Georgios Portokalidis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Georgios Portokalidis has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jun Xu
Kahlert School of Computing, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA
3 shared publications - Vidya Lakshmi Rajagopalan
Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, USA
2 shared publications - Alexander J. Gaidis
Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
1 shared publication - Alexios Voulimeneas
TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands
1 shared publication - Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner
Intel Labs, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication - Antonis Louka
University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1682-1699
IBTpoline: Flexible, Robust, and Intel IBT-compliant System Call Hooking
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1682-1699
Open AccessIBTpoline: Flexible, Robust, and Intel IBT-compliant System Call Hooking
- Open Access
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 108-120
Lessons Learned from Five Years of Artifact Evaluations at EuroSys
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 108-120
Open AccessLessons Learned from Five Years of Artifact Evaluations at EuroSys
- Open Access
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 63-69
rustc++: Facilitating Advanced Analysis of Rust Code
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 63-69
Open Accessrustc++: Facilitating Advanced Analysis of Rust Code
- Open Access
- 14 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Evaluating the Effect of Improved Indirect Call Resolution on System Call Debloating
Applications use only a small set of the system calls made available by the operating system. Modifying programs to debloat or disallow unused system calls is a mitigation technique that can both reduce kernel attack surface and attacker capabilities for when an application gets compromised. To achieve this, existing systems generate a sound function call graph of the application and its dependent libraries and based on that, determine the minimum set of system calls used. Techniques that refine the call graph by determining the possible targets of indirect function calls have, in theory, the potential to also improve system-call debloating. In this paper, we evaluate the effects of state-of-the-art indirect calls refinement technique and we find that even though it improves the application call graph, it does not have any significant effect on system call policies. In contrast, we find that standard C library (libc) being used plays a more important role on restricting system calls. Context-sensitive and path-sensitive call graph refinement on libc could bring benefits to system call debloating.
- 14 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Open AccessEvaluating the Effect of Improved Indirect Call Resolution on System Call Debloating
Applications use only a small set of the system calls made available by the operating system. Modifying programs to debloat or disallow unused system calls is a mitigation technique that can both reduce kernel attack surface and attacker capabilities for when an application gets compromised. To achieve this, existing systems generate a sound function call graph of the application and its dependent libraries and based on that, determine the minimum set of system calls used. Techniques that refine the call graph by determining the possible targets of indirect function calls have, in theory, the potential to also improve system-call debloating. In this paper, we evaluate the effects of state-of-the-art indirect calls refinement technique and we find that even though it improves the application call graph, it does not have any significant effect on system call policies. In contrast, we find that standard C library (libc) being used plays a more important role on restricting system calls. Context-sensitive and path-sensitive call graph refinement on libc could bring benefits to system call debloating.
- Open Access
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2032-2037
On the Dual Nature of Necessity in Use of Rust Unsafe Code
Rust offers both safety guarantees and high performance. Thus, it has gained significant popularity in the industry. To extend its capability as a system programming language, Rust allows unsafe blocks where the execution has low-level controls but loses the safety guarantees. In principle, unsafe blocks should only be used when necessary. However, preliminary evidence shows a different situation. This paper aims to establish a deeper view of this matter and bring endeavors toward improvement. We first present a study on the use of unsafe Rust in practice. We manually inspected 5946 unsafe blocks from 140 popular libraries and applications, focusing on whether the use of unsafe code is necessary (precisely, whether they have safe alternatives). The study unveils hundreds of instances of unnecessary unsafe Rust code and provides a taxonomy together with detailed analyses. These results complement our understanding and offer insights for the community to make a change. Following the study, we further summarize nine popular patterns of unnecessary unsafe blocks and design an IDE plugin to auto-suggest their safe alternatives. Applied to 140 buggy unsafe blocks from the RustSec Advisory Database, the plugin identifies and offers safe versions to remove the bug for 28.6% of all cases.
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2032-2037
Open AccessOn the Dual Nature of Necessity in Use of Rust Unsafe Code
Rust offers both safety guarantees and high performance. Thus, it has gained significant popularity in the industry. To extend its capability as a system programming language, Rust allows unsafe blocks where the execution has low-level controls but loses the safety guarantees. In principle, unsafe blocks should only be used when necessary. However, preliminary evidence shows a different situation. This paper aims to establish a deeper view of this matter and bring endeavors toward improvement. We first present a study on the use of unsafe Rust in practice. We manually inspected 5946 unsafe blocks from 140 popular libraries and applications, focusing on whether the use of unsafe code is necessary (precisely, whether they have safe alternatives). The study unveils hundreds of instances of unnecessary unsafe Rust code and provides a taxonomy together with detailed analyses. These results complement our understanding and offer insights for the community to make a change. Following the study, we further summarize nine popular patterns of unnecessary unsafe blocks and design an IDE plugin to auto-suggest their safe alternatives. Applied to 140 buggy unsafe blocks from the RustSec Advisory Database, the plugin identifies and offers safe versions to remove the bug for 28.6% of all cases.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1979-1993
SysPart: Automated Temporal System Call Filtering for Binaries
Restricting the system calls available to applications reduces the attack surface of the kernel and limits the functionality available to compromised applications. Recent approaches automatically identify the system calls required by programs to block unneeded ones. For servers, they even consider different phases of execution to tighten restrictions after initialization completes. However, they require access to the source code for applications and libraries, depend on users identifying when the server transitions from initialization to serving clients, or do not account for dynamically-loaded libraries. This paper introduces SYSPART, an automatic system-call filtering system designed for binary-only server programs that addresses the above limitations. Using a novel algorithm that combines static and dynamic analysis, SYSPART identifies the serving phases of all working threads of a server. Static analysis is used to compute the system calls required during the various serving phases in a sound manner, and dynamic observations are only used to complement static resolution of dynamically-loaded libraries when necessary. We evaluated SYSPART using six popular servers on x86-64 Linux to demonstrate its effectiveness in automatically identifying serving phases, generating accurate system-call filters, and mitigating attacks. Our results show that SYSPART outperforms prior binary-only approaches and performs comparably to source-code approaches.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1979-1993
Open AccessSysPart: Automated Temporal System Call Filtering for Binaries
Restricting the system calls available to applications reduces the attack surface of the kernel and limits the functionality available to compromised applications. Recent approaches automatically identify the system calls required by programs to block unneeded ones. For servers, they even consider different phases of execution to tighten restrictions after initialization completes. However, they require access to the source code for applications and libraries, depend on users identifying when the server transitions from initialization to serving clients, or do not account for dynamically-loaded libraries. This paper introduces SYSPART, an automatic system-call filtering system designed for binary-only server programs that addresses the above limitations. Using a novel algorithm that combines static and dynamic analysis, SYSPART identifies the serving phases of all working threads of a server. Static analysis is used to compute the system calls required during the various serving phases in a sound manner, and dynamic observations are only used to complement static resolution of dynamically-loaded libraries when necessary. We evaluated SYSPART using six popular servers on x86-64 Linux to demonstrate its effectiveness in automatically identifying serving phases, generating accurate system-call filters, and mitigating attacks. Our results show that SYSPART outperforms prior binary-only approaches and performs comparably to source-code approaches.
- Open Access
- 10 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 259-273
Eliminating Vulnerabilities by Disabling Unwanted Functionality in Binary Programs
Driven by application diversification and market needs, software systems are integrating new features rapidly. However, this “feature creep” can compromise software security, as more code carries the risk of more vulnerabilities. This paper presents a system for disabling features activated by common input types, using a component called F-detector to detect feature-associated program control flow branches. The system includes a second component called F-blocker to disable features without disrupting application continuity. It does so by treating unwanted features as unexpected errors and leveraging error virtualization to recover execution, by redirecting it to appropriate existing error handling code. We implemented and evaluated the system on the Linux platform using 145 features from 9 programs, and results show that it can detect and disable all features with few errors, hence, outperforming previous works in terms of vulnerability mitigation through debloating.
- 10 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 259-273
Open AccessEliminating Vulnerabilities by Disabling Unwanted Functionality in Binary Programs
Driven by application diversification and market needs, software systems are integrating new features rapidly. However, this “feature creep” can compromise software security, as more code carries the risk of more vulnerabilities. This paper presents a system for disabling features activated by common input types, using a component called F-detector to detect feature-associated program control flow branches. The system includes a second component called F-blocker to disable features without disrupting application continuity. It does so by treating unwanted features as unexpected errors and leveraging error virtualization to recover execution, by redirecting it to appropriate existing error handling code. We implemented and evaluated the system on the Linux platform using 145 features from 9 programs, and results show that it can detect and disable all features with few errors, hence, outperforming previous works in terms of vulnerability mitigation through debloating.