Quan Zheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Quan Zheng has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xiajun Amy Pan
Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611
5 shared publications Shichang Li
4 shared publicationsDuo Shi
2 shared publications- Honggang Hu
Advanced Institute of Business, School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai, China
2 shared publications Jie Wu
2 shared publicationsJingchuan Pu
Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Pricing with Customer (Internal vs External) Purchase Records
Problem Definition: Firms increasingly use customer purchase-record information to implement price discrimination. Some firms adopt a moderate acquisition strategy, relying only on their internal purchase records to distinguish first-time from repurchasing customers, while others pursue a more aggressive strategy by further tracking customers' external purchase records with rivals and offering tailored discounts to competitors' customers. These observations raise a fundamental question: in competitive markets, what drives firms to adopt different purchase record acquisition strategies? Methodology/Results: We develop a stylized two-period model in which two firms compete, products are horizontally differentiated, and customers make purchases in both periods. Firms determine their strategies for acquiring customer purchase records: no acquisition, internal acquisition, or external acquisition; each acquisition strategy corresponds to a different pricing approach. We show that purchase-record acquisition has a non-monotonic effect on firms' competitive dynamics. In particular, while the transition from no acquisition to internal acquisition softens price competition, the transition from internal acquisition to external acquisition intensifies price competition. In equilibrium, we identify customer farsightedness as a key driver of firms' acquisition strategies. Both firms choose to acquire only internal records when customers are mildly farsighted, whereas they acquire external records from each other when customers are highly farsighted. When customer farsightedness falls within an intermediate range, the two firms adopt asymmetric acquisition strategies---one acquires internal records while the other acquires external records---despite being ex ante symmetric. This differentiation leads the two firms to reward different customer types and derive their profits primarily from different periods. Managerial Implications: Aggressively acquiring customers' purchase records from rivals does not necessarily generate higher profits, and acquiring only internal records can be rewarding. When facing a rival's internal or external acquisition strategy, a firm can respond with an alternative strategy, which mitigates competition and enables both firms to extract customer surplus at different stages of the customer lifecycle.
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPricing with Customer (Internal vs External) Purchase Records
Problem Definition: Firms increasingly use customer purchase-record information to implement price discrimination. Some firms adopt a moderate acquisition strategy, relying only on their internal purchase records to distinguish first-time from repurchasing customers, while others pursue a more aggressive strategy by further tracking customers' external purchase records with rivals and offering tailored discounts to competitors' customers. These observations raise a fundamental question: in competitive markets, what drives firms to adopt different purchase record acquisition strategies? Methodology/Results: We develop a stylized two-period model in which two firms compete, products are horizontally differentiated, and customers make purchases in both periods. Firms determine their strategies for acquiring customer purchase records: no acquisition, internal acquisition, or external acquisition; each acquisition strategy corresponds to a different pricing approach. We show that purchase-record acquisition has a non-monotonic effect on firms' competitive dynamics. In particular, while the transition from no acquisition to internal acquisition softens price competition, the transition from internal acquisition to external acquisition intensifies price competition. In equilibrium, we identify customer farsightedness as a key driver of firms' acquisition strategies. Both firms choose to acquire only internal records when customers are mildly farsighted, whereas they acquire external records from each other when customers are highly farsighted. When customer farsightedness falls within an intermediate range, the two firms adopt asymmetric acquisition strategies---one acquires internal records while the other acquires external records---despite being ex ante symmetric. This differentiation leads the two firms to reward different customer types and derive their profits primarily from different periods. Managerial Implications: Aggressively acquiring customers' purchase records from rivals does not necessarily generate higher profits, and acquiring only internal records can be rewarding. When facing a rival's internal or external acquisition strategy, a firm can respond with an alternative strategy, which mitigates competition and enables both firms to extract customer surplus at different stages of the customer lifecycle.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (9) , 3292-3311
Pricing Limited Capacity Under Consumer Deliberation
The pricing of limited capacity is a pivotal issue in many business contexts such as event ticket sales and online flash sales. Prior studies overlook consumer deliberation behavior in the presence of supply limits, leading to ineffective pricing decisions. This motivates investigation of consumer deliberation behavior under supply limits, and the capacity-constrained firm’s pricing and operational strategies. We first show that severe supply limits inhibit consumers’ costly deliberation, while moderate supply limits enhance consumer deliberation as the availability enhancement effect of deliberation reaches its highest potency. Accordingly, the firm with intermediate capacity tends to adopt a normal pricing strategy, that is, pricing as in the market of informed consumers. However, when the capacity is relatively low (sufficiently high), the firm can charge a relatively high (low) price to induce (deter) consumer deliberation, that is, transgressive (regressive) pricing; when the capacity is sufficiently low, the firm should adopt a prior value pricing strategy because consumers never deliberate. Second, on the supply side, it is not always necessary to fully utilize the limited capacity in supplying products, and for firms with high capacity, a low-quality strategy may be preferable even if quality improvement is costless. Finally, extensions to imperfect learning and heterogeneous deliberation costs show the robustness of our baseline model and offer new insights. Interestingly, the presence of demand uncertainty may benefit firms. Our study sheds light on the pricing of limited capacity and elucidates several strategic decisions when considering consumer deliberation behavior.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (9) , 3292-3311
Pricing Limited Capacity Under Consumer Deliberation
The pricing of limited capacity is a pivotal issue in many business contexts such as event ticket sales and online flash sales. Prior studies overlook consumer deliberation behavior in the presence of supply limits, leading to ineffective pricing decisions. This motivates investigation of consumer deliberation behavior under supply limits, and the capacity-constrained firm’s pricing and operational strategies. We first show that severe supply limits inhibit consumers’ costly deliberation, while moderate supply limits enhance consumer deliberation as the availability enhancement effect of deliberation reaches its highest potency. Accordingly, the firm with intermediate capacity tends to adopt a normal pricing strategy, that is, pricing as in the market of informed consumers. However, when the capacity is relatively low (sufficiently high), the firm can charge a relatively high (low) price to induce (deter) consumer deliberation, that is, transgressive (regressive) pricing; when the capacity is sufficiently low, the firm should adopt a prior value pricing strategy because consumers never deliberate. Second, on the supply side, it is not always necessary to fully utilize the limited capacity in supplying products, and for firms with high capacity, a low-quality strategy may be preferable even if quality improvement is costless. Finally, extensions to imperfect learning and heterogeneous deliberation costs show the robustness of our baseline model and offer new insights. Interestingly, the presence of demand uncertainty may benefit firms. Our study sheds light on the pricing of limited capacity and elucidates several strategic decisions when considering consumer deliberation behavior.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Pricing Limited Capacity under Consumer Deliberation
The pricing of limited capacity is a pivotal issue in many business contexts such as event ticket sales and online flash sales. Prior studies overlook consumer deliberation behavior in the presence of supply limits, leading to ineffective pricing decisions. This motivates investigation of consumer deliberation behavior under supply limits, and the capacity-constrained firm's pricing and operational strategies. We first show that severe supply limits inhibit consumers' costly deliberation, while moderate supply limits enhance consumer deliberation as the availability enhancement effect of deliberation reaches its highest potency. Accordingly, the firm with intermediate capacity tends to adopt a normal pricing strategy, i.e., pricing as in the market of informed consumers. However, when the capacity is relatively low (sufficiently high), the firm can charge a relatively high (low) price to induce (deter) consumer deliberation, i.e., transgressive (regressive) pricing; when the capacity is sufficiently low, the firm should adopt a prior value pricing strategy because consumers never deliberate. Second, on the supply side, it is not always necessary to fully utilize the limited capacity in supplying products, and for firms with high capacity, a low-quality strategy may be preferable even if quality improvement is costless. Finally, extensions to imperfect learning and heterogeneous deliberation costs show the robustness of our baseline model and offer new insights. Interestingly, the presence of demand uncertainty may benefit firms. Our study sheds light on the pricing of limited capacity and elucidates several strategic decisions when considering consumer deliberation behavior.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPricing Limited Capacity under Consumer Deliberation
The pricing of limited capacity is a pivotal issue in many business contexts such as event ticket sales and online flash sales. Prior studies overlook consumer deliberation behavior in the presence of supply limits, leading to ineffective pricing decisions. This motivates investigation of consumer deliberation behavior under supply limits, and the capacity-constrained firm's pricing and operational strategies. We first show that severe supply limits inhibit consumers' costly deliberation, while moderate supply limits enhance consumer deliberation as the availability enhancement effect of deliberation reaches its highest potency. Accordingly, the firm with intermediate capacity tends to adopt a normal pricing strategy, i.e., pricing as in the market of informed consumers. However, when the capacity is relatively low (sufficiently high), the firm can charge a relatively high (low) price to induce (deter) consumer deliberation, i.e., transgressive (regressive) pricing; when the capacity is sufficiently low, the firm should adopt a prior value pricing strategy because consumers never deliberate. Second, on the supply side, it is not always necessary to fully utilize the limited capacity in supplying products, and for firms with high capacity, a low-quality strategy may be preferable even if quality improvement is costless. Finally, extensions to imperfect learning and heterogeneous deliberation costs show the robustness of our baseline model and offer new insights. Interestingly, the presence of demand uncertainty may benefit firms. Our study sheds light on the pricing of limited capacity and elucidates several strategic decisions when considering consumer deliberation behavior.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (1) , 153-171
Ad Blockers and Ad Quality
Problem definition: There has been a fierce debate among practitioners regarding ad blockers. On one hand, ad blockers are considered a serious threat to content platforms because advertising is a key revenue driver. On the other hand, people argue that ad blockers improve the advertising industry by pushing the creation of more attractive ads. This paper investigates the impact of ad blockers on a content platform when the advertiser’s ad quality decision is taken into account. Methodology/results: We develop an analytical model with an advertiser, a content platform, and a mass of consumers. Consumer valuations of advertising involve three aspects: information value—the knowledge about product attributes, entertainment value—the engaging text/image/video included, and nuisance disvalue—the interruption caused during content consumption. The advertiser can invest in ad quality to enhance its ad’s entertainment value. Consumers are classified into effective and ineffective types based on whether they derive information value and potentially purchase the advertised product. We identify two effects of ad blockers: the consumer screening effect filters out ineffective consumers who cannot generate revenue for the advertiser; the quality adjustment effect may induce the advertiser to improve ad quality to better serve effective consumers. As a result of these two effects, the presence of ad blockers can lead to a win-win-win outcome for all parties. This occurs if nuisance disvalue is high with intermediate information value or if nuisance disvalue is low and effective consumers are few. We further examine six extensions that reflect various industry structures and market microdynamics to demonstrate generalizability of the all-win outcome. Managerial implications: Advertisers and content platforms should manage ad blockers strategically, which possibly makes the system more efficient and benefits every stakeholder. Always opposing ad blockers is not the best solution, and permission should be given, particularly when the ad features a highly interruptive format (e.g., embedded videos) but provides consumers with some useful product knowledge, or when the audience contains few potential buyers and the ad format is mildly interruptive (e.g., texts only). Grant: The work of J. Li was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72501063] and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities in UIBE [Grant 24QD13], the work of Q. Zheng was supported by the Major Program of NSFC [Grants 72091210/72091215], the work of J. Wu was supported by the National Natural Science Funds of China [Grants 72371232, 71971203, 72188101], and the work of D. Shi was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72102205]. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0377 .
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (1) , 153-171
Ad Blockers and Ad Quality
Problem definition: There has been a fierce debate among practitioners regarding ad blockers. On one hand, ad blockers are considered a serious threat to content platforms because advertising is a key revenue driver. On the other hand, people argue that ad blockers improve the advertising industry by pushing the creation of more attractive ads. This paper investigates the impact of ad blockers on a content platform when the advertiser’s ad quality decision is taken into account. Methodology/results: We develop an analytical model with an advertiser, a content platform, and a mass of consumers. Consumer valuations of advertising involve three aspects: information value—the knowledge about product attributes, entertainment value—the engaging text/image/video included, and nuisance disvalue—the interruption caused during content consumption. The advertiser can invest in ad quality to enhance its ad’s entertainment value. Consumers are classified into effective and ineffective types based on whether they derive information value and potentially purchase the advertised product. We identify two effects of ad blockers: the consumer screening effect filters out ineffective consumers who cannot generate revenue for the advertiser; the quality adjustment effect may induce the advertiser to improve ad quality to better serve effective consumers. As a result of these two effects, the presence of ad blockers can lead to a win-win-win outcome for all parties. This occurs if nuisance disvalue is high with intermediate information value or if nuisance disvalue is low and effective consumers are few. We further examine six extensions that reflect various industry structures and market microdynamics to demonstrate generalizability of the all-win outcome. Managerial implications: Advertisers and content platforms should manage ad blockers strategically, which possibly makes the system more efficient and benefits every stakeholder. Always opposing ad blockers is not the best solution, and permission should be given, particularly when the ad features a highly interruptive format (e.g., embedded videos) but provides consumers with some useful product knowledge, or when the audience contains few potential buyers and the ad format is mildly interruptive (e.g., texts only). Grant: The work of J. Li was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72501063] and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities in UIBE [Grant 24QD13], the work of Q. Zheng was supported by the Major Program of NSFC [Grants 72091210/72091215], the work of J. Wu was supported by the National Natural Science Funds of China [Grants 72371232, 71971203, 72188101], and the work of D. Shi was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72102205]. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0377 .
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 44 (3) , 725-727
Commentary on “Pricing Prototypical Products”
This work corrects errors in a paper by Amaldoss and He in Marketing Science, and reveals the important impact of prototypicality on multiproduct competition.
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 44 (3) , 725-727
Commentary on “Pricing Prototypical Products”
This work corrects errors in a paper by Amaldoss and He in Marketing Science, and reveals the important impact of prototypicality on multiproduct competition.
- 25 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (11) , 3475-3492
Channel Pricing: A Retail Pass-Through Perspective
The concept of retail pass-through, including own-brand and cross-brand pass-throughs, is critical for channel management strategies. With a classical common retailer channel, our paper provides a novel perspective on channel pricing through the lens of retail pass-through, synthesizing and extending the existing results. By employing the conduct parameter approach, our study identifies two important driving forces behind channel pricing strategies: vertical strategic effect and competition moderation effect . In a symmetric setting, extant research has sidestepped the (upstream) competition moderation effect stemming from the retailer’s various cross-brand pass-through behaviors by assuming symmetric-at-symmetric prices. However, we find that this horizontal effect can outperform the previously esteemed vertical strategic effect, and the relative strength between the two forces is the key to formulating optimal channel pricing decisions. We apply the unifying framework to two well-known strategic questions in channel pricing—channel price leadership and product line pricing—leading to results qualitatively different from the literature. Our study not only emphasizes the necessity to account for both vertical and horizontal effects in channel analysis but also calls for practitioners in channel management to recognize the crucial role of cross-brand pass-through behavior in determining optimal channel pricing policy.
- 25 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (11) , 3475-3492
Channel Pricing: A Retail Pass-Through Perspective
The concept of retail pass-through, including own-brand and cross-brand pass-throughs, is critical for channel management strategies. With a classical common retailer channel, our paper provides a novel perspective on channel pricing through the lens of retail pass-through, synthesizing and extending the existing results. By employing the conduct parameter approach, our study identifies two important driving forces behind channel pricing strategies: vertical strategic effect and competition moderation effect . In a symmetric setting, extant research has sidestepped the (upstream) competition moderation effect stemming from the retailer’s various cross-brand pass-through behaviors by assuming symmetric-at-symmetric prices. However, we find that this horizontal effect can outperform the previously esteemed vertical strategic effect, and the relative strength between the two forces is the key to formulating optimal channel pricing decisions. We apply the unifying framework to two well-known strategic questions in channel pricing—channel price leadership and product line pricing—leading to results qualitatively different from the literature. Our study not only emphasizes the necessity to account for both vertical and horizontal effects in channel analysis but also calls for practitioners in channel management to recognize the crucial role of cross-brand pass-through behavior in determining optimal channel pricing policy.
- 24 March 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (9) , 2758-2774
Supplier Encroachment Through Online Marketplaces
Currently, major online retail platforms, such as Amazon and JD, provide both conventional reselling channels and online marketplaces (i.e., agency channels), enabling their suppliers to encroach more efficiently than the traditional self-established direct channel. We construct a parsimonious model of a bilateral monopoly supply chain where the supplier can encroach through online marketplaces as both reselling and agency channels are available. Surprisingly, the encroachment option does not necessarily benefit the supplier. Unlike the traditional supplier encroachment literature, the supplier now always prefers simultaneous ordering, suggesting that more information can hurt the supplier. We further characterize the retailer’s channel offering strategy and identify a win-win region where both firms prefer encroachment (i.e., the hybrid mode). Our work provides a guideline for supplier encroachment in the era of dominant platforms and sheds light on its impact on vertical channel relationships.
- 24 March 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (9) , 2758-2774
Supplier Encroachment Through Online Marketplaces
Currently, major online retail platforms, such as Amazon and JD, provide both conventional reselling channels and online marketplaces (i.e., agency channels), enabling their suppliers to encroach more efficiently than the traditional self-established direct channel. We construct a parsimonious model of a bilateral monopoly supply chain where the supplier can encroach through online marketplaces as both reselling and agency channels are available. Surprisingly, the encroachment option does not necessarily benefit the supplier. Unlike the traditional supplier encroachment literature, the supplier now always prefers simultaneous ordering, suggesting that more information can hurt the supplier. We further characterize the retailer’s channel offering strategy and identify a win-win region where both firms prefer encroachment (i.e., the hybrid mode). Our work provides a guideline for supplier encroachment in the era of dominant platforms and sheds light on its impact on vertical channel relationships.
- 28 April 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 33 (6) , 1320-1334
Wholesale Price Discrimination and Contract Unobservability
This study examines how wholesale price discrimination (WD) by a supplier affects different parties in a supply chain involving a common supplier distributing homogeneous products through two competing retailers with different costs under wholesale price contracts. Especially, we allow for contract unobservability, where the contract terms between the supplier and each retailer are secret to the rival retailer. Intuitively, given the downstream asymmetry, WD should be more advantageous than the uniform wholesale price (UW) scheme for the supplier. This is true under observable contracts, as we show that WD benefits the supplier and less efficient retailer but hurts the more efficient retailer, supply chain, and consumers. Under unobservability, however, we find that the supplier may be better off by committing to UW. The intuition is that contract unobservability induces the supplier to set lower discretionary wholesale prices, which can outweigh the benefits of pricing flexibility. Consequently, a lack of commitment to UW can benefit both retailers, improve supply chain efficiency, and increase consumer surplus. Our findings suggest that policymakers should be cautious about imposing restrictions on WD. We also consider three extensions for robustness and offer new insights.
- 28 April 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 33 (6) , 1320-1334
Wholesale Price Discrimination and Contract Unobservability
This study examines how wholesale price discrimination (WD) by a supplier affects different parties in a supply chain involving a common supplier distributing homogeneous products through two competing retailers with different costs under wholesale price contracts. Especially, we allow for contract unobservability, where the contract terms between the supplier and each retailer are secret to the rival retailer. Intuitively, given the downstream asymmetry, WD should be more advantageous than the uniform wholesale price (UW) scheme for the supplier. This is true under observable contracts, as we show that WD benefits the supplier and less efficient retailer but hurts the more efficient retailer, supply chain, and consumers. Under unobservability, however, we find that the supplier may be better off by committing to UW. The intuition is that contract unobservability induces the supplier to set lower discretionary wholesale prices, which can outweigh the benefits of pricing flexibility. Consequently, a lack of commitment to UW can benefit both retailers, improve supply chain efficiency, and increase consumer surplus. Our findings suggest that policymakers should be cautious about imposing restrictions on WD. We also consider three extensions for robustness and offer new insights.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Commentary on "Pricing Prototypical Products"
The article by Amaldoss and He [Amaldoss W, He C (2013) Pricing prototypical products. Marketing Science. 32(5): 733-752.] investigates how prototypicality changes the competitive behavior of firms in a horizontally differentiated market. Their study extends the spokes model by considering the asymmetry between the prototypical and nonprototypical products in terms of the probabilities of being included in consumers' consideration sets. Their analyses show that when consumer valuations are low (moderately high), the prototypical product charges a lower (higher) price than a nonprototypical product. However, the asymmetric probabilities are overlooked when characterizing the demand for the prototypical product. With the correct demand function, we show that whether the prototypical product is priced lower depends on consumer valuations as well as the level of prototypicality, and the prototypical product can charge a lower price even when consumer valuations are moderately high. One should use extra caution when characterizing demands in the spokes model with asymmetric probabilities.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCommentary on "Pricing Prototypical Products"
The article by Amaldoss and He [Amaldoss W, He C (2013) Pricing prototypical products. Marketing Science. 32(5): 733-752.] investigates how prototypicality changes the competitive behavior of firms in a horizontally differentiated market. Their study extends the spokes model by considering the asymmetry between the prototypical and nonprototypical products in terms of the probabilities of being included in consumers' consideration sets. Their analyses show that when consumer valuations are low (moderately high), the prototypical product charges a lower (higher) price than a nonprototypical product. However, the asymmetric probabilities are overlooked when characterizing the demand for the prototypical product. With the correct demand function, we show that whether the prototypical product is priced lower depends on consumer valuations as well as the level of prototypicality, and the prototypical product can charge a lower price even when consumer valuations are moderately high. One should use extra caution when characterizing demands in the spokes model with asymmetric probabilities.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1636-1653
Implications of product substitutability in a distribution channel
This paper examines the effect of product substitutability on the equilibrium profits in a distribution channel of two symmetric manufacturers selling substitutable products to consumers through a nonexclusive retailer. Conventional wisdom suggests that when the products are more substitutable, the retailer will be better off while the manufacturers will be worse off, owing to the dominance of the competition effect of substitutability. In this work, we identify the hitherto neglected demand effect of substitutability and show that the relative strength between the competition and demand effects is the key to this result. As the products become more substitutable, the upstream competition does intensify, but vitally, the demand may expand. We show that the interests of the retailer and manufacturers can be aligned in terms of product substitutability, depending on both the demand and supply factors. Surprisingly, the conventional result can even be completely reversed such that the manufacturers benefit from a certain level of substitutability for some demand patterns. Assuming linear demand, we further isolate the important role of the bargaining power balance and the alternative of agency selling format in moderating the competition effect. For example, as the retailer gains more bargaining power, the (negative) demand effect can overshadow the (positive) competition effect such that a higher degree of substitutability can actually hurt the retailer. Our findings provide valuable implications for persuasive advertising and category management.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1636-1653
Implications of product substitutability in a distribution channel
This paper examines the effect of product substitutability on the equilibrium profits in a distribution channel of two symmetric manufacturers selling substitutable products to consumers through a nonexclusive retailer. Conventional wisdom suggests that when the products are more substitutable, the retailer will be better off while the manufacturers will be worse off, owing to the dominance of the competition effect of substitutability. In this work, we identify the hitherto neglected demand effect of substitutability and show that the relative strength between the competition and demand effects is the key to this result. As the products become more substitutable, the upstream competition does intensify, but vitally, the demand may expand. We show that the interests of the retailer and manufacturers can be aligned in terms of product substitutability, depending on both the demand and supply factors. Surprisingly, the conventional result can even be completely reversed such that the manufacturers benefit from a certain level of substitutability for some demand patterns. Assuming linear demand, we further isolate the important role of the bargaining power balance and the alternative of agency selling format in moderating the competition effect. For example, as the retailer gains more bargaining power, the (negative) demand effect can overshadow the (positive) competition effect such that a higher degree of substitutability can actually hurt the retailer. Our findings provide valuable implications for persuasive advertising and category management.