KHKurt Houlberg

Kurt Houlberg

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Kurt Houlberg has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Hidden Side of Political Budget Cycles: Within‐Year Electioneering

    by Kurt Houlberg, Poul Erik Mouritzen

    Vote‐maximizing politicians have incentives to create political budget cycles (PBC) in public policy to meet the voters with the most favorable conditions on election day. Studies at the local level generally support the theory as local politicians tend to relax fiscal policies at the time of elections and build up a fiscal surplus in the midterm years. However, the literature seems to assume that electoral cycles are planned when the budgets are approved. We argue that cycles may also arise by activating fiscal instruments during the budget year, that is, in the implementation of the planned budget. Based on a unique set of panel data on Danish municipalities' fiscal policies across four full election periods, we systematically find that local governments relax fiscal policies the closer they get to an election, and that the cyclical fluctuations are created by a mix of expenditure and revenue cycles. However, the main contribution to the political budget cycle literature is the finding that “electioneering” of fiscal policies is created by a combination of budgeted (planned) expenditure increases in the post‐election year budget and (unplanned) supplementary appropriations during the election year.

  • Open Access

    Reducing horizontal neglect in local government: The role of informal institutions

    by Jostein Askim, Kurt Houlberg, Søren Serritzlew

    The problem of “horizontal neglect” is fundamental to decentralization. However, while individual local authorities may lack incentives to consider the benefits and costs that their actions have on others, they are not always indifferent to these spillover effects. The study focuses on a clear case of horizontal neglect, namely the tendency of local authorities to overspend prior to merging. By employing a survey experiment involving Norwegian local elected officials, the article demonstrates that horizontal neglect can be alleviated through informal institutions, specifically through prosocial norms and the framing of decisions in a way that encourages officials to consider the impact on other jurisdictions. Priming local politicians with reminders of their broader responsibilities reduces both horizontal neglect and the overspending effect of social norms that stem from local politicians’ opposition to the merger of their own municipality.


  • The relationship between market capacity and local governments’ choice of voucher model

    by Søren Kjær Foged, Kurt Houlberg, Jacob Ladenburg, Jeppe Elholm Madsen

  • Open Access

    Local government amalgamations and pre-merger overspending: Central naivety meets local opportunism

    by Jostein Askim, Kurt Houlberg, Jan Erling Klausen

    Amalgamation of local governments is an incentive for pre-merger overspending as the costs are transferred to the merged unit of the future. The article updates application of the common pool theory to such opportunistic pre-merger behavior. It studies Norway’s reform of the 2010s and paints a uniquely nuanced picture of pre-merger overspending, comparing fiscal policies before and after enactment of the reform among merging and non-merging municipalities. It provides corroboration that local governments that are about to merge overspend prior to the merger. New insights are gained into local governments’ differential incentives to allocate overspending to capital or current expenditure, and their opportunities to act on these incentives in the final and penultimate years before mergers are implemented. New insights are also gained into the differential incentive structures of junior and senior partners to a merger. Juniors overspend the most on current expenditure, while junior and senior partners overspend equally on capital expenditure. These insights not only have theoretical value but also practical applications.


  • “Top-down” local government mergers: Political and institutional factors facilitating radical amalgamation reforms

    by Mark Callanan, Kurt Houlberg, Ringa Raudla, Filipe Teles

    Why are some countries able to go ahead with comprehensive top-down local government amalgamation reforms, despite the many challenges such a reform entails? So far, we have limited theoretical and empirical understanding of how central governments manage to adopt such reforms. Drawing on different theoretical frameworks around public policy as well as research into territorial reforms, this article presents key political and institutional factors that are likely to facilitate top-down municipal mergers and examines whether these theoretical propositions help to explain the adoption of comprehensive top-down municipal amalgamation in four cases: Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, and Portugal. Key political and institutional factors identified in existing frameworks provide a useful starting point for understanding and explaining top-down comprehensive municipal amalgamation reforms, such as the role played by the breaking up of existing policy monopolies and emergence of new venues for discussing the reform. At the same time, the cases also reveal some important nuances that at times run counter to theoretical expectations. Our cases also reveal further factors, including the “bundling” of amalgamation reforms with other wider initiatives, and the potential effect of “distracting events” that should be taken into account in the further development of theoretical frameworks concerning top-down amalgamations.


  • Open Access

    The administrative burden of doing business with the government: Learning and compliance costs in Business‐Government interactions

    by Ole Helby Petersen, Jesper Rosenberg Hansen, Kurt Houlberg

    Administrative burdens are widespread and likely to generate unequal opportunities in access to government programs and other important entitlements. Whereas a large body of research has examined administrative burdens in citizen‐state encounters, little is known either theoretically or empirically about burdens in business–government interactions. In this article, we argue that private businesses, just like individual citizens, experience administrative burdens in encounters with the government, and that these burdens are the result of bureaucratic procedures as well as the administrative capital resources in the businesses themselves. We present empirical evidence from an original study of Danish businesses' learning and compliance costs in government purchasing contracts. The findings suggest that businesses' learning and compliance costs are shaped more by bureaucratic procedures and requirements than by the administrative capital resources businesses can mobilize in response. We propose steps governments can take to reduce administrative burdens and harness public values in business‐government interactions.


  • The Moderating Effects of Social Norms on Pre-merger Overspending: Results from a Survey Experiment

    by Jostein Askim, Kurt Houlberg

    The proposition that amalgamation reforms lead to a common-pool problem is strongly supported; governments are incentivized to overspend before the merger is implemented. However, existing literature helps little in understanding why some governments do not overspend in the pre-merger period, and why hoarders do not overspend more than they do. One explanation hitherto overlooked is the moderating effect of social norms. Two hypotheses regarding the importance of social norms are tested with data from a survey experiment conducted on over 3,000 Norwegian local elected officials. The analysis supports both: Support for hoarding is lower when hoarding is debt-financed than when financed by savings. Support for hoarding is also lower when others in the amalgamation are anticipated not to hoard than when they are. That pre-merger hoarding varies with different levels of social obligations vis-à-vis the amalgamation has implications for common-pool theory and for reformers of the structure of government.


  • The economic costs of voucher markets for public service provision

    by Søren Kjær Foged, Kurt Houlberg

    Voucher markets where governments subsidise the consumers of public services to give them a free choice of service provider are implemented by public authorities as a means to reap the supposed benefits of competition and choice. Such voucher markets imply economic costs for the public authority in the form of transaction costs, e.g., for preparation of quality standards and information material as well as approval, coordination and supervision of providers. However, voucher markets may also affect the public authority’s production costs through a competitive pressure for increased efficiency and/or by affecting the potential economies of scale for public service delivery. This article shows that in a voucher market without price competition voucher markets increase the public production costs of delivering home help services. Specifically, the larger the share of elderly persons who choose a private provider, the higher the public costs of delivering practical home help.


  • Where do municipal mergers occur?

    by Paweł Swianiewicz, Adam Gendźwiłł, Kurt Houlberg, Jan Erling Klausen

    This chapter identifies the patterns of reform occurrence and intensity in countries with different institutional settings for territorial choice. The main assumption is that the type of setting serves as a moderator for political agency. In countries with localised settings, territorial changes were visibly less frequent than in those with nationalised and regionalised settings. Amongst countries with nationalised settings, where the decision-making is centralised, the amalgamation reforms were predominantly more intense. In all countries that combined a national institutional setting and a high level of fragmentation at the outset (small and very small municipalities), there has been an amalgamation reform of greater or lesser intensity in the last two decades. The relationship between fiscal stress (crisis) and municipal mergers is not very systematic: a substantial recession preceded municipal mergers in only six countries with nationalised settings and one country with a localised setting.

  • Patterns of conflicts

    by Paweł Swianiewicz, Adam Gendźwiłł, Kurt Houlberg, Jan Erling Klausen

    This chapter explores the intensity and dimensions of conflict in countries of amalgamation reforms. Territorial reforms are politically demanding ventures that typically activate intense political conflicts over the very need for reform, as well as over the content, process and implementation of the reform. In most countries, amalgamation reforms activate high-intensity reform conflicts that unfold in the primary action arena for deciding on amalgamations, which in turn is set by the institutional rules for territorial change. Amalgamation reforms invoke multidimensional conflicts. Across different types of countries, political–ideological and centre–periphery cleavages are the most important dimensions of conflict. However, cleavages between central and local governments, as well as conflicts between large and small entities, are also widespread. The institutional rules for territorial change shape the relative importance of conflict dimensions, as centre–periphery conflicts are aroused to a larger extent in localised rather than non-localised countries. In non-localised institutional settings, conflicts are more likely to unfold between a national/regional government that constitutes the primary action arena for territorial change and the local governments affected by the upper-tier decisions.