Davide Barrera

Norms are fundamental to social life, but basic questions about how they are affected by social context remain. Specifically, how do normative constraints depend on the presence and status of observers, and how do such relational contingencies vary across cultures? Using data from more than 25,000 individuals across 90 societies, we test several hypotheses linking normative constraints on everyday behaviors (like arguing, laughing, cursing, kissing, and crying), to the presence and status of observers. We find that behaviors widely viewed as appropriate in private become more constrained in the presence of others (an observer effect), and even more so when those others are higher in status (a status effect). Both observer and status effects are culturally universal, but the observer effect shows more variation across cultures. In particular, we find that observer effects are larger in societies that emphasize individualizing moral foundations, that is, avoiding harm and unfairness to others, because these societies are more permissive of actions when others are not around. The relative stability of status effects across cultural contexts suggests a universal tendency to defer in social hierarchies. These findings shed light on the relational contingency of everyday norms and underscore the role of such norms in the maintenance of social order and reproduction of inequality.

Every social situation that people encounter in their daily lives comes with a set of unwritten rules about what behavior is considered appropriate or inappropriate. These everyday norms can vary across societies: some societies may have more permissive norms in general or for certain behaviors, or for certain behaviors in specific situations. In a preregistered survey of 25,422 participants across 90 societies, we map societal differences in 150 everyday norms and show that they can be explained by how societies prioritize individualizing moral foundations such as care and liberty versus binding moral foundations such as purity. Specifically, societies with more individualistic morality tend to have more permissive norms in general (greater liberty) and especially for behaviors deemed vulgar (less purity), but they exhibit less permissive norms for behaviors perceived to have negative consequences in specific situations (greater care). By comparing our data with available data collected twenty years ago, we find a global pattern of change toward more permissive norms overall but less permissive norms for the most vulgar and inconsiderate behaviors. This study explains how social norms vary across behaviors, situations, societies, and time.

Depression in adolescents has been linked to poor life outcomes, including suicidal ideation, peer victimization, and fewer friendships. Less is known about how depressed adolescents perceive their peer interactions. Based on the depression-distortion model, we expected that adolescents with depressive symptoms misperceive their social ties by being less likely to like some peers, and more likely to dislike other peers. An Italian dataset about adolescent relationships was used, including 275 first-year secondary school students (M age = 11.80, 46% female) in 12 classrooms across nine schools. Adolescents were asked to nominate classmates they liked and disliked. Longitudinal social network analyses (stochastic actor-oriented models) were conducted, including structural network effects (reciprocity, transitivity, indegree-popularity) and covariates such as gender, immigrant origin, and highest parents’ education level. The results indicated that adolescents with depressive symptoms were less likely to send liking nominations, and conversely, they were more likely to send disliking nominations than non-depressed classmates. Interestingly, adolescents with depressive symptoms were not more disliked or less liked by their peers. These findings seem to support the depression-distortion model by suggesting that, compared to non-depressed peers, adolescents with depressive symptoms misperceive their relationships by overstating negative relationships and underestimating positive ones.

The emergence of COVID-19 dramatically changed social behavior across societies and contexts. Here we study whether social norms also changed. Specifically, we study this question for cultural tightness (the degree to which societies generally have strong norms), specific social norms (e.g. stealing, hand washing), and norms about enforcement, using survey data from 30,431 respondents in 43 countries recorded before and in the early stages following the emergence of COVID-19. Using variation in disease intensity, we shed light on the mechanisms predicting changes in social norm measures. We find evidence that, after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, hand washing norms increased while tightness and punishing frequency slightly decreased but observe no evidence for a robust change in most other norms. Thus, at least in the short term, our findings suggest that cultures are largely stable to pandemic threats except in those norms, hand washing in this case, that are perceived to be directly relevant to dealing with the collective threat.

Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.

This study examined whether teachers’ perceptions of students’ behavior (referring to halo effects) and the behavior of teacher‐perceived friends (referring to association effects) influenced teachers’ ability to recognize students identified as bullies, victims, and prosocial by their peers. Data came from 1,458 children (M_age = 10.5, 47.5% girls) and 56 teachers (M_age = 40.8, 66.1% females). Perceived likeability was associated with decreased odds and teachers’ perceptions of popularity and externalizing behavior were associated with increased odds for teacher attunement to bullying. Perceived likeability and affiliation were associated with decreased odds for teacher attunement to victimized students. Teachers’ perceptions of externalizing behavior were associated with decreased odds, whereas teachers’ perceptions of affiliation and academic competence were associated with increased odds for attunement to prosociality. Finally, a positive association was found between teacher attunement and the average behavior of teacher‐perceived friends for bullying, victimization, and prosociality.

Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors individually decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors collectively agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and 48 Nynke van Miltenburg et al. higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.