Jinlong Zhao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jinlong Zhao has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Guang Li
Smith School of Business, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada
2 shared publications Zhong-Zhong Jiang
2 shared publications- Zhong-Zhong Jiang
Northeastern University
2 shared publications Arcan Nalca
1 shared publicationMinghe Sun
1 shared publication- Ying-Ju Chen
School of Business and Management (ISOM) The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Hong Kong China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Interplay Between Showrooming and Social Learning Information Externalities
This paper examines how showrooming (SR) and social learning (SL) interact to shape dynamic pricing and competition between a brick-and-mortar store and an online retailer. We take SR and SL as two distinct but interdependent information externalities. Showrooming creates a horizontal information externality by allowing consumers to acquire product information in one channel and purchase in another, whereas social learning creates a vertical information externality by allowing later consumers to learn from reviews generated by earlier buyers. Using a two-period game, we show that the interaction between these externalities fundamentally changes the strategic role of the online retailer's first-period price, which simultaneously influences current channel competition, the composition of early buyers, and the generation of future product information. Showrooming may intensify or soften competition depending on the brick-andmortar store's price, thereby inducing the online retailer to lower or raise its prices. Social learning further creates incentives for both decreasing-and increasing-price strategies because the online retailer can use its initial price to influence early purchases and, consequently, the availability of reviews for future consumers. Contrary to the conventional view that social learning intensifies competition, we show that, in the presence of showrooming, it can soften competitive pressure by supporting higher prices and may create a win-win outcome for both retailers. We also examine the implications for consumer welfare and show that the value of social learning depends critically on the competitive environment in which it operates. Extensions incorporating general consumer distributions, price matching, and multirooming demonstrate the robustness of the main insights and identify mechanisms through which brick-and-mortar retailers can mitigate the adverse effects of showrooming. Overall, the analysis shows that the coexistence of horizontal and vertical information externalities fundamentally alters pricing incentives, competition, profitability, and welfare.
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Interplay Between Showrooming and Social Learning Information Externalities
This paper examines how showrooming (SR) and social learning (SL) interact to shape dynamic pricing and competition between a brick-and-mortar store and an online retailer. We take SR and SL as two distinct but interdependent information externalities. Showrooming creates a horizontal information externality by allowing consumers to acquire product information in one channel and purchase in another, whereas social learning creates a vertical information externality by allowing later consumers to learn from reviews generated by earlier buyers. Using a two-period game, we show that the interaction between these externalities fundamentally changes the strategic role of the online retailer's first-period price, which simultaneously influences current channel competition, the composition of early buyers, and the generation of future product information. Showrooming may intensify or soften competition depending on the brick-andmortar store's price, thereby inducing the online retailer to lower or raise its prices. Social learning further creates incentives for both decreasing-and increasing-price strategies because the online retailer can use its initial price to influence early purchases and, consequently, the availability of reviews for future consumers. Contrary to the conventional view that social learning intensifies competition, we show that, in the presence of showrooming, it can soften competitive pressure by supporting higher prices and may create a win-win outcome for both retailers. We also examine the implications for consumer welfare and show that the value of social learning depends critically on the competitive environment in which it operates. Extensions incorporating general consumer distributions, price matching, and multirooming demonstrate the robustness of the main insights and identify mechanisms through which brick-and-mortar retailers can mitigate the adverse effects of showrooming. Overall, the analysis shows that the coexistence of horizontal and vertical information externalities fundamentally alters pricing incentives, competition, profitability, and welfare.
- 10 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (10) , 3063-3081
Pricing in the Presence of Strategic Consumers and Social Learning Under Contingent Pricing and Price Guarantee
Purchasing new experience products or services often involves significant quality uncertainty for both consumers and firms. Social learning through online reviews helps reduce this uncertainty but exacerbates strategic waiting, as consumers delay purchases to gain more information. This paper examines the impact of social learning on firms’ pricing policies in the presence of strategic consumers under two widely adopted schemes: Contingent pricing and price guarantee. We find that while social learning always benefits the firm, it enables the price guarantee scheme to outperform contingent pricing in terms of profitability for highly patient consumers, which would not be possible without social learning. Notably, social learning drives a range of pricing patterns, even making price skimming optimal under price guarantee for highly patient consumers, as high initial prices combined with markdowns effectively alleviate strategic waiting, enhancing review outcomes and the firm’s profitability. Additionally, social learning always enables the firm to extract greater consumer surplus for impatient consumers under price guarantee. In contrast, social learning under contingent pricing consistently benefits consumers and can achieve win-win outcomes when consumers are moderately patient. Our extensions validate the robustness of these findings under different assumptions, including fully rational consumers and partially forward-looking firms. In particular, a partially forward-looking firm can achieve win-win outcomes with social learning under price guarantee, expanding its practical applicability. This study provides novel insights into the role of social learning in shaping pricing strategies, highlighting its implications for firm profitability and consumer welfare in markets influenced by review dynamics and strategic consumers.
- 10 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (10) , 3063-3081
Pricing in the Presence of Strategic Consumers and Social Learning Under Contingent Pricing and Price Guarantee
Purchasing new experience products or services often involves significant quality uncertainty for both consumers and firms. Social learning through online reviews helps reduce this uncertainty but exacerbates strategic waiting, as consumers delay purchases to gain more information. This paper examines the impact of social learning on firms’ pricing policies in the presence of strategic consumers under two widely adopted schemes: Contingent pricing and price guarantee. We find that while social learning always benefits the firm, it enables the price guarantee scheme to outperform contingent pricing in terms of profitability for highly patient consumers, which would not be possible without social learning. Notably, social learning drives a range of pricing patterns, even making price skimming optimal under price guarantee for highly patient consumers, as high initial prices combined with markdowns effectively alleviate strategic waiting, enhancing review outcomes and the firm’s profitability. Additionally, social learning always enables the firm to extract greater consumer surplus for impatient consumers under price guarantee. In contrast, social learning under contingent pricing consistently benefits consumers and can achieve win-win outcomes when consumers are moderately patient. Our extensions validate the robustness of these findings under different assumptions, including fully rational consumers and partially forward-looking firms. In particular, a partially forward-looking firm can achieve win-win outcomes with social learning under price guarantee, expanding its practical applicability. This study provides novel insights into the role of social learning in shaping pricing strategies, highlighting its implications for firm profitability and consumer welfare in markets influenced by review dynamics and strategic consumers.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2021
- Published by KEAI Publishing in Data Science and Management
- Vol. 1 (1) , 38-47
A review on the gray market business using a data-driven approach
- 1 March 2021
- Published by KEAI Publishing in Data Science and Management
- Vol. 1 (1) , 38-47
Open AccessA review on the gray market business using a data-driven approach