GPGeorgios Portokalidis

Georgios Portokalidis

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Georgios Portokalidis has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    IBTpoline: Flexible, Robust, and Intel IBT-compliant System Call Hooking

    by Alexander J. Gaidis, Ioulios Patmanidis, Isabelle Shapiro, Georgios Portokalidis, Alexios Voulimeneas, Vasileios P. Kemerlis

  • Open Access

    Lessons Learned from Five Years of Artifact Evaluations at EuroSys

    by Daniele Cono D'ELia, Thaleia Dimitra Doudali, Cristiano Giuffrida, Miguel Matos, Mathias Payer, Solal Pirelli, Georgios Portokalidis, Valerio Schiavoni, Salvatore Signorello, Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner


  • Open Access

    rustc++: Facilitating Advanced Analysis of Rust Code

    by Antonis Louka, Georgios Portokalidis, Elias Athanasopoulos

  • Open Access

    Evaluating the Effect of Improved Indirect Call Resolution on System Call Debloating

    by Vidya Lakshmi Rajagopalan, Georgios Portokalidis

    Applications use only a small set of the system calls made available by the operating system. Modifying programs to debloat or disallow unused system calls is a mitigation technique that can both reduce kernel attack surface and attacker capabilities for when an application gets compromised. To achieve this, existing systems generate a sound function call graph of the application and its dependent libraries and based on that, determine the minimum set of system calls used. Techniques that refine the call graph by determining the possible targets of indirect function calls have, in theory, the potential to also improve system-call debloating. In this paper, we evaluate the effects of state-of-the-art indirect calls refinement technique and we find that even though it improves the application call graph, it does not have any significant effect on system call policies. In contrast, we find that standard C library (libc) being used plays a more important role on restricting system calls. Context-sensitive and path-sensitive call graph refinement on libc could bring benefits to system call debloating.

  • Open Access

    On the Dual Nature of Necessity in Use of Rust Unsafe Code

    by Yuchen Zhang, Ashish Kundu, Georgios Portokalidis, Jun Xu

    Rust offers both safety guarantees and high performance. Thus, it has gained significant popularity in the industry. To extend its capability as a system programming language, Rust allows unsafe blocks where the execution has low-level controls but loses the safety guarantees. In principle, unsafe blocks should only be used when necessary. However, preliminary evidence shows a different situation. This paper aims to establish a deeper view of this matter and bring endeavors toward improvement. We first present a study on the use of unsafe Rust in practice. We manually inspected 5946 unsafe blocks from 140 popular libraries and applications, focusing on whether the use of unsafe code is necessary (precisely, whether they have safe alternatives). The study unveils hundreds of instances of unnecessary unsafe Rust code and provides a taxonomy together with detailed analyses. These results complement our understanding and offer insights for the community to make a change. Following the study, we further summarize nine popular patterns of unnecessary unsafe blocks and design an IDE plugin to auto-suggest their safe alternatives. Applied to 140 buggy unsafe blocks from the RustSec Advisory Database, the plugin identifies and offers safe versions to remove the bug for 28.6% of all cases.


  • Open Access

    SysPart: Automated Temporal System Call Filtering for Binaries

    by Vidya Lakshmi Rajagopalan, Konstantinos Kleftogiorgos, Enes Göktas, Jun Xu, Georgios Portokalidis

    Restricting the system calls available to applications reduces the attack surface of the kernel and limits the functionality available to compromised applications. Recent approaches automatically identify the system calls required by programs to block unneeded ones. For servers, they even consider different phases of execution to tighten restrictions after initialization completes. However, they require access to the source code for applications and libraries, depend on users identifying when the server transitions from initialization to serving clients, or do not account for dynamically-loaded libraries. This paper introduces SYSPART, an automatic system-call filtering system designed for binary-only server programs that addresses the above limitations. Using a novel algorithm that combines static and dynamic analysis, SYSPART identifies the serving phases of all working threads of a server. Static analysis is used to compute the system calls required during the various serving phases in a sound manner, and dynamic observations are only used to complement static resolution of dynamically-loaded libraries when necessary. We evaluated SYSPART using six popular servers on x86-64 Linux to demonstrate its effectiveness in automatically identifying serving phases, generating accurate system-call filters, and mitigating attacks. Our results show that SYSPART outperforms prior binary-only approaches and performs comparably to source-code approaches.


  • Open Access

    Eliminating Vulnerabilities by Disabling Unwanted Functionality in Binary Programs

    by Mohamad Mansouri, Jun Xu, Georgios Portokalidis

    Driven by application diversification and market needs, software systems are integrating new features rapidly. However, this “feature creep” can compromise software security, as more code carries the risk of more vulnerabilities. This paper presents a system for disabling features activated by common input types, using a component called F-detector to detect feature-associated program control flow branches. The system includes a second component called F-blocker to disable features without disrupting application continuity. It does so by treating unwanted features as unexpected errors and leveraging error virtualization to recover execution, by redirecting it to appropriate existing error handling code. We implemented and evaluated the system on the Linux platform using 145 features from 9 programs, and results show that it can detect and disable all features with few errors, hence, outperforming previous works in terms of vulnerability mitigation through debloating.