Johannes Muthers
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Johannes Muthers has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kai Hüschelrath
Faculty of Business and Economics Schmalkalden University of Applied Sciences Blechhammer 9 Schmalkalden Germany
1 shared publication - Matthias Hunold
Faculty III University of Siegen Siegen Germany
1 shared publication - Sebastian Wismer
Bundeskartellamt , Bonn , Germany
1 shared publication - Ulrich Laitenberger
Telecom ParisTech; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Network Economics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 83-110
Why Do Platforms Charge Proportional Fees? Commitment and Seller Participation
This paper deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical two-part tariffs only as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, some products that are not known to the platform operator will not be offered at all. We find that revenue-based fees lower the platform operator’s incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, which may explain why several trade platforms indeed charge proportional fees.
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Network Economics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 83-110
Open AccessWhy Do Platforms Charge Proportional Fees? Commitment and Seller Participation
This paper deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical two-part tariffs only as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, some products that are not known to the platform operator will not be offered at all. We find that revenue-based fees lower the platform operator’s incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, which may explain why several trade platforms indeed charge proportional fees.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (4) , 737-779
Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence*
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (4) , 737-779
Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence*