Antonis Louka
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Antonis Louka has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elias Athanasopoulos
University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
2 shared publications - Antreas Dionysiou
Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
1 shared publication - Georgios Portokalidis
IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 63-69
rustc++: Facilitating Advanced Analysis of Rust Code
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 63-69
Open Accessrustc++: Facilitating Advanced Analysis of Rust Code
- Open Access
- 22 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 8-14
Validating Memory Safety in Rust Binaries
Without depending on heavy runtime support, Rust can realize fast machine code that mitigates most of the common attacks associated with memory-corruption and can appear in all unsafe machine code developed using C/C++. Most of the work for producing machine code with security guarantees is carried out at compile-time by the Rust compiler. However, at runtime, there is no mechanism to ensure that the produced security guarantees, as computed at compile-time, are still in place. In this paper, we explore the possibilities of an attacker fabricating Rust binaries so that they are on purpose vulnerable. We show that it is possible to modify automatically, and at large scale, binaries so that certain defences, placed by the Rust compiler, are removed. We introduce a generic problem, and focus on concepts of spatial and temporal safety. Finally, we produce a validator that assesses if all checks ensuring spatial and temporal safety remain intact within a Rust binary, before executing it. Our work is a step towards validating Rust binaries at load time so that security guarantees computed at compile-time are effective at runtime.
- 22 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 8-14
Open AccessValidating Memory Safety in Rust Binaries
Without depending on heavy runtime support, Rust can realize fast machine code that mitigates most of the common attacks associated with memory-corruption and can appear in all unsafe machine code developed using C/C++. Most of the work for producing machine code with security guarantees is carried out at compile-time by the Rust compiler. However, at runtime, there is no mechanism to ensure that the produced security guarantees, as computed at compile-time, are still in place. In this paper, we explore the possibilities of an attacker fabricating Rust binaries so that they are on purpose vulnerable. We show that it is possible to modify automatically, and at large scale, binaries so that certain defences, placed by the Rust compiler, are removed. We introduce a generic problem, and focus on concepts of spatial and temporal safety. Finally, we produce a validator that assesses if all checks ensuring spatial and temporal safety remain intact within a Rust binary, before executing it. Our work is a step towards validating Rust binaries at load time so that security guarantees computed at compile-time are effective at runtime.