Andrzej Skrzypacz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Andrzej Skrzypacz has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Joseph E. Harrington
Johns Hopkins University;
1 shared publication - Matthew F. Mitchell
Department of Economics, Henry B Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA
1 shared publication - Yossi Feinberg
Stanford University
1 shared publication - Yuliy Sannikov
Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544‐1021, U.S.A.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 78 (3) , 847-882
The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two-player games in which information arrives via a continuous-time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 78 (3) , 847-882
The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two-player games in which information arrives via a continuous-time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 38 (2) , 314-331
Collusion under monitoring of sales
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms' prices are private information and their quantities are public information; such an information structure is consistent with several recent price‐fixing cartels, such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric oligopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas. In practice, cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members.
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 38 (2) , 314-331
Collusion under monitoring of sales
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms' prices are private information and their quantities are public information; such an information structure is consistent with several recent price‐fixing cartels, such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric oligopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas. In practice, cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members.
- 5 November 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 29 (3) , 621-648
Network externalities and long-run market shares
- 5 November 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 29 (3) , 621-648
Network externalities and long-run market shares
- 1 January 2005
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 73 (1) , 69-91
Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
- 1 January 2005
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 73 (1) , 69-91
Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining