Jacob Nyrup
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jacob Nyrup has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael Bang Petersen
Aarhus University
2 shared publications - Stuart Bramwell
Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom
2 shared publications - Carl Henrik Knutsen
University of Oslo
1 shared publication - Hikaru Yamagishi
Harvard University, United States
1 shared publication - Ina Lyftingsmo Kristiansen
University of Oslo
1 shared publication - Jonas Willibald Schmid
University of Oslo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Which Governments are most Representative?
Descriptive representation is a cornerstone of modern democratic ideals, yet we know relatively little about the extent to which governments reflect the demographics of the populations they serve. Combining the novel Paths to Power dataset on the backgrounds of cabinet members worldwide with matched population data, we measure representativeness on five key dimensions: gender, age, education, occupational class, and geographic origin. We propose a theoretical model to explain the degree of representation in government and focus on two explanations, namely economic development and democratization. We first document global and historical levels of representativeness. Next, we compile covariates from the literature and use machine learning methods to show that GDP per capita and experience with democracy are the best predictors of representativeness. We then show that wealthier, more democratic countries have more representative governments and, crucially, that as countries grow richer and more democratic, their governments become more representative in turn.
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhich Governments are most Representative?
Descriptive representation is a cornerstone of modern democratic ideals, yet we know relatively little about the extent to which governments reflect the demographics of the populations they serve. Combining the novel Paths to Power dataset on the backgrounds of cabinet members worldwide with matched population data, we measure representativeness on five key dimensions: gender, age, education, occupational class, and geographic origin. We propose a theoretical model to explain the degree of representation in government and focus on two explanations, namely economic development and democratization. We first document global and historical levels of representativeness. Next, we compile covariates from the literature and use machine learning methods to show that GDP per capita and experience with democracy are the best predictors of representativeness. We then show that wealthier, more democratic countries have more representative governments and, crucially, that as countries grow richer and more democratic, their governments become more representative in turn.
- 16 July 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 68-86
Teaching autocracy to undergraduate versus graduate students
- 16 July 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 68-86
Teaching autocracy to undergraduate versus graduate students
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 5 May 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 79 (3) , 921-935
Governing for Growth? Economic Performance and Finance Minister Survival in Democracies and Autocracies
Are the highest-ranking public officials rewarded for good performance? Using the case of finance ministers, we argue that this depends on the type of regime. Democratic leaders have incentives to retain high-performing finance ministers because they are accountable to the population through free and fair elections. In the absence of free and fair elections, autocrats face opposing incentives. While growth stabilizes the regime, a high-performing minister of finance can also be a potential rival. Moreover, autocratic finance ministers will, to a higher degree than democratic, be judged on their ability to enrich the leader rather than creating growth. As a result, autocrats reward finance ministers less for economic growth than democrats. Using data on over 2,800 finance ministers in the period 1966–2021, we demonstrate a close link between economic growth and the retention of finance ministers in democracies but not in autocracies. The findings indicate that democracies are better at fostering and rewarding competence at the highest level of political office, speaking to the merits of democracy relative to autocracy.
- 5 May 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 79 (3) , 921-935
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessGoverning for Growth? Economic Performance and Finance Minister Survival in Democracies and Autocracies
Are the highest-ranking public officials rewarded for good performance? Using the case of finance ministers, we argue that this depends on the type of regime. Democratic leaders have incentives to retain high-performing finance ministers because they are accountable to the population through free and fair elections. In the absence of free and fair elections, autocrats face opposing incentives. While growth stabilizes the regime, a high-performing minister of finance can also be a potential rival. Moreover, autocratic finance ministers will, to a higher degree than democratic, be judged on their ability to enrich the leader rather than creating growth. As a result, autocrats reward finance ministers less for economic growth than democrats. Using data on over 2,800 finance ministers in the period 1966–2021, we demonstrate a close link between economic growth and the retention of finance ministers in democracies but not in autocracies. The findings indicate that democracies are better at fostering and rewarding competence at the highest level of political office, speaking to the merits of democracy relative to autocracy.
- Open Access
- 20 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e129
Paths to Power: A New Dataset on the Social Profile of Governments
Systematized information on the background of policymakers across long time-periods and all geographical regions of the world remains limited. In this article, we introduce Paths to Power (PtP), a new dataset on the educational, occupational, and social background of cabinet members. PtP contains detailed individual-level data – whenever identifiable – on 44,789 cabinet members across 141 countries in the period 1966-2021. This comprehensive dataset will be of relevance to numerous scholars (and others) interested in understanding politics and recent political history, and it enables a wide variety of new, empirically founded insights. We first present how the data is created and then discuss data quality and limitations. Next, we show how PtP is useful for researchers in diverse fields, including comparative politics, political sociology, gender studies, public administration, and international relations.
- 20 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e129
Open AccessPaths to Power: A New Dataset on the Social Profile of Governments
Systematized information on the background of policymakers across long time-periods and all geographical regions of the world remains limited. In this article, we introduce Paths to Power (PtP), a new dataset on the educational, occupational, and social background of cabinet members. PtP contains detailed individual-level data – whenever identifiable – on 44,789 cabinet members across 141 countries in the period 1966-2021. This comprehensive dataset will be of relevance to numerous scholars (and others) interested in understanding politics and recent political history, and it enables a wide variety of new, empirically founded insights. We first present how the data is created and then discuss data quality and limitations. Next, we show how PtP is useful for researchers in diverse fields, including comparative politics, political sociology, gender studies, public administration, and international relations.
- Open Access
- 16 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in npj Climate Action
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-8
Dedicated climate ministries help to reduce carbon emissions
Several countries have introduced dedicated national climate ministries in the last two decades. However, we know little about the consequences of these ministries. We demonstrate that the introduction of climate ministries helps to reduce carbon emissions. A difference-in-differences analysis of a global sample of countries reveals robust and statistically significant evidence that introducing a dedicated climate ministry lowers carbon emissions substantially. At the same time, establishing such climate ministries does not significantly influence the introduction of new climate policies. This indicates that climate ministries primarily amplify climate action by improving the effectiveness of the governmental measures taken rather than by increasing the number of climate policies themselves.
- 16 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in npj Climate Action
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-8
Open AccessDedicated climate ministries help to reduce carbon emissions
Several countries have introduced dedicated national climate ministries in the last two decades. However, we know little about the consequences of these ministries. We demonstrate that the introduction of climate ministries helps to reduce carbon emissions. A difference-in-differences analysis of a global sample of countries reveals robust and statistically significant evidence that introducing a dedicated climate ministry lowers carbon emissions substantially. At the same time, establishing such climate ministries does not significantly influence the introduction of new climate policies. This indicates that climate ministries primarily amplify climate action by improving the effectiveness of the governmental measures taken rather than by increasing the number of climate policies themselves.
- Open Access
- 17 April 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 31 (8) , 1669-1694
Authoritarian multiparty governments
In 2020, almost 50% of dictatorships included multiple parties in their government. Existing research has not studied this systematically, and generally considers granting outsiders access to ministerial cabinets a risky and costly strategy. This article provides evidence of authoritarian multiparty governments (AMGs) being a global and increasingly common phenomena. We argue that AMGs are a power-sharing strategy whereby autocrats co-opt outsiders through cabinet appointments to divide the opposition and consolidate their rule. Using individual-level data on ministers' partisan affiliation in autocracies worldwide, we show that AMGs positively correlate with ethnic divides, civil war, and “democratic” institutions, and we use new measures of power sharing to demonstrate that coalition partners often exert a real influence through their ministerial mandates. Our findings suggest that AMG is an overlooked survival strategy for autocrats and highlight the need to focus more on the organization and composition of the political executive in autocracies.
- 17 April 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 31 (8) , 1669-1694
Open AccessAuthoritarian multiparty governments
In 2020, almost 50% of dictatorships included multiple parties in their government. Existing research has not studied this systematically, and generally considers granting outsiders access to ministerial cabinets a risky and costly strategy. This article provides evidence of authoritarian multiparty governments (AMGs) being a global and increasingly common phenomena. We argue that AMGs are a power-sharing strategy whereby autocrats co-opt outsiders through cabinet appointments to divide the opposition and consolidate their rule. Using individual-level data on ministers' partisan affiliation in autocracies worldwide, we show that AMGs positively correlate with ethnic divides, civil war, and “democratic” institutions, and we use new measures of power sharing to demonstrate that coalition partners often exert a real influence through their ministerial mandates. Our findings suggest that AMG is an overlooked survival strategy for autocrats and highlight the need to focus more on the organization and composition of the political executive in autocracies.
- Open Access
- 20 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (2) , 724-743
Consolidating Progress: The Selection of Female Ministers in Autocracies and Democracies
Though governments historically have been a men’s club, women are increasingly gaining access. We argue that democratic institutions are important drivers of women’s inclusion in government. This stems from the rationales of autocratic versus democratic leaders when selecting ministers. Autocrats fear a coup by inner-circle elites, who are mostly men, incentivizing them to assign ministerial positions as co-optation. In contrast, democratic leaders are accountable to the citizenry through elections and must satisfy increasing demands for gender equality. Furthermore, we argue that it is historical experience with democracy that matters, rather than the level, as it takes time to create an even playing field, change attitudes, and generate trust in democracy. To support this, we contribute with the first study using the most comprehensive dataset, WhoGov, on women’s access to cabinets. Overall, we show that democracy is a process that gradually enables women to enter the highest echelons of power.
- 20 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (2) , 724-743
Open AccessConsolidating Progress: The Selection of Female Ministers in Autocracies and Democracies
Though governments historically have been a men’s club, women are increasingly gaining access. We argue that democratic institutions are important drivers of women’s inclusion in government. This stems from the rationales of autocratic versus democratic leaders when selecting ministers. Autocrats fear a coup by inner-circle elites, who are mostly men, incentivizing them to assign ministerial positions as co-optation. In contrast, democratic leaders are accountable to the citizenry through elections and must satisfy increasing demands for gender equality. Furthermore, we argue that it is historical experience with democracy that matters, rather than the level, as it takes time to create an even playing field, change attitudes, and generate trust in democracy. To support this, we contribute with the first study using the most comprehensive dataset, WhoGov, on women’s access to cabinets. Overall, we show that democracy is a process that gradually enables women to enter the highest echelons of power.
- Top Cited Papers
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 114 (4) , 1366-1374
Who Governs? A New Global Dataset on Members of Cabinets
Who governs? This is one of the most fundamental questions in political science. Despite its importance, there is currently no global dataset on governing elites over a long period. This article presents a novel dataset, WhoGov, which contains yearly data on members of cabinets in 177 countries during the period 1966–2016, making it the largest of its kind. We first present how the dataset was created and validate it by matching this data against existing data. We then demonstrate how the data can be used to gain new insights into diverse fields such as the study of autocracies, gender studies, the study of regime types, and government formation. We expect that this dataset will be an invaluable resource for both comparativists and country experts.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 114 (4) , 1366-1374
Top Cited PapersWho Governs? A New Global Dataset on Members of Cabinets
Who governs? This is one of the most fundamental questions in political science. Despite its importance, there is currently no global dataset on governing elites over a long period. This article presents a novel dataset, WhoGov, which contains yearly data on members of cabinets in 177 countries during the period 1966–2016, making it the largest of its kind. We first present how the dataset was created and validate it by matching this data against existing data. We then demonstrate how the data can be used to gain new insights into diverse fields such as the study of autocracies, gender studies, the study of regime types, and government formation. We expect that this dataset will be an invaluable resource for both comparativists and country experts.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration in Journal of Behavioral Public Administration
- Vol. 3 (2)
Do Survey Estimates of the Public’s Compliance with COVID-19 Regulations Suffer from Social Desirability Bias?
The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments to instate a large number of restrictions on and recommendations for citizens’ behavior. One widely used tool for measuring compliance with these strictures are nationally representative surveys that ask citizens to self-report their behavior. But if respondents avoid disclosing socially undesirable behaviors, such as not complying with government strictures in a public health crisis, estimates of compliance will be biased upwards. To assess the magnitude of this problem, this study compares measures of compliance from direct questions to those estimated from list-experiments - a response technique that allows respondents to report illicit behaviors without individual-level detection. Implementing the list-experiment in two separate surveys of Danish citizens (n>5,000), we find no evidence that citizens under-report non-compliant behavior. We therefore conclude that survey estimates of compliance with COVID-19 regulations do not suffer from social desirability bias.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration in Journal of Behavioral Public Administration
- Vol. 3 (2)
Open AccessDo Survey Estimates of the Public’s Compliance with COVID-19 Regulations Suffer from Social Desirability Bias?
The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments to instate a large number of restrictions on and recommendations for citizens’ behavior. One widely used tool for measuring compliance with these strictures are nationally representative surveys that ask citizens to self-report their behavior. But if respondents avoid disclosing socially undesirable behaviors, such as not complying with government strictures in a public health crisis, estimates of compliance will be biased upwards. To assess the magnitude of this problem, this study compares measures of compliance from direct questions to those estimated from list-experiments - a response technique that allows respondents to report illicit behaviors without individual-level detection. Implementing the list-experiment in two separate surveys of Danish citizens (n>5,000), we find no evidence that citizens under-report non-compliant behavior. We therefore conclude that survey estimates of compliance with COVID-19 regulations do not suffer from social desirability bias.
- Open Access
- 8 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Do Survey Estimates of the Public’s Compliance with COVID-19 Regulations Suffer from Social Desirability Bias?
The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments to instate a large number of restrictions on and recommendations for citizens’ behavior. One of our best tools for measuring compliance with these strictures are nationally representative surveys that ask citizens to self-report their behavior. But if respondents’ avoid disclosing socially undesirable behaviors, such as not complying with government strictures in a public health crisis, estimates of compliance will be biased upwards. To assess the magnitude of this problem, this study compares measures of compliance from direct questions to those estimated from list-experiments - a response technique that allows respondents to report illicit behaviors without individual-level detection. Implementing the list-experiment in two separate surveys of Danish citizens (n>5,000), we find no evidence that citizens under-report non-compliant behavior. We therefore conclude that survey estimates of compliance with COVID-19 regulations do not suffer from social desirability bias
- 8 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDo Survey Estimates of the Public’s Compliance with COVID-19 Regulations Suffer from Social Desirability Bias?
The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments to instate a large number of restrictions on and recommendations for citizens’ behavior. One of our best tools for measuring compliance with these strictures are nationally representative surveys that ask citizens to self-report their behavior. But if respondents’ avoid disclosing socially undesirable behaviors, such as not complying with government strictures in a public health crisis, estimates of compliance will be biased upwards. To assess the magnitude of this problem, this study compares measures of compliance from direct questions to those estimated from list-experiments - a response technique that allows respondents to report illicit behaviors without individual-level detection. Implementing the list-experiment in two separate surveys of Danish citizens (n>5,000), we find no evidence that citizens under-report non-compliant behavior. We therefore conclude that survey estimates of compliance with COVID-19 regulations do not suffer from social desirability bias