 25 (11) , 12569-12595
Influences of mechanisms on investment in renewable energy storage equipment
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 25 (11) , 12569-12595
Influences of mechanisms on investment in renewable energy storage equipment
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in China Economic Review
- Vol. 68
Reciprocity information and wage personalization
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in China Economic Review
- Vol. 68
Reciprocity information and wage personalization
- Open Access
- 14 May 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 12 (10) , 4027
Reciprocity and Veto Power in Relation-Specific Investments: An Experimental Study
Relation-specific investments are usually associated with great risk. Investors, afraid of being held up, are likely to invest too little, endangering both financial and organizational sustainability. Theory suggests that relation-specific investment decisions are mainly affected by potential ex-post bargaining, while experimental evidence shows social-preference-driven thinking affects both investors’ and investees’ behavior. We decompose an experimental hold-up game to identify the effect of reciprocity and the effect of veto power on investees’ transfers. In addition, we investigate the effects of corresponding information disclosures on investors’ performance as possible behavioral remedies to the hold-up problem. We find strong evidence of the effect of reciprocity and reciprocity-related information significantly lower investors’ suboptimal investment. Investors underestimate the effect of reciprocity without related information disclosure. In contrast, we find little evidence of the effect of ex-post veto power on investment decisions. Our results imply that reciprocity-related information disclosure is helpful in promoting both financial and organizational sustainability.
- 14 May 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 12 (10) , 4027
Open AccessReciprocity and Veto Power in Relation-Specific Investments: An Experimental Study
Relation-specific investments are usually associated with great risk. Investors, afraid of being held up, are likely to invest too little, endangering both financial and organizational sustainability. Theory suggests that relation-specific investment decisions are mainly affected by potential ex-post bargaining, while experimental evidence shows social-preference-driven thinking affects both investors’ and investees’ behavior. We decompose an experimental hold-up game to identify the effect of reciprocity and the effect of veto power on investees’ transfers. In addition, we investigate the effects of corresponding information disclosures on investors’ performance as possible behavioral remedies to the hold-up problem. We find strong evidence of the effect of reciprocity and reciprocity-related information significantly lower investors’ suboptimal investment. Investors underestimate the effect of reciprocity without related information disclosure. In contrast, we find little evidence of the effect of ex-post veto power on investment decisions. Our results imply that reciprocity-related information disclosure is helpful in promoting both financial and organizational sustainability.