JFJianchang Fan

Jianchang Fan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jianchang Fan has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Dual-channel supply chain coordination strategies considering electricity quality

    by Wei Chen, Kaiming Zheng, Mengwen Li, Jianchang Fan, Nana Wan, Matthew Quayson

    The introduction of tradable electricity platforms in China has enriched the channels for consumers to purchase electricity and intensified the competition among channels. The quality of electricity is an essential factor affecting consumer purchasing behavior. This paper mainly focuses on the influence of the competition among channels on electricity quality.We construct a dual-channel electricity supply chain, in which electricity generators sell electricity directly to consumers or resell it through electricity retailers. We use the backward induction method of game theory to solve the equilibrium solutions in centralized, decentralized, and coordinated decisions. By analyzing and comparing the equilibrium solutions, we draw the following conclusions; (1) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits increase with the sensitivity coefficient of electricity quality and price competition coefficient. (2) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits decrease with the investment cost coefficient of quality improvement. (3) The increase in transmission and distribution costs reduces the electricity quality while increasing the electricity price through both channels. Furthermore, the increase leads to an increase in electricity demand and the profit of the electricity retailer through the resale channel. However, it reduces the electricity demand and the profit of the electricity generator through the direct sales channel. (4) A combined contract consisting of revenue sharing and quality improvement investment cost-sharing can lead to coordination.


  • Research on corporate social responsibility and product quality in an outsourcing supply chain

    by Hong Dingjun, Fu Hong, Fan Jianchang

    In a supply chain with product outsourcing, it is crucial to identify which firm implements corporate social responsibility (CSR) leads to a higher CSR effort level, a higher product quality level, a higher quantity of outsourced products, and higher profits for supply chain members. In response to this question, we consider a decentralized supply chain with an upstream contract manufacturer (CM) and a downstream original equipment manufacturer (OEM). In this relationship, the downstream OEM outsources the product to the upstream CM and determines the quantity, while the upstream CM produces for the downstream OEM and determines the product quality and the wholesale price. Based on the scenario that each supply chain member can respectively implement the CSR effort (i.e., the CM model and the OEM model), we first investigate the impacts of the CSR demand-sensitivity coefficient, the CSR cost-reducing efficiency, and the CSR effort investment efficiency on the operational decisions and on the profits for supply chain members. Second, we compare the equilibrium results between the CM model and the OEM model. Finally, we study supply chain coordination. We find that (1) an increase in the CSR demand-sensitivity coefficient (the CSR cost-reducing efficiency and the CSR effort investment efficiency) is beneficial to the CSR effort level, the product quality level, the quantity of outsourced products, and the profitability for each supply chain member; (2) the CSR effort level is higher in the CM model than that in the OEM model, which in turn leads to a higher product quality level, a higher quantity of outsourced products, and a higher profitability of supply chain members; and (3) the proposed schemes consisting of quantity discount contracts, CSR effort investment cost sharing contracts, and quality investment cost sharing contracts can effectively coordinate the supply chain.


  • Investment strategy for renewable energy and electricity service quality under different power structures

    by Wei Chen, Jianchang Fan, Hongyan Du, Pingsi Zhong

    This paper investigates and develops an electricity supply chain with an electricity generator and electricity retailer. The electricity generator invests in renewable energy and sells the electricity to the electricity retailer; the retailer then sells the electricity to consumers according to electricity service quality. Three models are considered: the vertical Nash game, the electricity-generator Stackelberg model, and the electricity-retailer Stackelberg model. Finally, the optimal solutions under different power-structure models are compared. Certain conclusions can be drawn from the findings: (1) the highest electricity service quality and renewable energy investment are obtained in the vertical Nash game model, the electricity generator obtains more profits in the electricity-generator Stackelberg model, and the electricity retailer obtains more profits in the electricity-retailer Stackelberg model. (2) The investment in renewable energy in the electricity-generator Stackelberg model is less than that in the electricity-retailer Stackelberg model, and the investment in electricity service quality in the electricity-retailer Stackelberg model is less than that in the electricity-generator Stackelberg model (under certain conditions). (3) Both increasing the electricity service quality sensitivity and renewable energy sensitivity could increase the optimal electricity price, electricity demand, electricity service quality, renewable energy investment, and supply-chain enterprises' profit.