GPGeorge Provelengios

George Provelengios

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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George Provelengios has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Voltage Sensor Implementations for Remote Power Attacks on FPGAs

    by Shayan Moini, Aleksa Deric, Xiang Li, George Provelengios, Wayne Burleson, Russell Tessier, Daniel Holcomb

    This article presents a study of two types of on-chip FPGA voltage sensors based on ring oscillators (ROs) and time-to-digital converter (TDCs), respectively. It has previously been shown that these sensors are often used to extract side-channel information from FPGAs without physical access. The performance of the sensors is evaluated in the presence of circuits that deliberately waste power, resulting in localized voltage drops. The effects of FPGA power supply features and sensor sensitivity in detecting voltage drops in an FPGA power distribution network (PDN) are evaluated for Xilinx Artix-7, Zynq 7000, and Zynq UltraScale+ FPGAs. We show that both sensor types are able to detect supply voltage drops, and that their measurements are consistent with each other. Our findings show that TDC-based sensors are more sensitive and can detect voltage drops that are shorter in duration, while RO sensors are easier to implement because calibration is not required. Furthermore, we present a new time-interleaved TDC design that sweeps the sensor phase. The new sensor generates data that can reconstruct voltage transients on the order of tens of picoseconds.


  • Power Distribution Attacks in Multitenant FPGAs

    by George Provelengios, Daniel Holcomb, Russell Tessier

    The increased use of field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) in the cloud and embedded computing environments has led to a number of potential security risks. The sizable amount of logic resources in these devices makes them amenable to sharing across multiple untrusted tenants. However, the co-location of multiple independent circuits presents the possibility of malicious fault injection into an unsuspecting circuit. In this article, the ability of one tenant’s FPGA circuit to inject delay faults into another tenant’s application located at points across the FPGA die via deliberate supply voltage modulation is investigated. To illustrate the risks involved, a Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) encryption key extraction attack is performed by introducing delay faults in hardware via voltage manipulations. This attack does not require modification to the encryption core nor require attack activation synchronized with specific encryption operations. Our work characterizes the magnitude of on-chip voltage changes and fault injections over time in relation to the on-chip location of the malicious circuit once an attack is initiated. Strategies to identify power manipulation using low-cost monitoring circuits that can locate the source of an attack are highlighted.