Gustavo Bergantiños
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Gustavo Bergantiños has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Juan Vidal-Puga
Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa and ECOSOT, Universidade de Vigo, Vigo, Spain
13 shared publications - Jordi Massó
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica
11 shared publications - Juan D. Moreno Ternero
Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain
10 shared publications - Leticia Lorenzo
Universidade de Vigo
10 shared publications - Alejandro Neme
Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET
7 shared publications - Silvia Lorenzo-Freire
MODES Research Group, Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Computer Science, University of A Coruña, A Coruña, Spain
7 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 159, 131-143
New methods to compensate artists in music streaming platforms
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 159, 131-143
Open AccessNew methods to compensate artists in music streaming platforms
- Open Access
- 13 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Sports Economics Review
- Vol. 13
The economics of sportscast revenue sharing
- 13 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Sports Economics Review
- Vol. 13
Open AccessThe economics of sportscast revenue sharing
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 54 (2) , 1-24
Cooperative game theoretic results from the tuna fishing problem
Bergantiños et al. (2023) introduce cooperative tuna fishing games. We prove that the core of this game is not empty. We give an explicit formula for the $$\tau $$ -value. We also study the distance game associated with tuna fishing games and prove that it is a generalized big boss game. In most practical cases, the number of vessels is two or three. In these cases, the core and the core cover coincide. Moreover, we provide an explicit formula for the nucleolus.- 28 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 54 (2) , 1-24
Open AccessCooperative game theoretic results from the tuna fishing problem
Bergantiños et al. (2023) introduce cooperative tuna fishing games. We prove that the core of this game is not empty. We give an explicit formula for the $$\tau $$ -value. We also study the distance game associated with tuna fishing games and prove that it is a generalized big boss game. In most practical cases, the number of vessels is two or three. In these cases, the core and the core cover coincide. Moreover, we provide an explicit formula for the nucleolus. - Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (10) , 8319-8335
Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms
We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from subscriptions to music streaming platforms among content providers. We provide direct, axiomatic, and game-theoretical foundations for two focal (and somewhat polar) methods widely used in practice: pro rata and user centric. The former rewards artists proportionally to their number of total streams. With the latter, each user’s subscription fee is proportionally divided among the artists streamed by that user. We also provide foundations for two families of methods addressing the rising concern in the music industry to explore new streaming models that better align the interests of artists, fans, and streaming services. One of the families offers a natural compromise between the pro rata and user-centric methods. The other family generalizes the user-centric method while capturing various formalizations of incentives for artists and users. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Xunta de Galicia [Grant ED431B2022/03] and MCIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and FSE+ [Grants PID2020-113440GBI00, PID2020-115011GB-I00, and PID2023-146364NB-I00].
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (10) , 8319-8335
Top Cited PapersRevenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms
We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from subscriptions to music streaming platforms among content providers. We provide direct, axiomatic, and game-theoretical foundations for two focal (and somewhat polar) methods widely used in practice: pro rata and user centric. The former rewards artists proportionally to their number of total streams. With the latter, each user’s subscription fee is proportionally divided among the artists streamed by that user. We also provide foundations for two families of methods addressing the rising concern in the music industry to explore new streaming models that better align the interests of artists, fans, and streaming services. One of the families offers a natural compromise between the pro rata and user-centric methods. The other family generalizes the user-centric method while capturing various formalizations of incentives for artists and users. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Xunta de Galicia [Grant ED431B2022/03] and MCIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and FSE+ [Grants PID2020-113440GBI00, PID2020-115011GB-I00, and PID2023-146364NB-I00].
- Open Access
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 329 (3) , 1030-1036
Streaming problems as (multi-issue) claims problems
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 329 (3) , 1030-1036
Open AccessStreaming problems as (multi-issue) claims problems
- Open Access
- 25 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (3) , 977-988
Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game
We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection.
- 25 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (3) , 977-988
Open AccessAxiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game
We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 336 (3) , 1395-1417
Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in broadcasting problems are equal treatment of equals, weak equal treatment of equals and symmetry. We study the relationship between all impartiality axioms. Besides we combine anonymity with other axioms that have been considered in the literature. Some combinations give rise to new characterizations of well-known rules. The family of generalized split rules is characterized with anonymity, additivity and null team. The concede-and-divide rule is characterized with anonymity, additivity and essential team. Other and combinations characterize new rules that had not been considered before. We provide three characterizations in which three axioms are the same (anonymity, additivity, and order preservation) and the fourth one is different (maximum aspirations, weak upper bound, and non-negativity). Depending on the fourth axiom we obtain three different families of rules. In all of them concede-and-divide plays a central role.
- 1 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 336 (3) , 1395-1417
Open AccessAnonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in broadcasting problems are equal treatment of equals, weak equal treatment of equals and symmetry. We study the relationship between all impartiality axioms. Besides we combine anonymity with other axioms that have been considered in the literature. Some combinations give rise to new characterizations of well-known rules. The family of generalized split rules is characterized with anonymity, additivity and null team. The concede-and-divide rule is characterized with anonymity, additivity and essential team. Other and combinations characterize new rules that had not been considered before. We provide three characterizations in which three axioms are the same (anonymity, additivity, and order preservation) and the fourth one is different (maximum aspirations, weak upper bound, and non-negativity). Depending on the fourth axiom we obtain three different families of rules. In all of them concede-and-divide plays a central role.
- Open Access
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 328 (2) , 1213-1238
Broadcasting revenue sharing after cancelling sports competitions
The COVID-19 pandemic forced the partial or total cancellation of most sports competitions worldwide. Sports organizations crucially rely on revenues raised from broadcasting. How should the allocation of these revenues be modified when sports leagues are cancelled? We aim to answer that question in this paper by means of the axiomatic approach. Two extension operators (dubbed zero and leg operators, respectively) will play a major role in our analysis. We show that several combinations of axioms (formalizing ethical or strategic principles) characterize the image via those operators of two focal rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide.
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 328 (2) , 1213-1238
Open AccessBroadcasting revenue sharing after cancelling sports competitions
The COVID-19 pandemic forced the partial or total cancellation of most sports competitions worldwide. Sports organizations crucially rely on revenues raised from broadcasting. How should the allocation of these revenues be modified when sports leagues are cancelled? We aim to answer that question in this paper by means of the axiomatic approach. Two extension operators (dubbed zero and leg operators, respectively) will play a major role in our analysis. We show that several combinations of axioms (formalizing ethical or strategic principles) characterize the image via those operators of two focal rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide.
- Open Access
- 5 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 309 (1) , 306-318
Applying the Shapley value to the tuna fishery
- 5 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 309 (1) , 306-318
Open AccessApplying the Shapley value to the tuna fishery
- Open Access
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 297 (1) , 338-346
Monotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 297 (1) , 338-346
Open AccessMonotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues